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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, people have thought of zoning as a means of con-
trolling physical aspects of the urban environment. Indeed, over the
years zoning has frequently been viewed as a method of "nuisance con-
trol"-the device that protects a homeowner from having a glue fac-
tory, or some other noxious use, locate next door. There is a good deal
of justification for this widely held view.
Although a number of local regulatory efforts around the turn of
the century resembled zoning, the building zone resolution of New
York City, passed in 1916, "constituted the first comprehensive zoning
of height, area, and use in this country."' The individuals who brought
comprehensive zoning to New York City were deeply concerned with
controlling the negative externalities accompanying various urban land
uses. In particular, the skyscraper, with its propensity to make "dark
canyons of narrow streets,"' 2 was identified as an architectural villain
that could create fire hazards, foster crowding and panic should a catas-
trophe occur, and threaten public health by shutting out light, thus con-
tributing to eyestrain and the spread of tuberculosis. 3
The zoning pioneers also sought the stabilization of neighbor-
hoods with a view to protection of property values. In making the case
foi zoning, they wrote of apartments and retail uses invading residen-
tial ditricts while, in turn, "bright business streets would be invaded by
1. E. BASSETr, ZONING 23 (1940 ed.).
2. Id. at 24.
3. See S. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 153-54 (1969).
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factories."'4 With its apparent ability to separate incompatible land
uses, zoning appeared a good means of protecting property values.
Courts also thought of zoning in terms of its contribution to the
improvement of the physical environment during these early years, as
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.5 illustrates. In Euclid the
Supreme Court considered the constitutional validity of comprehensive
zoning for the first time. In arriving at its decision the Court looked to
the common law of nuisance, not to delimit the boundaries of the zon-
ing power, "but for the helpful aid of its analogies."' 6 The Justices
identified the most contentious aspect of the Euclid scheme--the crea-
tion of a residential classification which excluded not only business and
industrial uses, but apartment buildings as well. In upholding this re-
striction, the Court described in terms of physical impact how the pres-
ence of a multiple-family structure could lead to a deterioration in
developmental quality:
[Tihe coming of one apartment house is followed by others, interfer-
ing by their height and bulk with the free circulation of air and
monopolizing the rays of the sun[,] ... bringing ... increased traf-
fic and business,. . . depriving children of the privilege of quiet and
open spaces for play, . . . until, finally, the residential character of
the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of detached resi-
dences are utterly destroyed. Under these circumstances, apartment
houses, which in a different environment would not only be entirely
unobjectionable but highly desirable, come very near to being
nuisances.7
Not only did the judiciary usually think of zoning as a means of
ordering the urban environment to reduce negative externalities; some
courts took the position that zoning ordinances should not regulate
anything but the physical aspects of land use.8 Nevertheless, over the
years both courts and commentators have noted that, like it or not, land
use restrictions apparently aimed at physical concerns alone can have
profound socioeconomic implications.
4. E. BASSETr, ZONING 315-16 (Nat'l Municipal League Tech. Pamphlet Series No. 5, rev.
1922).
5. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
6. Id. at 387.
7. Id. at 394-95.
8. For instance, Justice Frederick Hall of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in a dissent
which has since become famous for other reasons, stated that zoning is "land use control byphysi-
cal planning to bring about physical results" and "is not a device to be used to accomplish any
and all purportedly desirable social results." Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 261, 181
A.2d 129, 145 (1962) (emphasis in original), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963).
Similar opinions have appeared in other cases. See, eg., Central Management Co. v. Town Bd.,
47 Misc. 2d 385, 262 N.Y.S.2d 728, a f'dmem., 24 A.D.2d 881, 264 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1965); Board of
Supervisors v. DeGroff Enters., 214 Va. 235, 238, 198 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1973).
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The capacity for local ordinances dealing exclusively with physical
standards to dictate, albeit indirectly, who may live where has appeared
most clearly in "exclusionary zoning." Such land use controls are
"those which interfere seriously with the availability of housing for
low- and moderate-income people in areas where such housing is much
needed." 9 By manipulating restrictions on matters such as lot size, lot
width, building size, or the number of bedrooms in multiple-family
units, or by excluding mobile homes or multiple-family structures, a
municipality can make housing within its borders too expensive for
low- and moderate-income groups. Exclusionary zoning has served
goals that courts'0 and commentators"1 have identified as improper.
For instance, zoning ordinances have separated housing for working-
class families from industrial job opportunities, 12 and barred racial mi-
norities from communities to the extent that a greater proportion of
these groups are forced into the lower income levels.13
Even in the earliest years of the institution some people expressed
concern that zoning could effect profound socioeconomic, including ex-
clusionary, results. The district court's opinion in Euclid provides an
apt example: Judge Westenhaver found it a "plain truth" that the vil-
9. 2 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 64.01, at 666 (1974).
10. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Pascack Ass'n v. Mayor of Washington, 74 N.J. 470,
379 A.2d 6 (1977); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481,371 A.2d 1192
(1977); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d
713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa.
182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977);" Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Girsh
Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of
Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
11. See, e.g., R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND USE REGULA-
TION AND HOUSING IN THE 1970s 3-44 (1973); 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, chs. 62-65; 3 id ch.
66; Bigharn & Bostick, Exclusionary Zoning Practices: An Examination of the Current Controversy,
25 VAND. L. REV. 1111 (1972); Haar, Zoningfor Minimum Standards: The Wayne Townsho Case,
66 HARv. L. REv. 1051 (1953); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection,
and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969); Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Con-
trols: The Case ofNorth-Eastern New Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 475 (1971); Developments in
the Lax-Zoning, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1427, 1618-1708 (1978).
12. See Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use
Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 704 (1973); see also M. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF EXCLU-
SION 23-24 (1976).
13. See D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 243 n.6
(1975); 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, § 59.07, at 585; Aloi, Goldberg, & White, Racial and Eco-
nomic Segregation by Zoning: Death Knellfor Home Rule?, 1 U. TOL. L. REv. 65, 74-79 (1969);
Branfman, Cohen & Trubek, Measuring the Invisible Wall- Land Use Controls and the Residential
Patterns ofthe Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483, 503-06 (1973); Williams, Planning Law and Democratic
Living, 20 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBs. 317, 330 (1955) ("Economic segregation is not only the easi-
est but also the most effective form of racial and ethnic segregation... :).
[Vol. 1982:761
Vol. 1982:761] ZONING FOR SOCIAL CONTROL
lage's ordinance sought to place the affected land in a "strait-jacket"
and concluded that "[iln the last analysis, the result to be accomplished
is to classify the population and segregate them according to their in-
come or situation in life."' 4  In an article published in 1920 entitled
Unwalled Towns, Bruno Lasker argued that zoning "inevitably in-
creases the separation of the classes."' 5
Today most would admit that residential zoning does, indeed, de-
termine to some extent the type of person who lives in a particular area,
even if, unlike Westenhaver and Lasker, they may not consider this
state of affairs necessarily bad. 16 New Jersey's highest court provided
an illustration of the modem view in Taxpayers Association v. Wey-
mouth Township, 17 observing that "as a conceptual matter regulation of
land use cannot be precisely dissociated from regulation of land
users." 8 Thus, generally speaking, a zoning ordinance that in its oper-
ation displays a socioeconomic purpose or effect will not disturb the
judiciary merely because it does not deal exclusively with physical
characteristics.
Conventional residential zoning ordinances regulate tangible ele-
ments of the urban environment, identifying the users or potential users
of a given parcel of land in only an indirect manner. But municipali-
ties can also explicitly identify land users or potential land users in zon-
ing ordinances, and in this manner exercise social control directly. In
doing so, localities have "zoned for direct social control." This article
addresses this sort of land use regulation.' 9 As a useful starting point,
this article constructs a definition of zoning for direct social control:
A zoning ordinance is used for direct social control when land users
are authorized to live in a residential district, or potential land users
are excluded from the same, on the basis of relatively immutable per-
sonal characteristics that are explicitly identified in the ordinance.
14. Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev'd, 272 U.S.
365 (1926).
15. 43 THE SURVEY 675, 676 (Mar. 6, 1920).
16. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOP-
MENT, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES-NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, FREEDOM OF
CHOICE IN HOUSING 31 (1972), quoted in E. BERGMAN, ELIMINATING EXCLUSIONARY ZONING:
RECONCILING WORKPLACE AND RESIDENCE IN SUBURBAN AREAS 15 (1974) ("The nature of zon-
ing is such that it is difficult to disentangle its control over physical development per se, its influ-
ence over the economic status of prospective residents, and its use to discriminate against specific
ethnic or racial groups."); C. PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE 3 (1977); Gans, SocialandPhysi-
cal Planningfor the Elimination of Urban Poverty, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 2, 16.
17. 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977).
18. Id. at 277, 364 A.2d at 1031.
19. Many courts and commentators have considered exclusionary zoning which exercises so-
cial control in an indirect way. See, e.g., authorities cited supra notes 10-11.
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There are several reasons for examining the use of zoning as a
direct social control. First, such zoning raises the clash between the
police power, the basis of all zoning restrictions, and certain constitu-
tional protections in a most interesting way, and helps to test the
boundaries of each. An inquiry into zoning of this sort also helps to
determine the regulatory capacity of enabling legislation and other de-
vices that delegate the zoning power from the state legislatures to mu-
nicipalities. Zoning for direct social control also illustrates the use of
zoning to further sophisticated modem regulatory goals. Finally, in the
past, with one major exception,20 few such regulations were promul-
gated; currently they appear to be much more prevalent and are em-
ployed to serve increasingly diversified ends.
One potential end of this type of zoning is racial segregation.21
Yet the segregation ordinance is the easy case: zoning with respect to
race for purposes of segregation 22 founders on clearly overriding con-
stitutional protections. But what of other, less obviously unfair, meas-
ures effecting direct social control? For instance, a great number of
municipalities have enacted ordinances that, with certain exceptions,
authorize only individuals related by blood, marriage, or adoption-in
other words, a traditional family--to live in a dwelling unit in a partic-
20. The exception is racial zoning for segregation. See infra note 21.
21. Possibly the first zoning ordinance aimed at racial segregation was the "Bingham Ordi-
nance," adopted in San Francisco at the end of the nineteenth century, which required the city's
Chinese population to abandon their residences and businesses and quit the city and county of
San Francisco or, in the alternative, move to a designated area within the municipality. Seegener-
aly In re Lee Sing, 43 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Cal. 1890) (ordinance invalidated). Most local segrega-
tion laws tried to separate whites from blacks. Early attempts preceded the development of
comprehensive zoning and were often called "segregation ordinances." See generally Benson,
Segregation Ordinances, I VA. L. REG. (n.s.) 330 (1915); Note, Constitutionality ofResidential Seg-
regation Ordinances, 41 Ky. LJ. 250 (1952). Later efforts were incorporated into comprehensive
zoning restrictions. See, e.g., Monk v. City of Birmingham, 87 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Ala. 1949,
ajfd, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 940 (1951).
Apparently the first segregation ordinance was adopted in Baltimore in 1911, Baltimore, Md.,
Ordinance 692 (May 15, 1911), but it was a Louisville, Kentucky, ordinance that came before the
Supreme Court in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). The Buchanan ordinance was typical
of many: it made it unlawful for any black to move into and occupy a house in a block where a
majority of dwellings were occupied by whites. After reviewing the history of the fourteenth
amendment, its treatment in the case law, and the legislative provisions enacted to implement it,
the Court concluded that the state could not lawfully disqualify a man from acquiring property
solely because of color, or prevent a man from selling his property solely because of the buyer's
color. Buchanan clearly established the invalidity of segregation otdinances, and subsequent at.
tempts by recalcitrant municipalities to adopt this type of regulation were struck down. See, e.g.,
Bowen v. City of Atlanta, 159 Ga. 145, 125 S.E. 199 (1924); Tyler v. Harmon, 160 La. 943, 107 So.
704 (1926), rev'dper curiam, 273 U.S. 668 (1927); Jackson v. State, 132 Md. 311, 103 A. 910 (1918);
Clinard v. City of Winston-Salem, 217 N.C. 119, 6 S.E.2d 867 (1940); Irvine v. City of Clifton
Forge, 124 Va. 781, 97 S.E. 310 (1918).
22. Racial zoning for the purpose of promoting integration is discussed infra in Part IV.
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ular residential district. In other cases, local governments have adopted
age-restrictive ordinances that permit only the elderly to live in a de-
fined zone. These ordinances plainly aim at goals other than the tradi-
tional objectives, such as providing more light and air, that
characterized early zoning efforts. At the same time, these new ordi-
nances do not seek to further residential preferences as obviously base
as segregation. Whether the law can accommodate these experiments
is a question worth exploring.
Part II of this article examines ordinances that permit only tradi-
tional families to live in a dwelling area. Part III discusses age-restric-
tive zoning. Some other forms of zoning for direct social control are
identified in Part IV. Each of these parts traces the historical develop-
ment of the type of zoning discussed, indicates the purported goals of
those restrictions, and outlines some of the constitutional implications
of such ordinances. Each part also suggests some safeguards against
potential abuses of land use restrictions of this kind. Finally, addressed
in each section, and most fully explored in Part III, are several tests that
courts should apply in reviewing these newest developments in zoning,
to insure that the competing values they embody receive proper
attention.
II. ZONING FOR DIRECT SOCIAL CONTROL: THE FAMILY
A. Historical Development of Single-Family Ordinances.
"Promotion of the single-family home. .. is deemed good public
policy in America, ' '23 wrote Alfred Bettman in 1924. Fostered by this
sentiment, zoning spread swiftly,24 particularly in suburban
communities.25
The original New York City building zone resolution did not es-
tablish an exclusive single-family home area; it merely created a district
where new dwellings could cover no more than thirty percent of the
lot.26 The resolution's backers thought that treating private detached
23. Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARv. L. REv. 834, 839-40 (1924).
24. See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 115 (1966); B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZON-
ING 49 (1972); Ellickson, supra note 12, at 629 ("Although a few major cities had earlier made
modest attempts to control land uses, the precedent of the New York City ordinance triggered the
rapid spread of zoning, apparently because of its political appeal as a device to protect the value of
single-family homes."); see also E. BAssETr, supra note 1, at 64; J. DELAFONS, LAND-USE CON-
TROLS IN THE UNITED STATES 26 (1962); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILD-
ING THE AMERICAN CITY 204 (1969).
25. See S. TOLL, supra note 3, at 193 ("The suburbs were among the first municipalities in the
nation to enact zoning. During the twenties they were prime contributors to the extraordinary
spread of the institution.").
26. E. BASSETr, supra note 4, at 323.
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residences as a separate use would be a "hazardous course" because
courts might question whether traditional police power considerations
of health and safety could justify a differentiation between one-family
and two-family dwellings.27 Court decisions soon proved, however,
that no such hazard existed. The United States Supreme Court allowed
the exclusion of apartment buildings from residential districts, 28 and a
Massachusetts court decided that two-family dwellings could be validly
separated from single-family homes.29 Thus, by the mid-1920s the le-
gitimacy of exclusive single-family districts was settled; the next impor-
tant question became how, if at all, a given ordinance defined the term
"family" for purposes of determining who could live in these districts.
30
In the early years of zoning, a significant number of ordinances
simply left the word family undefined,31 and some modem ordinances
continue to include no definitional provision.32 A good deal of litiga-
tion naturally resulted: homeowners or occupants and zoning enforce-
ment authorities often disagree on exactly what "single-family"
means.33 Ultimately the courts can decide, but the obvious problem
with this type of ordinance is the uncertainty it creates. 34
Even in the earliest days of zoning many municipalities were not
willing to leave so much to chance and therefore included some defini-
27. See id. at 323-24.
28. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926).
29. Brett v. Building Comm'r, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269 (1924).
30. Of course, the definition of "family" could also affect the occupants of two-family and
other multiple-family dwellings. It appears, however, that the definition of "family" has been
contested almost exclusively in relation to single-family dwelling districts. Furthermore, restric-
tions on dwelling type were invariably accompanied by regulations concerning physical character-
istics such as lot size, area of permissible coverage, building height, and so on. Thus, the type of
area restriction employed in the original New York City building zone resolution was not aban-
doned; it was merely supplemented by regulations segregating building types.
31. See, e.g., BALTIMORE, MD., CODE art. 49, § 1 (1928); BIRMINGHAM, ALA., GENERAL
CODE ORDINANCE 1101-C, art. I, § 1 (1930).
32. See, e.g., Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 77-82, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242, 247-49
(1962) (discussing Atherton Ord. 146 § 22-5); Region 10 Client Management, Inc. v. Town of
Hampstead, 120 N.H. 885, 887, 424 A.2d 207, 208-09 (1980) (discussing Hampstead Zoning Ordi-
nance); Carroll v. Washington Township, 63 Ohio St. 2d 249, 251, 408 N.E.2d 191, 193 (1980).
33. See, eg., Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 71-72, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242, 243-44
(1962); Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Synanon Found., 153 Conn. 305, 311, 216 A.2d 442, 444
(1966); Village of Riverside v. Reagan, 270 Ill. App. 355, 365-66 (1933); Pettis v. Alpha Alpha
Chapter of Phi Beta Pi, 115 Neb. 525, 529, 213 N.W. 835, 837 (1927); Sullivan v. Anglo-American
Inv. Trust, Inc., 89 N.H. 112, 115, 193 A. 225, 227 (1937); Village of Quogue v. Ladd, 40 A.D.2d
859, 859, 337 N.Y.S.2d 868, 869 (1972); City of Schenectady v. Alumni Ass'n of Union Chapter,
Delta Chi Fraternity, Inc., 5 A.D.2d 14, 15, 168 N.Y.S.2d 754, 755 (1957); Town of Henrietta v.
Fairchild, 53 Misc. 2d 862, 279 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
34. One commentator has concluded that in general "the courts have approached these cases
on a pragmatic, ad hoc basis." Note, Excluding the Communefrom Suburbia: The Use of Zonlng
for Social Control, 23 HAsTiNGs LJ. 1459, 1465 (1972).
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tion of family in their zoning restrictions. One formulation defined
family as a "single housekeeping unit," and many early restrictions in-
corporated this definition 35 or some variation thereof, including the
zoning regulation at issue in the Euclid case.36 But whether the "single
housekeeping unit" formulation injected any certainty into the system
is open to question. This type of ordinance has also given rise to a
significant amount of litigation,37 and courts have often interpreted the
formulation in ways that frustrate its basic objective of limiting the oc-
cupation of homes to relatively permanent and stable groups.38
Many municipalities sought even more certain control over the
composition of domestic units occupying dwellings in residential areas.
They developed provisions describing a family in terms of the biologi-
cal and legal interrelationships of its members, thus restricting a resi-
dential area to what might be variously called "legal," "biological,"
"traditional," or "conventional" families. A typical example might de-
fine "family" as follows:
One or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living
and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of
household servants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2)
living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not
35. It seems that even before 1920, a Newark, New Jersey ordinance included such a provi-
sion. See CITIZENS' ZONE PLAN CONFERENCE, CHICAGO 20 (1920) (report of proceedings, Dec.
16-17, 1919).
36. See J. METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING 338 (1930) (reproducing the Village of Euclid
ordinance that was upheld by the Supreme Court); see also, e.g., ALEXANDRIA, VA., CODE § 35-
1(33) (1953); ATLANTA, GA., CODE § 93-202(k) (1942); CHICAGO, ILL., REVISED CODE § 1860(i)
(1931); CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODE § 1281-14 (1924); cf. PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE § 14-102(11)
(1956) ("Family. A person or a group of persons living together."). The widespread use of the
single housekeeping unit formulation may have resulted from its use by leading commentators on
zoning, see, ag., E. BAsSETT, supra note 1, at 189, and by its use in various model ordinances, see,
e.g., New York Dep't of Commerce, Zoning in New York State: A Guide to the Preparation of
Zoning Ordinances 45-46 (rev. ed. 1958).
37. See, e.g., Neptune Park Ass'n v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 357, 84 A.2d 687 (1951); Oliver v.
Zoning Comm'n, 31 Conn. Supp. 197, 326 A.2d 841 (C.P. 1974); Carroll v. City of Miami Beach,
198 So. 2d 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Harmon v. City of Peoria, 373 Ill. 594, 27 N.E.2d 525
(1940); Baddour v. City of Long Beach, 279 N.Y. 167, 18 N.E.2d 18, 7 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1938), reh'g
denied, 279 N.Y. 794, 19 N.E.2d 90, 7 N.Y.S.2d 794, appeal dismissed, 308 U.S. 503 (1939); Carroll
v. Arlington County, 186 Va. 575, 44 S.E.2d 6 (1947); Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette v.
Village of Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis. 609, 66 N.W.2d 627 (1954); see also cases cited infra note 38.
38. For example, in one case a single housekeeping unit restriction was held not to exclude a
college sorority. See City of Syracuse v. Snow, 123 Misc. 568, 205 N.Y.S. 785 (Sup. Ct. 1924). In
the majority of cases, however, it would be fair to say that the "single housekeeping unit" formu-
lation has proved effective in fraternity-sorority cases. See, e.g., Cassidy v. Triebel, 337 Ill. App.
117, 85 N.E.2d 461 (1949); Theta Kappa, Inc. v. City of Terre Haute, 141 Ind. App. 165, 226
N.E.2d 907, rehk' denied, 141 Ind. App. 165, 228 N.E.2d 34 (1967). However, courts have held
that twenty nurses can be a single housekeeping unit, see Robertson v. Western Baptist Hosp., 267
S.W.2d.395 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954), as can sixty college students, seeln re Laporte, 2 A.D.2d 710, 152
N.Y.S.2d 916 (1956).
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related by blood, adoption or marriage shall be deemed to constitute
a family.39
The requirement that the individuals comprise a single housekeep-
ing unit in addition to the requirement of legal or biological relatedness
almost invariably appears in these definitions. So the traditional-fam-
ily definition simply adds restrictions to the single housekeeping unit
formulation. An exception permitting some families of unrelated indi-
viduals is another element common in these definitions, though the
number of unrelated persons that will be deemed to constitute a family
in a given ordinance varies widely.40 A few ordinances make no such
exception.41 In other ordinances, some "other domestic bond" may sat-
isfy the requirement of relatedness in addition to the usual ties of
blood, marriage, or adoption.42 Resort communities have introduced
requirements of permanent rather than seasonal occupancies;43 other
definitions require that the related group live under "one head.""'
39. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2 (1974) (quoting Belle Terre, Long Island
Ordinance).
40. The number is often five, see, e-g., City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123,
127, 610 P.2d 436, 437, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 542 (1980) (en banc); Douglass v. City of Spokane, 25
Wash. App. 823, 609 P.2d 979 (1980) (discussing Spokane Zoning Ord. 110.060), but it can range
as high as ten, see, e.g., State ex rel. Ellis v. Liddle, 520 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)
(discussing Meryville, Mo. Zoning Ord. 3142). Another common provision in these types of ordi-
nances exempts domestic servants from the relatedness requirements. See, e.g., City of Des
Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 434, 216 N.E.2d 116, 117 (1966). Limited exceptions are often
made for gratuitous guests, see, eg., id., and boarders, roomers, or lodgers, see, e.g., Town of N.
Hempstead v. Griffen, 71 Misc. 2d 864, 337 N.Y.S.2d 318 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
Some ordinances make additional exceptions. See Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456
(E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded, 510 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975) (licensed foster home); City
of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 IlL 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966) (specified religious uses); Holy
Name Hosp. v. Montroy, 153 NJ. Super. 181, 379 A.2d 299 (Law Div. 1977) (restrictions relaxed
if dwelling is owner-occupied).
41. See, eg., City of Newark v. Johnson, 70 NJ. Super. 381, 175 A.2d 500 (Essex County Ct.,
Law Div. 1961); ST. PETERSBURG BEACH, FLA., COMPREHENSIVE ZONING ORDINANCE § 1 (1972),
reprinted in MODERN LEGAL FORMS § 10214.5 (Supp. 1980). Some ordinances permit unrelated
groups in designated areas only as a conditional use. See, e.g., City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 159
Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979), vacated, 115 Cal. App. 3d 785, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981); People v. Renais-
sance Project, Inc., 36 N.Y.2d 65, 324 N.E.2d 355, 364 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1975).
42. See, e.g., People v. Kalayjian, 76 Misc. 2d 1097, 352 N.Y.S.2d 115 (Sup. Ct. 1973);
NIMLO MODEL ZONING ORDINANCE § 11-204(18) (C. Rhyne ed. 1954).
43. See, ag., Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513
(1971); Larson v. Mayor of Spring Lake Heights, 99 N.J. Super. 365, 240 A.2d 31 (Law Div. 1968).
Ironically, some resort communities in the province of Ontario, Canada, have employed zoning
for direct social control to require that the occupancy of dwelling units be exclusively seasonal.
Evidently the municipalities are concerned that servicing problems could arise if the dwellings
were used on a year-round basis. See, e.g., Horseshoe Valley Ltd. v. Township of Medonte, 79
D.L.R.3d 156 (Ont. H.C. 1977); Mueller v. Township of Tiny, 72 D.L.R.3d 28 (Ont. H.C. 1976).
44. See, eg., Berger v. State, 71 NJ. 206,218, 364 A.2d 993, 999 (1976). Some municipalities
have adopted unusual definitions of family that recognize only certain categories of related indi-
viduals in an apparent attempt to establish limits on the extended family. One such provision
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Though in recent years some municipalities have replaced the sin-
gle housekeeping unit formulation with a traditional-family defini-
tion,45 it would be misleading to view the history of single-family
zoning ordinances as an even progression from less restrictive to more
restrictive definitions of family.46 It appears, however, that early in-
stances of defining family in terms of legal and biological relationships
did not foster any litigation, perhaps because this type of definition did
not become widespread until later years, or perhaps because most do-
mestic groups in this early period lived in the context of a traditional
family. Today there is no lack of litigation. From quite insignificant
beginnings in the 1950S,47 cases considering traditional-family defini-
tions in zoning ordinances occurred more frequently in the next dec-
ade48 and became commonplace in the 1970s.49 The inclusion of this
states "[c]ousins, nephews, nieces, etc., shall not be considered a part of a family so defined."
YPSILANTI, MICH., CODE § 209.00 (1957) (amended 1967); see also City of White Plains v. Ferrai-
oi, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 304, 313 N.E.2d 756, 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 451 (1974). The definition of
family in another zoning ordinance recognizes only "direct lineal descendants and adopted chil-
dren" of "one or two persons" as relatives. TROY, MICH., ZONING ORDINANCE § 5.2(30), reprinted
in C. CRAwFORD, HANDBOOK OF ZONING AND LAND USE ORDINANCES-WITH FoRMs 124
(1974). Some of these definitions can produce peculiar results. For instance, the definition consid-
ered in one case allowed two siblings to live with their grandmother but permitted only one child
to live with her if the children happened to be cousins. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977).
45. See, e.g., Prospect Gardens Convalescent Home, Inc. v. City of Norwalk, 32 Conn. Supp.
214, 347 A.2d 637 (C.P. 1975) (change from "single housekeeping unit" formulation to traditional-
family definition made in 1974); Town of Durham v. White Enters., 115 N.H. 645, 348 A.2d 706
(1975) (similar change made in 1971).
46. At least one city adopted a definition referring to the legal and biological relationships of
household members in the year after the Supreme Court's decision in Euclid. See PITTSBURGH,
PA., GENERAL ORDINANCES § 1887 (1938):
Family: Two or more persons related by blood or marriage living together, or one or
more persons maintaining wholly or partly other persons, all of them living together in
one household; not embracing clubs, fraternities, boarding or rooming houses or other
groups of individuals living together.
(Clause added by Ordinance No. 537, ap. June 30, 1927, O.B. 39, page 89) (emphasis added).
Other municipalities adopted zoning restrictions incorporating traditional-family definitions rela-
tively early. See, e.g., Cook County, Ill., Zoning Ordinance § 22 (1940); Detroit, Mich., Official
Zoning Ordinance § 2.13 (1945); Los ANGELES, CAL., CODE § 12.00 (1946). In 1928, the Village
of Grosse Pointe Farms, Michigan, adopted the following definition:
FAMILY-A family is one or two persons or parents with their direct descendants and
adopted children (and including the domestic employees thereof) together with not more
than five persons not so related, living together in a room or rooms comprising a single
housekeeping unit. Every additional group of five or less persons living in such house-
keeping unit shall be considered a separate family for the purposes of this ordinance.
Grosse Pointe Farms, Mich., Zoning Ordinance § 1(15) (1928).
47. See, eg., Young v. Montgomery County, 216 Md. 341, 140 A.2d 527 (1958); Kellog v.
Joint Council of Women's Auxiliaries Welfare Ass'n, 265 S.W.2d 374 (Mo. 1954).
48. See, eg., City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 111. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966); Larson v.
Mayor of Spring Lake Heights, 99 NJ. Super. 365, 240 A.2d 31 (Law Div. 1968); Marino v. Mayor
of Norwood, 77 N.J. Super. 587, 187 A.2d 217 (Law Div. 1963); City of Newark v. Johnson, 70
N.J. Super. 381, 175 A.2d 500 (Essex County Ct., Law Div. 1961).
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type of definition of family in model zoning ordinances50 and widely
used form books5' undoubtedly contributed to the increasing accept-
ance of such zoning by municipalities, and one result was more
litigation.
The increasing prevalence of traditional-family ordinances repre-
sents an increase in zoning for direct social control. An ordinance that
defines family with respect to the legal and biological interrelationships
of its members exercises such control: land users are authorized to live
in a residential district, or potential land users are excluded, on the
49. See, ag., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality); Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Wis. 1974),
vacated and remanded, 510 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975); Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F.
Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970), afdper cur/am, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973); City of Chula Vista v.
Pagard, 159 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979), vacated, 115 Cal. App. 3d 785, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981);
Hessling v. City of Broomfield, 193 Colo. 124, 563 P.2d 12 (1977); Rademan v. City of Denver, 186
Colo. 250, 526 P.2d 1325 (1974); Prospect Gardens Convalescent Home, Inc. v. City of Norwalk,
32 Conn. Supp. 214, 347 A.2d 637 (C.P. 1975); Village of River Forest v. Midwest Bank & Trust
Co., 12 111 App. 3d 136, 297 N.E.2d 775 (1973); City of Takoma Park v. County Bd. of Appeals,
259 Md. 619, 270 A.2d 772 (1970); Association for Educ. Dev. v. Hayward, 533 S.W.2d 579 (Mo.
1976); State ex rel. Ellis v. Liddle, 520 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); State ex rel. Thelen v.
City of Missoula, 168 Mont. 375, 543 P.2d 173 (1975); Town of Durham v. White Enters., 115
N.H. 645, 348 A.2d 706 (1975); State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979); Berger v. State, 71
NJ. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976); Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281
A.2d 513 (1971); Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341,271 A.2d
430 (App. Div. 1970); Holy Name Hosp. v. Montroy, 153 N.J. Super. 181, 379 A.2d 299 (Law Div.
1977); YWCA of Summit v. Board of Adjustment, 134 N.J. Super. 384, 341 A.2d 356 (Law Div.
1975), af'd, 141 NJ. Super. 315, 358 A.2d 211 (App. Div. 1976); Group House of Port Washing-
ton, Inc. v. Board of Zoning & Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 380 N.E.2d 207, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1978);
People v. Renaissance Project, Inc., 36 N.Y.2d 65, 324 N.E.2d 355, 364 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1975); City
of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974); Little Neck
Community Ass'n v. Working Org. for Retarded Children, 52 A.D.2d 90, 383 N.Y.S.2d 364
(1976); Town of Ithaca v. Lucente, 36 A.D.2d 560, 317 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1971); Abbott House v.
Village of Tarrytown, 34 A.D.2d 821, 312 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1970); Incorporated Village of Freeport
v. Association for the Help of Retarded Children, 94 Misc. 2d 1048, 406 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct.
1977); People v. Kala3jian, 76 Misc. 2d 1097, 352 N.Y.S.2d 115 (App. Term 1973); Town of N.
Hempstead v. Griffen, 71 Misc. 2d 864,337 N.Y.S.2d 318 (Sup. Ct. 1972); People v. Skidmore, 69
Misc. 2d 320, 329 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Village Justice Ct. of Sea Cliff 1971); Culp v. City of Seattle, 22
Wash. App. 618, 590 P.2d 1288 (1979); Browndale Int'l, Ltd. v. Board of Adjustment, 60 Wis. 2d
182, 208 N.W.2d 121 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). In a recent survey of Montana
localities two-thirds of the responding municipalities had adopted some form of traditional-family
ordinance. See Note, The Defiiiion of "Family"in Single-Family Zoning, 42 MONT. L. REv. 165,
181-82 (1981).
50. See, ag., F. BAIR & E. BARTLEY, THE TEXT OF A MODEL ZONING ORDINANCE, WITH
COMMENTARY 68 (2d ed. 1960); L. KENDIG, PERFORMANCE ZONING 105 (1980) (model ordi-
nance); T. MATTHEWs, DRAFTING MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES 323 (1956); NIMLO MODEL ZONING
ORDINANCE § 11-204(18) (C. Rhyne ed. 1954).
51. See, ag., AM. JuR. 2D, LEGAL FORMs § 268.34 (1974) ("Family: A number of individu-
als related by blood, marriage or adoption living and cooking together on the premises as a single
housekeeping unit and including domestic employees."); MODERN LEGAL FORMS § 10214.5
(Supp. 1980).
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basis of marital or family status, relatively immutable personal charac-
teristics explicitly identified in the ordinance. What motivated the de-
velopment and adoption of these traditional-family ordinances? 52 One
way to find out is to examine cases considering definitions of traditional
families to ascertain what governmental objectives are cited as reasons
for these restrictions.53
B. Purported Goals of Zoningfor the Traditional Family.
Many of the ends that traditional-family ordinances are said to
promote are conventional zoning goals. The Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act 54 by and large encapsulates these goals:
Such regulations shall be in accordance with a comprehensive plan
and designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from
52. Ordinances defining family with respect to legal and biological relationships almost al-
ways make an exception for some number of unrelated individuals. See supra note 40 and accom-
panying text. Therefore, when this article states that a zoning ordinance limits a district to
traditional families, or discusses a "traditional-family ordinance", the reader should assume, un-
less the context indicates otherwise, that unrelated persons are not totally excluded.
53. Another way to answer this question would be to examine, among other things, what
members of local governing bodies said when adopting such ordinances. In many instances, how-
ever, this sort of record will be unavailable. With respect to one traditional-family ordinance it
was said "[t]here exist no City Council minutes nor committee reports which might assist this
Court in identifying the purposes of the ordinance in question." Brief for Appellant at 42, Moore
v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality) (footnote omitted). Also, it may very well
be that little discussion would preface the adoption of such provisions because they are accepted
largely on the recommendation of a municipal solicitor or planning staff member who previously
examined a model ordinance or form book for an acceptable formulation. See R. ELLICKSON &
A.D. TARLocK, LAND-USE CONTROLS 56 (1981) ("As in other areas of law, those who draft zon-
ing ordinances rely heavily on standard forms and language developed and tested by those who
have gone before."). Unfortunately, such form books and model ordinances contain little, if any,
explanation of why they suggest a traditional-family definition. See, e.g., F. BAIR & E. BARTLEY,
supra note 50, at 80. On the preparation and use of model ordinances, see generally E. GREEN-
MAN, CODIFICATION OF ORDINANCES 9-10 (Municipal Administrative Service Pub. No. 6, 1928);
C. RHYNE, B. RHYNE, & E. MEANS, CODIFICATION OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES 27-29 (National
Institute of Municipal Law Officers Report No. 147, 1961).
54. The Standard Act was model legislation developed by the United States Department of
Commerce in the 1920s for delegating the zoning power from state to local governments. It was
instrumental in the rapid spread of zoning throughout the country, see E. BASSETr, supra note 1,
at 29, and was eventually adopted in some form by all fifty states. In 1974 it remained in effect in
forty-seven states. See 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, § 18.01 (1974). The explanatory notes of the
draftsmen encouraged state legislatures to modify the Standard Act as little as possible when
adopting enabling legislation. See United States Dep't of Commerce, Standard State Zoning En-
abling Act, reprintedin ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE app. A, 212 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1968) (draftsmen's explanatory note) [hereinafter cited as Standard Act]. See generally, R. ANDER-
SON & B. ROswiG, PLANNING, ZONING & SUBDIVISION: A SUMMARY OF STATUTORY LAW IN THE
50 STATES (1966). The Standard Act and variations thereon are discussed in 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra
note 9, ch. 18 (chart presentation at 361-70), and in Cunningham, Land-Use Control-The State
and Local Programs, 50 IowA L. REV. 367, 367-80 (1965). In recent years some states have en-
acted zoning and planning statutes that depart significantly from the wording of the Standard Act.
See R. ELLICKSON & A.D. TARLoCK, supra note 53, at 37.
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fire, panic, and other dangers; to promote health and general welfare;
to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of
land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate the
adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks,
and other public requirements. Such regulations shall be made with
reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the
district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view
to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appro-
priate use of land throughout such municipality.
55
Of these objectives, population density control is the one most
commonly cited in support of zoning ordinances defining family with
reference to the legal and biological composition of the domestic unit.
56
Apparently, it is argued that traditional-family ordinances will prevent
overcrowding because traditional families tend to be self-limiting and
unrelated groups do not.57 A number of other zoning objectives are
also closely associated with controlling the density of development.5 8
Problems of traffic and parking are frequently given as reasons for the
adoption of zoning restrictions authorizing only conventional families
to reside in a district59 because a group of unrelated individuals would
allegedly be more likely to create traffic and parking problems than an
unrelated group of the same size.60 Another standard concern is the
problem of increased noise.61 For instance, the raucous behavior of
fraternities,62 and of unrelated groups in resort communities,63 has ap-
parently prompted the adoption of restrictive definitions of family. Lo-
55. Standard Act, supra note 54, §3.
56. See, eg., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (plurality); Palo
Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908, 912 (N.D. Cal. 1970), a i'd, 487 F.2d 883, 884
(9th Cir. 1973); City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 159 Cal. Rptr. 29, 33 (1979), vacated, 115 Cal. App.
3d 785, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981); Kellog v. Joint Council of Women's Auxiliaries Welfare Ass'n,
265 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Mo. 1954).
57. See, ag., Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456, 467 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 510 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975); Brief for Appellants at 32, Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). But see Note, "Burning the House to Roast the Pg"- Unrelatedindivid-
uals and Single Family Zoning'r Blood Relation Criterion, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 138, 156 n.102
(1972).
58. One goal, adequate provision for light and air, is not usually linked with traditional-
family ordinances. But see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (discussing "the
blessings ... of clean air").
59. See, eg., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500 (1977) (plurality); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9, 18 (1974); Larson v. Mayor of Spring Lake Heights, 99 N.J.
Super. 365, 369, 240 A.2d 31, 33 (Law Div. 1968).
60. See City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 I1. 2d 432, 437, 216 N.E.2d 116, 119 (1966).
61. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9, 18 (1974); Kirsch Holding Co. v.
Borough of Manasquan, 59 NJ. 241, 245, 281 A.2d 513, 515 (1971).
62. Pettis v. Alpha Alpha Chapter of Phi Beta Pi, 115 Neb. 525, 530, 213 N.W. 835, 837-38
(1927) (describes standard view of fraternity behavior). The definition of family found in one
model ordinance would restrict occupancy of a housekeeping unit to related persons. The com-
mentary to the ordinance explains: "[t]he definition is definitely intended to prevent fraternity
[Vol. 1982:761
Vol. 1982:761] ZONING FOR SOCIAL CONTROL
cal councils hope that with parental or other supervision will come
peace and quiet.6 In some cases, avoiding an undue burden on public
services has also been cited in support of traditional-family regula-
tions,65 an argument apparently associated with the density rationale.
It has frequently been said that traditional-family zoning provi-
sions further the goal of protecting property values.66 It has been ar-
gued that an "end of single-family housing will make the community
less aesthetic, will result in more traffic and more children, will reduce
the quality of police, fire, transportation, and educational services and,
consequently, will drive property values down."67 Another economic
rationale often used to support ordinances excluding all but traditional
families or a limited number of unrelated individuals is that this type of
ordinance ensures the availability of appropriate accommodations for
traditional families by preventing the rental (or sale) of houses to
groups of unrelated persons who, because of their independent sources
of income, might be able to pay a higher price than traditional fami-
lies.68 In other words, zoning ordinances with traditional-family defi-
nitions allegedly preserve the structure of housing costs and prevent
inflated property and rental prices. 69
and sorority houses... from taking on a single-family status." F. BMAR & E. BARTLEY, supra note
50, at 80.
63. See, eg., Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513
(1971); Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341,271 A.2d 430 (App.
Div. 1970).
64. See Larson v. Mayor of Spring Lake Heights, 99 N.J. Super. 365, 369-70, 240 A.2d 31, 33
(Law Div. 1968) (Public officials felt problems "were due largely to the absence of parental or
other supervision and control within the premises.").
65. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977) (plurality) (school system);
Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456, 460, 467 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded, 510
F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975) (services in general).
66. See, eg., Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456, 460, 465, 466, 467 (E.D. Wis. 1974),
vacated and remanded, 510 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975); Larson v. Mayor of Spring Lake Heights, 99
N.J Super. 365, 370, 240 A.2d 31,34 (Law Div. 1968); City of Newark v. Johnson, 70 N.J. Super.
381, 387, 175 A.2d 500, 503 (Essex County Ct., Law Div. 1961). For a general discussion of
protecting property values, see E. BAssETr, supra note 1, at 52-53 (protection of values should
remain distinct from the increase of values, as the latter is not a proper purpose of zoning).
67. Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456,467 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacatedandremanded, 510
F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975).
68. See, eg., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1974); Palo Alto Tenants
Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908, 912-13 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aj'd, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973).
Of course, depending on the quality of housing in a given district, not all traditional families may
find it economically feasible to participate. See, eg., Rademan v. City of Denver, 186 Colo. 250,
253, 526 P.2d 1325, 1327 (1974) (two traditional families jointly purchasing house, neither family
capable of effecting purchase without the financial assistance of the other). Thus, as with other
types of residential zoning, it appears that ordinances limiting areas to traditional families can
potentially have an exclusionary effect.
69. See Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456, 467 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and re-
manded, 510 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975). Courts considering this type of ordinance as enacted by
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Less conventional zoning goals also allegedly support traditional-
family ordinances. The extent to which the zoning power may be exer-
cised in furtherance of municipal aesthetics has long occupied courts
and commentators alike.70 In the early years an aesthetic purpose
alone would not be adequate support for a zoning ordinance, although
aesthetic purposes could be recognized if a regulation was primarily
based on considerations of public health and safety.71 Ultimately,
however, the Supreme Court signaled in Berman v. Parker72 that gov-
ernments could pursue aesthetic objectives. Mr. Justice Douglas stated
that the "concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive" and then
elaborated: "The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical,
aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature
to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled. '73
Two decades later, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,74 Douglas
again recognized the legitimacy of aesthetic objectives in a similarly
lyrical passage:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehi-
cles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project ad-
dressed to family needs. This goal is a permissible one within
Berman v. Parker .... The police power is not confined to elimi-
nation of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out
zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet
seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.75
Particularly noteworthy for our purposes, however, is that the majority
in Belle Terre adopted this passage in the course of upholding a tradi-
tional-family ordinance.76
resort communities have accepted that groups of unrelated persons are able to pay more rent than
conventional families. See, e.g., Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 245,
281 A.2d 513, 515 (1971); Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341,
344, 271 A.2d 430, 431 (App. Div. 1970).
70. See generally 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, ch. 11.
71. See, eg., Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1909); Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass.
597, 604, 127 N.E. 525, 528 (1920); E. BASSETr, supra note 1, at 97.
72. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
73. Id. at 33. "Berman was not, strictly speaking, a zoning case, but involved issues of emi-
nent domain. Nonetheless, it has been cited frequently in subsequent zoning decisions as support
for the broad scope of the police power." Developments in the Law-Zoning, supra note 11, at
1443 n.8.
74. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
75. Id. at 9.
76. See also Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456, 467 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 510 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975) (citing aesthetic objective in support of a traditional-
family ordinance). Aesthetic concerns have achieved more acceptance as proper zoning goals in
recent years. See 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9 § 11.21; Developments in the Law-Zoning, supra
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A similarly amorphous concept, closely related to aesthetics, is that
of the "character of the community" or "neighborhood character," the
preservation of which is frequently said to underlie ordinances limiting
residential areas to traditional families. 77 Unquestionably there is a
physical aspect to neighborhood character.78 The exclusion of industry
and businesses certainly aids in establishing the character of a residen-
tial district, and Belle Terre speaks of noise, open space, population
density, and traffic as elements that in part determine community char-
acter.79 Other decisions indicate that the stability of residential occu-
pancy is also a factor.80 And rather minor physical matters often
determine whether a given land use will comport with a neighbor-
hood's character.81 Nevertheless, the notion of community character is
not limited to the quality of the physical urban environment. The con-
cept includes less tangible elements: "Protection of character covers
many physical, social, economic, and psychological objectives that af-
fect people's choices."'8 2 Thus, zoning becomes a regulatory tool shap-
note 11, at 1448. As "classifications... not based primarily on physical characteristics," NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note 24, at 219, aesthetic concerns arguably
support zoning based on other intangible qualities such as the composition of a household in a
dwelling unit.
77. See, eg., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 550 (1977) (White, J., dissenting);
City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 131, 610 P.2d 436, 440, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543
(1980) (en banc); State ex rel. Ellis v. Liddle, 520 S.W.2d 644, 651 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Berger v.
State, 71 NJ. 206, 223, 364 A.2d 993, 1002 (1976); City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d
300, 305, 313 N.E.2d 756, 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452 (1974). Although zoning to preserve neigh-
borhood character has traditionally been thought to be a legitimate purpose of zoning, it has not
gone uncriticized. See 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, § 15.07; Williams, Planning Law and Demo-
cratic Living, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 317,333-34(1955). Nor have the courts allowed neigh-
borhood character to be pursued at the expense of other values. See Developments in the Law-
Zoning, supra note 11, at 1452-57.
78. See Developments in the Law--Zoning supra note 11, at 1450-51.
79. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9. Though open space is primarily a physical characteristic re-
lated to density controls, it may have symbolic weight as an abstract notion of developmental
quality determined by elements like "privacy, amenity, and compatability." See NATIONAL COM-
MISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note 24, at 206 (1969).
80. See, eg., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 516 (1977) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 305, 313 N.E.2d 756, 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d
449, 452 (1974).
81. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note 24, at 219:
Perhaps the greatest classification problem, though, stems from the sheer number of fac-
tors that can influence compatibility-such matters as exact location, topography, the
design of the site and the building, the location of automobile access points, mainte-
nance, and details of operation (how late a store stays open at night, whether there is an
exhaust filter on the pizza oven). Some of the details that determine compatibility may
vary over time--the quiet little drugstore that used to close at 10:30 now stays open all
night and sells a special ice cream concoction that attracts teenagers and their cars until
the small hours. The nicely maintained gas station changes hands, and the new owner
leaves tires lying around and hangs up fluttery pennants.
82. Id.; see also M. MCLEAN, ZONING BuFFEaS: SOLUTION OR PANACEA? 3 (1960) ("psycho-
logical factors" evaluated in determining compatibility).
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ing not only the physical character of the neighborhood, but "the
socioeconomic character of a community" as well.83
In this context, aiming to preserve a certain community character
implies zoning for social control. For example, in Belle Terre the Court
refers to "family values" and "youth values." 84 A purpose of the mu-
nicipal code considered in another case was "to promote and encourage
a suitable environment for family life."'85 These vague phrases invite
ideological interpretations, and this possibility must be considered:
that zoning restrictions limiting residential districts to traditional fami-
lies actually have ideological goals.
Like all police power regulations, zoning ordinances must relate to
the "public health, safety, morals or general welfare." 86 The first sec-
tion of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act explicitly duplicates
this requirement.8 7 Consequently, one might anticipate efforts to sup-
port traditional-family ordinances on the basis that such regulations
further public morals on issues such as the cohabitation of unrelated
adults. 88 Traditional-family ordinances enacted by resort communities
have been said to be aimed in part at the immoral behavior of unre-
lated groups (fornication in cars parked on public streets, for in-
stance). 89 Nevertheless, these regulations have sought more to
ameliorate the generally inconsiderate behavior of these groups than to
deal specifically with moral concerns. Nor have the attempts to sup-
port these ordinances relied primarily on the rationale of protecting
public morals; indeed, non-resort communities have explicitly dis-
avowed any intention to influence the moral behavior of cohabiting
unrelated adults, or to preserve the moral fiber of the community.90 A
83. Blumstein, A Prolegomenon to Growth Management and Exclusionary Zoning Issues, 43
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 11 (1979). For instance, the zoning power can preserve a small New
England town's "charm." Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir.
1972).
84. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9.
85. City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 159 Cal. Rptr. 29, 33 (1979), vacated, 115 Cal. App. 3d 785,
171 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981).
86. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 548 (1923).
87. Standard Act, supra note 54, § 1.
88. See Cope, Zoning: The Defnition of Family, 62 ILL. B.J. 30, 31 (1973).
89. See, ag., Kirseh Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 245, 281 A.2d 513,
515 (1971); Larson v. Mayor of Spring Lake Heights, 99 N.J. Super. 365, 369, 240 A.2d 31, 33
(Law Div. 1968).
90. See, eg., Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456, 465 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 510 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975); Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 814 (2d
Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Arguments that local governments had the moralistic objec-
tive of excluding unrelated couples by means of traditional-family ordinances falter in the face of
the usual exceptions made for a limited number of unrelated persons. See, e.g., Village of Belle
[Vol. 1982:761
Vol. 1982:761] ZONING IFOR SOCIAL CONTROL
disclaimer of this kind seems wise, because at least one court has ex-
plicitly stated that a zoning objective based on the fear "that groups of
unrelated persons hazard an immoral environment for families with
children" would not be legitimate.91
Though the protection of morals has not figured prominently in
zoning goals,92 municipalities defining family with respect to the legal
and biological interrelationships of household members may in fact be
pursuing ideological goals not far removed from the moralistic objec-
tives noted above. These municipalities can be seen as seeking to pro-
vide affirmatively for the traditional family and all the values and
ideals normally associated with it, rather than as simply prohibiting
unmarried cohabitations. Thus, when Mr. Justice Douglas spoke of
"family values" and "youth values" in the Belle Terre case, he referred
to a municipality's allegedly legitimate interest in establishing a pre-
serve where the ideological virtues that accompany family living might
flourish.93 Other cases could be read in a similar manner.94
Clearly the law affords the family a favored position in a number
of contexts, 95 including constitutional protection for both its nuclear
and extended forms.96 Furthermore, courts have long associated the
social values of family life with the very concept of zoning controls. As
was noted in a leading California case: "we think it may be safely and
sensibly said that justification for residential zoning may, in the last
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974); City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 139 n.2,
610 P.2d 436, 445 n.2, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 548 n.2 (1980) (en band); see also supra note 40.
91. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 133, 610 P.2d 436, 441, 164 Cal. Rptr.
539, 544 (1980) (en bane); Sf Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Life-
Styles, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 563, 568 (1977) ("Law is a vehicle by which democratic majorities
reaffirm shared moral aspirations and summon society's allegiance to a common set of behavioral
goals. Deploying the Constitution to undermine conventional precepts of domestic morality is a
step not lightly taken.').
92. See supra text accompanying notes 86-91; 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, § 8.03 (1974);
Developments in the Law-Zoning, supra note 11, at 1445.
93. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); see also Boraas v. Village of
Belle Terre, 367 F. Supp. 136, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aft'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
94. See, eg., Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908, 912 (N.D. Cal. 1970),
af'dper curiam, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973); Rademan v. City of Denver, 186 Colo. 250, 254-55,
526 P.2d 1325, 1327 (1974); Town of Durham v. White Enters., 115 N.H. 645, 649, 348 A.2d 706,
709 (1975).
95. See, eg., Town of Durham v. White Enters., 115 N.H. 645, 649, 348 A.2d 706, 709 (1975).
The author of a legal manual for individuals who wish to pursue a communal style of living opens
by noting that one of his fundamental assumptions is that the legal system in the United States is
designed to maintain "cohesive, socially productive family units." L. GOLDSTEIN, COMMUNES,
LAW & COMMONSENSE 1 (1974). Cf. Wilkinson & White, supra note 91, at 595 ("Preserving the
strength of this basic, organic unit [the nuclear, heterosexual family] is a central and legitimate
end of the police power").
96. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality).
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analysis, be rested upon the protection of the civic and social values of
the American home. ' 97 Many commentators have also tied family val-
ues to zoning. In the first edition of his treatise on zoning, James,Met-
zenbaum asserts that "[a] proper administration of zoning laws will go
far toward preserving the American Home-that institution which has
been referred to repeatedly as the backbone and the mainstay of our
country."98 And in his Euclid brief Alfred Bettman noted that people
seek to purchase their own homes because they prefer to raise their
children in a moral environment. 99
Ultimately, however, it is difficult to assess the strength of the asso-
ciation between the social values of family life and the upholding of
traditional-family ordinances by the judiciary. 100 For instance, some
judges have read Belle Terre and its language of "family values" and
"youth values" to refer only to the creation of an appropriate physical
environment for family living.101 Others have seen the decision of the
97. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 492-93, 234 P. 381, 386 (1925), appeal dis-
missed, 273 U.S. 781 (1927). The court went on to specify some of these values:
The establishment of single family residence districts offers inducements, not only to the
wealthy, but to those of moderate means to own their own homes. With ownership
comes stability, the welding together of family ties, and better attention to the rearing of
children. With ownership comes increased interest in the promotion of public agencies,
such as church and school, which have for their purpose a desired development of the
moral and mental make-up of the citizenry of the country. With ownership of one's
home comes recognition of the individual's responsibility for his share in the safeguard-
ing of the welfare of the community and increased pride in personal achievement which
must come from personal participation in projects looking toward community better-
ment.
Id. at 493, 234 P. at 387; see also State ex rel. Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn.
13, 20, 176 N.W. 159, 162 (1920), rev'g 144 Minn. 1, 174 N.W. 885 (1919); City of Bismarck v.
Hughes, 53 N.D. 838, 851-52, 208 N.W. 711, 716-17 (1926); Fraser v. Fred Parker Funeral Home,
201 S.C. 88, 96-97, 21 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1942) (action in nuisance).
98. J. METZENBAUM, supra note 36, at 8. Metzenbaum was counsel for the municipality in
the Euclid case. Another early commentator suggested that districts zoned only for residences
provided "more moral surroundings." Note, Delimitation of the State Police Power as to Building
Restrictions, 26 YALE LJ. 151, 152 (1916).
99. A. BETTMAN, Euclid Brief, reprinted in CITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING PAPERS 175
(1946). The explanation for the almost unquestioning solicitude afforded the single-family de-
tached dwelling may very well lie in the tenets of social anthropology. According to one author,
"[a] sacred quality endows both the family and its 'home,' sacred in the sense of being set apart
from the mundane and having a distinctive aura." C. PERIN, supra note 16, at 47.
100. See generally Williams & Doughty, Studies in LegalRealism: Mount Laurel, Belle Terre
and Berman, 29 RuTOERs L. REv. 73, 79-80 (1975); Note, supra note 34, at 1476-77. Clearly the
Village of Belle Terre sought to have ideological goals associated with its ordinance. "An abun-
dance of stable families to provide an environment comportable with parents' ideals for raising
their children is an end which the ordinance does in fact promote." Brief for Appellants at 15,
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
101. See City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 115 Cal. App. 3d 785, 799-800, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738,
746-47 (1981) (viewing promotion of family values entirely in terms of creating an appropriate
physical environment); City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 304-05, 313 N.E.2d 756,
758, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452 (1974) (suggesting Belle Terre was primarily concerned with the pre-
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Supreme Court as contemplating intangible concepts independent of
the physical aspects of urban design.10 2 The word "values" used in
Belle Terre and in other cases10 3 certainly suggests that ideological
goals were thought to be at stake.
In general, many of the broad range of zoning goals associated
with traditional family ordinances-notably those of protecting the
community character, aesthetics, and promoting abstract notions asso-
ciated with family life-are rather far removed from the explicit con-
cerns of the founders of zoning. At the same time, however, there
remains a reluctance to wander too far from the traditional health and
safety goals. Density control and related matters are still the most com-
mon goals used to support traditional-family ordinances, and in no
case has such a regulation been supported with no reference at all to
the tangible aspects of the urban environment. Thus, this more estab-
lished branch of zoning for direct social control retains its roots in the
physical rationales for zoning.
C. Enter the Courts. Constitutional Issues and Substantive Review.
Judicial review in other areas of the law may create controversy,
but "it has always been recognized that it is an essential part of the
judicial function" for courts to watch over the actions of local govern-
ments.104 Perhaps the activist attitude of the courts reveals a funda-
mental "fear of popular majorities."10 5 In any event, each judicial
examination of a zoning ordinance weighs public interest against pri-
vention of transiency); see also Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 519 n.15 (1977)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
102. See Town of Durham v. White Enters., 115 N.H. 645, 649, 348 A.2d 706, 709 (1975)
(traditional family ordinance upheld in spite of the "fact that unrelated group use does not consti-
tute a different [physical] use than that by the blood related family group"); see also City of Chula
Vista v. Pagard, 159 Cal. Rptr. 29, 32-33 (1979) (report of chief associate planner finding "no
difference in land use impact between a related family of 10 and an unrelated family of 10"),
vacated, 115 Cal. App. 3d 785, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981); c. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 367
F. Supp. 136, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) ("The question ultimately posed is whether it is lawful to have
a one-family dwelling zoning district which excludes equally small household groups who impose
no greater burdens of use on the land, the building or the surroundings than a blood-and-marriage
family group on the simple and bare ground that such student groups are not families made up of
husband, wife and children."), aft'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
103. See, eg., City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 128, 610 P.2d 436, 438, 164
Cal. Rptr. 539, 541 (1980) (en banc) ("Valid laws can, of course, be written to help promote and
protect values that family life enhances.").
104. Williams, supra note 77, at 318; see also E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 63, at 57
(1904).
105. Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L. REv. 641, 670
(1909).
DUKE L4WJOURVAL
vate deprivation, and in so doing defines the legitimate objectives of
planning and the limits of the police power.106
A court always has the option of determining that a traditional-
family ordinance exceeds the power delegated to the municipality in
the enabling legislation.10 7 Nevertheless, courts have reviewed tradi-
tional-family zoning restrictions almost exclusively on constitutional
bases.'08 The outcomes have varied greatly, in part because some state
courts construe state constitutions as affording protections that differ
somewhat from the guarantees included in the federal Constitution.
For example, the highest court in New Jersey refused to follow the
Supreme Court's decision in Belle Terre, noting that a New Jersey
court may interpret its state constitution as it sees fit.109 Furthermore,
federal courts, unlike their state counterparts, hesitate to interfere in
zoning matters because zoning is an exercise of the police power re-
served to the states." 0 But the constitutional principles involved,
whether originating from federal or state guarantees, are similar and
invite a more integrated approach to these cases in order to determine
when a traditional-family ordinance should survive review.
1. Due Process. The Court in Euclid stated the basic test of sub-
stantive due process under the fourteenth amendment, declaring that a
zoning ordinance violates due process if it is "clearly arbitrary and un-
reasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare."' State courts express tests of substantive
106. See THE NEw ZONING at xxii (N. Marcus & M. Groves ed. 1970).,
107. This assumes, of course, that the municipality does not zone pursuant to home rule pow-
ers. In one well-known Illinois case (not involving home rule) the court invalidated a zoning
ordinance, holding that the ordinance was ultra vires. This left the state legislature free to amend
the enabling statute to explicitly permit the local government to zone for direct social control with
respect to traditional families, and the legislature did so. See City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34
Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966), and its ultimate consequence, Village of River Forest v. Mid-
west Bank & Trust Co., 12 Ill. App. 3d 136, 138, 297 N.E.2d 775, 776 (1973) (interpreting ILL.
REv. STAT. 1967, c. 24, § 11-13-1(9)); see also State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 119-20, 405 A.2d 368, 376
(1979).
108. This is true despite the well-worn maxim that a court will not decide an issue on constitu-
tional grounds if statutory grounds will serve as well, see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347
(1936) (concurring opinion), quoted in Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 526 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 118-21, 405 A.2d 368, 376-78 (1979) (Moun-
tain, J., dissenting).
109. State v. Baker, 81 NJ. 99, 112,405 A.2d 368, 374 (1979); see also City of Santa Barbara v.
Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130 n.3, 610 P.2d 436, 440 n.3, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543 n.3 (1980) (en
banc); Holy Name Hosp. v. Montroy, 153 NJ. Super. 181, 185, 379 A.2d 299, 301 (Law Div.
1977); ABA ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HOUSING AND URBAN GROWTH, HOUSING FOR ALL
UNDER LAW 123 (R. Fishman ed. 1978).
110. See Rose, Exclusionary Zoning and Managed Growt Some Unresolved Issues, in AFTER
MOUNT LAUREL 331 (J. Rose & R. Rothman eds. 1977).
111. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395; see also E. FREUND, supra note 104, § 20, at 15. Freund makes
an interesting comment on the meaning of reasonableness: "In discussing this question we may
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due process in similar terms;1l 2 the primary concern is that a measure
bear a reasonable relation to a legitimate governmental objective."t 3
As in analysis pursuant to the equal protection clause,1 4 substantive
due process review becomes more rigorous when a zoning ordinance
intrudes upon "fundamental" liberties. For example, in Moore v. City
of East Cleveland" 5 a zoning restriction that defined family so as to
make it a crime for a grandmother to live with two of her grandsons
impinged upon "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life"1' 6 and prompted a plurality of the Supreme Court to
engage in a searching appraisal of the ordinance. Mr. Justice Powell,
writing for the plurality, conceded that the goals said to justify the ordi-
nance-preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking con-
safely discard all arguments drawn from the assumption that unreasonable means absurd or
plainly arbitrary; statutes which deserve that designation are not much more apt to occur than
judicial decisions of the like character." Id. § 63, at 58 (footnote omitted). The counsel for the
municipality in Euclid wrote in the preface to his treatise on zoning that in every act associated
with zoning the "guiding rule should be reasonableness." I J. METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZON-
ING at v (2d ed. 1955). Cf. H. Werner, The Constitutionality of Zoning Regulations, in 12 STUDIES
IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 52 (1924) ("[t]he point to be emphasized in all zoning is reasonable-
ness"). Another commentator states more generally that "'[d]ue process of law' comes to mean
reasonable law, in the Court's opinion." Corwin, supra note 105, at 663.
112. See, e.g., Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251, 281 A.2d 513,
518 (1971).
113. See Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisiied" Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases,
71 Nw. U.L. REv. 417, 419 (1976) (substantive due process "refers to the principle that a law
adversely affecting an individual's life, liberty, or property is invalid, even though offending no
specific constitutional prohibition, unless the law serves a legitimate governmental objective").
114. Cf. E. FREUND, supra note 104, § 611, at 632 ("The two ideas [of due process and equal
protection] are closely associated in the minds of the courts."). For a discussion of the analysis
given traditional-family zoning ordinances under the equal protection clause see infra text accom-
panying notes 129-62.
115. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
116. Id at 499. The ordinance at issue in Moore included the following definition:
"Family" means a number of individuals related to the nominal head of the household
or to the spouse of the nominal head of the household living as a single housekeeping
unit in a single dwelling unit, but limited to the following:
(a) Husband or wife of the nominal head of the household.
(b) Unmarried children of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the
nominal head of household, provided, however, that such unmarried children have no
children residing with them.
(c) Father or mother of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the nomi-
nal head of the household.
(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, a family may include not
more than one dependent married or unmarried child of the nominal head of the house-
hold or of the spouse of the nominal head of the household and the spouse and depen-
dent children of such dependent child. For the purpose of this subsection, a dependent
person is one who has more than fifty percent of his total support furnished for him by
the nominal head of the household and the spouse of the nominal head of the household.
(e) A family may consist of one individual.
.d. at 496 n.2. Mrs. Moore was living with her son and his son. A second grandson of Mrs.
Moore, a cousin of the first, came to live with the household after his mother's death and thus the
ordinance was contravened. Id. at 496-97.
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gestion, and avoiding undue financial burden on the school system-
were legitimate governmental objectives, but held that the measure in
question "serve[d] them marginally, at best." ' 1 7 Consequently, the East
Cleveland ordinance could not survive the rational basis test under the
Court's heightened substantive due process review. In contrast, when
the Court reviewed a more usual type of traditional-family ordinance
that permitted any number of related individuals to live together, the
majority had no difficulty in finding a relationship between the ordi-
nance and its alleged objectives. 1 8
Rational relationship tests imposed in the course of substantive
due process review have not always been so easily satisfied in the state
courts. When confronted with an ordinance limiting a household to
individuals legally or biologically related, or to no more than four un-
related individuals, the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Baker" 1 9
held that the measure violated the state's constitutional guarantee of
due process.120 Employing an analysis of a sort that frequently appears
in review pursuant to the equal protection clause, the Baker court con-
cluded that the municipality could have accomplished its goals by less
restrictive means. 12'
Other New Jersey cases have also displayed little judicial defer-
ence to local governing bodies in the substantive due process review of
traditional-family ordinances. 22 Zoning restrictions are, however, nor-
mally presumed to be valid; the legislative judgment will prevail if the
validity of the zoning classification is "fairly debatable." 123 The Euclid
117. Id. at 499-500. Parents from surrounding areas had been sending their children to live
with relatives in East Cleveland to take advantage of the superior public school system available
there. See R. ELLICKSON & A.D. TARLOCK, supra note 53, at 894. See generally Brief for Appel-
lant at 57 n.43, Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
118. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). The municipal goals cited were
primarily the historical zoning concerns of controlling population density, traffic congestion and
noise.
119. 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979).
120. Id. at 114, 405 A.2d at 375. In a footnote the court indicated that the ordinance also
violated the right of privacy guaranteed by the state constitution. Id. at 114 n.10, 405 A.2d at 375
n.10.
121. Id at 114, 405 A.2d at 375.
122. See, e.g., Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513
(1971); Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341,271 A.2d 430 (App.
Div. 1970); see also Payne, Delegation Doctrine in the Reform of Local Government Law: The Case
of Exclusionary Zoning, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 803 (1976). Recent exclusionary zoning opinions in
New Jersey seem to seriously and unnecessarily violate the principle that "law reform decisions
... ought to be framed in terms that are as minimally intrusive of the ordinary democratic pro-
cess as possible." Id. at 804.
123. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). One commentator
asserts that the presumption of validity "should remain the strongest in those cases where courts




The presumption of validity has been reversed in other zoning
cases, which may indicate a trend toward less judicial deference to local
legislation, and which some commentators have applauded. 28 It may
be argued that the balance between public interest and private liberty is
best preserved by compelling a municipality to explain why it has
zoned in a particularly restrictive manner. Certainly this approach, or
variations of it, should not be immediately discarded in the search for
means of preventing abuses in zoning for direct social control.
2. EqualProtection. Zoning is at its very heart a system of classi-
fication, and there is a potential for inequality in the operation of any
legislative system of classification. 129 As a result, judges often appraise
the fairness of distinctions drawn in a zoning ordinance by using the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and analogous
provisions of state constitutions. Equal protection analysis has tradi-
tionally followed a "two-tiered" formula. 130 The first level of review
requires that the challenged classification aim at a legitimate govern-
mental purpose and, as the Court noted in Belle Terre, that the classifi-
cation is "'reasonable, not arbitrary . . . and bears a rational
relationship to a [permissible] state objective.'"131 Moreover, "[a] stat-
utory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it"; 132 further, the party attacking the classi-
fication bears the burden of showing a lack of rational relationship. 133
If the legislative classification turns on some constitutionally "sus-
pect" class, such as race, or impinges upon some constitutionally pro-
tected "fundamental right," a second, higher level of equal protection
analysis comes into play. The challenged law must then survive "strict
128. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 180-81, 336 A.2d 713,728, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Bosselman,
Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights of the Entire World? in LAND USE CON-
TROLS 360, 360-63 (D. Listokin ed. 1974); Sager, supra note 11, at 784-85 (1969); Note, The General
Public Interest vs. The Presumption of Zoning Ordinance Validity: 4 Debatable Question, 50 J.
URB. L. 129 (1972); Comment, The Presumption of Constitutionality and the Law of Zoning, 1971
WASH. U.L.Q. 673.
129. E. FREUND, supra note 104, § 611, at 634 notes that "the idea of equality excludes in
principle both particular burdens and special privileges, but admits of reasonable classification."
130. See generaly Tussman & tenBroek, The EqualProtection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341 (1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
131. 416 U.S. at 8; see also F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1919)
("classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike"); Town of Durham v. White Enters., 115 N.H. 645, 648-49,
348 A.2d 706, 708 (1975).
132. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
133. See Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 281, 364 A.2d 1016, 1033
(1976), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977).
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scrutiny": not only must the enactment further a legitimate state objec-
tive, it must also promote a "compelling state interest."' 34 Under this
analysis, the burden of proof shifts to the party seeking tojustiy the
classification. 35 Obviously a legislative classification is more likely to
survive review under the first tier of analysis than under the second,
particularly because it will often prove difficult to show that a tradi-
tional-family ordinance has a rational relationship to a compelling
state interest-such as traffic safety-that could not be more easily pre-
served by less intrusive regulations-such as parking codes or one-way
streets. 136
There is some suggestion that the rigid two-tiered formula is being
replaced by a more flexible analysis. 137 The court of appeals in Belle
Terre adopted this approach. 38 In 1974 a federal district court also
employed a more flexible approach in appraising the validity of a tradi-
tional-family ordinance. This approach involved weighing "the nature
of the unequal classification attacked, the nature of the adversely af-
fected rights, and the governmental interest urged in support of the
classification."' 39 This flexible equal protection analysis is similar to
the substantive due process review utilized by the New Jersey courts
when appraising traditional-family ordinances. 140 Although both of
these methodologies subject the regulations to less strict scrutiny than
the "compelling state interest" test, they nevertheless place a substan-
tial burden on the municipality to support its classification with fact
rather than possibility. 14'
134. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1968).
135. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). As Mr. Justice Marshall noted,
"the onus of demonstrating that no less intrusive means will adequately protect the compelling
state interest and that the challenged statute is sufficiently narrowly drawn, is upon the party
seeking to justify the burden. . . ." Id. at 18.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 147-62.
137. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 551 (1977) (plurality) (recognition
of a "somewhat less strict standard" than strict scrutiny); J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG,
HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 525-26 (1978 & Supp. 1979); Gunther, The Supreme Court
1971 Term--Forward" In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972); Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under
the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classpcations, 62 GEo. L.J.
1071 (1974).
138. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 814 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
For a discussion of the test propounded by the court of appeals, see Note, Boraas v. Village of
Belle Terre: The New, New Equal Protection, 72 MICH. L. REv. 508 (1974).
139. Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456,465 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded, 510
F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975).
140. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
141. The court in Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Wis. 1974) held that the
ordinance in question violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and was
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In most instances, however, courts have used the traditional two-
tiered equal protection analysis, and have found that traditional-family
ordinances do not impinge on any constitutionally protected funda-
mental right.142 Thus, they avoid the second level of analysis: so-
called strict scrutiny. For example, in Belle Terre 143 the zoning restric-
tion prohibited six unrelated students who attended a local university
from living together. A majority of the Supreme Court examined a
number of fundamental interests, including rights of association, pri-
vacy, or travel, and found that these rights were not burdened by the
ordinance. 144 Some state courts will, however, treat certain rights as
fundamentally protected under their respective state constitutions, even
when the federal Constitution provides no such protection. 145 In Cali-
fornia and New Jersey, broad interpretations of the right of privacy
have proved particularly effective in overturning traditional-family
ordinances. 146
Under both strict scrutiny and the lesser level of equal protection
analysis, the rational relationship test must be met.147 In administering
therefore unconstitutional; see also Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973),
rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
142. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality), with the peculiar defini-
tion of family considered therein, is an exception.
143. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
144. Some commentators have criticized the Supreme Court's failure to perceive that freedom
of association and other civil liberties were at stake in Belle Terre. See, e.g., Karst, The Freedom of
Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 686-92 (1980); Michelman, Political Markets and Commu-
nity Self-Determination. Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J.
145, 187-89 (1977-1978). Several state courts have followed Belle Terre, however, even when a
traditional-family ordinance prevented groups from maintaining communal living arrangements
in connection with a common religious orientation, see, e.g., Rademan v. City of Denver, 186
Colo. 250, 526 P.2d 1325 (1974); Town of Durham v. White Enters., 115 N.H. 645, 348 A.2d 706
(1975), thus raising claims of inteference with the constitutionally protected right of free exercise
of religion. See City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 159 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979), vacated, 115 Cal. App. 3d
785, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981); Association for Educ. Dev. v. Hayward, 533 S.W.2d 579 (Mo.
1976).
145. For example, New Jersey courts will employ a more strict scrutiny if a zoning ordinance
impedes the right to decent housing. See Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249,
287, 364 A.2d 1016, 1037 (1976), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977). In con-
trast, access to housing is not a fundamental right under the federal Constitution. See Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). Mr. Justice Brennan has applauded the efforts of state courts to
construe the protections afforded by their respective state constitutions more broadly than coun-
terpart provisions of the federal Constitution have been interpreted. See Brennan, State Constitu-
tions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 489 (1977).
146. See City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539
(1980) (en banc); State v. Baker, 81 NJ. 99, 114 n.10, 405 A.2d 368, 375 n.10 (1979).
147. Courts often neglect to state which branch of equal protection analysis they use in a
particular case-this omission is possibly evidence of the general lack of a clear constitutional
doctrine in zoning litigation as a whole. See R. ELLICKSON & A.D. TARLOCK, supra note 53, at
62; 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, § 4.03, at 93.
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this test, courts frequently assess whether less restrictive or more appro-
priate regulatory means could have achieved the same ends. In so do-
ing, the courts seem to be shedding their judicial role and projecting
themselves into the council chambers of the various municipalities to
contemplate alternative courses of legislative action. For example, with
respect to the goal of maintaining rent structures and ensuring that
traditional families are not priced out of the market, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in Belle Terre thought that this goal could
be better served by a system of rent controls.148 Other admittedly legit-
imate zoning goals have also been described as more properly achieved
by means other than traditional-family ordinances. Problems of traffic
and parking congestion are said to be more effectively solved by limit-
ing the number of cars per dwelling unit,149 prohibiting on-street park-
ing,' 50 enforcing general traffic and noise ordinances,' 5' and requiring
off-street parking.' 52 "Noise and morality," one court notes, "can be
dealt with by enforcement of police power ordinances and criminal
statutes" rather than by zoning.'5 3
Similarly, many courts doubt the relationship of traditional-family
ordinances to the goal of density control. They suggest solutions to
overcrowding such as limiting occupancy in relation to available sleep-
ing or bathroom facilities, 154 or the amount of habitable floor space, 55
148. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 817 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1(1974).
In his dissent in Belle Terre Mr. Justice Marshall also suggested the adoption of rent controls. 416
U.S. at 20. The court may have been too hasty in suggesting this alternative: rent controls are no
panacea and may only compound the problems of the poor and others seeking low-cost housing.
See B. SIEGAN, OTHER PEOPLE'S PROPERTY 25-27 (1976). There is the additional problem of
whether a given municipality has the authority to adopt rent controls. See Brief for Appellants at
35, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
149. See, e.g., Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 817 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416
U.S. 1 (1974); City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 133, 610 P.2d 436, 441, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 539, 544 (1980) (en banc).
150. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 520 n.16 (1977) (plurality).
151. See, e.g., Larson v. Mayor of Spring Lake Heights, 99 N.J. Super. 365, 374, 240 A.2d 31,
36-37 (Law Div. 1976).
152. See, e.g., City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 133, 610 P.2d 436, 441, 164
Cal. Rptr. 539, 544 (1980) (en banc).
153. Id accord, City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 115 Cal. App. 3d 785, 799, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738,
746 (1981) (characterizing such ordinances as "closing-the-barn-door-after-the-horse-is-out
measures").
154. See, e.g., Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456, 467 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 510 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975); City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 115 Cal. App. 3d 785, 797,
171 Cal. Rptr. 738, 745 (1981); Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 254,
281 A.2d 513, 520 (1971).
155. See, e.g., City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 133, 610 P.2d 436, 441, 164
Cal. Rptr. 539, 544 (1980) (en banc); City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 115 Cal. App. 3d 785,797, 171
Cal. Rptr. 738, 745 (1981).
DUKE LAW JOUR2VAL
or by restricting the number of bedrooms in a dwelling structure,1 56 or
"by limiting each household to a specified number of adults, two or
three perhaps, without limitation on the number of dependent
children."' 57
These various ends and means analyses demonstrate that many
courts will hold local governments to a relatively high standard of pre-
cision in exercising municipal zoning power. Because the observations
that traditional families tend to be self-limiting, are less transient, and
generate less traffic than unrelated groups do not "reflect[]. . . univer-
sal truth[s],"158 a local council often cannot pursue objectives of den-
sity, traffic control, and neighborhood stability through the use of
traditional-family zoning. Many courts will not countenance what they
consider the "underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness" of these ordi-
nances.159 According to these courts, the discredited ordinances do
more than merely incorporate "a reasonable margin to insure effective
enforcement."' 60 Nor will these courts uphold such ordinances on the
ground that "the police power ought to comprehend crude and unsuc-
cessful programs as well as perfect and successful ones."' 6' This atti-
tude of review, possibly even more than shifting the burden of proof,162
tends to prevent municipal experimentation with traditional-family
ordinances.
3. The "FunctionalFami. " One specialized form of review ana-
lyzes the rationality of the characteristics an ordinance may use to dis-
tinguish families from other collective groups. Some state courts, most
notably those of New York and New Jersey, in addition to striking
down traditional-family ordinances, have ruled that a local governing
body may deal only with certain characteristics of the traditional fam-
ily in regulating the membership of household units. In essence, mu-
nicipalities may not make distinctions between traditional families and
156. See, e.g., Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 817 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416
U.S. 1 (1974).
157. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 19 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). In Moore v. City
ofE. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 520 n.16 (1977) (plurality), Mr. Justice Stevens remarked that "[t]o
prevent overcrowding, a community can certainly place a limit on the number of occupants in a
household ... in absolute terms. .. ."
158. City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 437, 216 N.E.2d 116, 119 (1966). The
notion of faulting legislative classifications for failing to reflect universal truths recalls the "ir-
rebuttable presumption doctrine" discussed in Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974).
159. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 81 NJ. 99, 110, 405 A.2d 368, 373 (1979).
160. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
161. Johnson, Constitutional Law and Community Planning, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199,
212 (1955).
162. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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domestic groups that, in the opinion of these courts, display all the per-
tinent qualities of a traditional family and therefore constitute "func-
tional families."
In the course of striking down a traditional-family ordinance, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey remarked in a recent opinion that "the
core concept underlying single family living is not biological or legal
relationship but, rather, its character as a single housekeeping unit."1
63
The court has elsewhere indicated that a municipality maintaining a
"family environment," a legitimate goal,.may concern itself only with
"stability" and "permanence," matters largely involving the impact of
land uses on the physical environment. 164 To this end "boarding
houses, dormitory and institutional living" and similar uses could be
excluded. 165 By permitting councils to interfere with the internal struc-
ture of domestic units only so far as to require a bona fide single house-
keeping unit, the New Jersey courts seem to place community character
and ideological goals beyond the reach of the police power as applied
through single-family zoning. 1
66
The New York courts have adopted a more discerning approach.
They have defined the functional equivalent of a family in the context
of applying traditional-family ordinances to "group homes"--dwell-
ings used for housing such groups as mental retardates and neglected
and abandoned children. 167 In City of White Plains v. Ferraioli,168 the
domestic unit in a group home for neglected and abandoned children
consisted of an adult married couple, their two children, and ten foster
children, seven of whom were siblings. In reviewing this unit under an
ordinance requiring legal and biological relationships, the court ob-
served that "[z]oning is intended to control types of housing and living
163. State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 108, 405 A.2d 368, 372 (1979).
164. Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 225, 364 A.2d 993, 1003 (1976).
165. Id.; see also Holy Name Hosp. v. Montroy, 153 N.J. Super. 181, 379 A.2d 299 (1977);
Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 350, 271 A.2d 430, 435
(App. Div. 1970) (suggesting that resort community might validly yet effectively curtail problem of
"group rentals" by requiring that groups of unrelated -individuals constitute bona fide single
housekeeping units).
166. The New Jersey position denies recognition, at least through the use of the zoning power,
to values which some commentators attribute to a variety of enduring relationships in unrelated
groups as well as in the traditional family, but which do not inhere in every bona fide single
housekeeping unit. As the following discussion demonstrates, it seems the same charge could not
be leveled at the New York courts.
167. There has been no suggestion that the New York courts would not adhere to the func-
tional family approach where a group home was not involved. The establishment of a group
home may, however, involve policy questions and state interests that would not attach to the
establishment of all households comprised of unrelated people. See Developments in the Law-
Zoning, supra note 11, at 1577-78 ("social importance of [these] small institutions").
168. 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974).
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and not the genetic or intimate internal family relations of human be-
ings."' 69 The court held that the minimal arrangement required to
meet the ordinance's definition of family was "a group headed by a
householder caring for a reasonable number of children as one would
be likely to find in a biologically unitary family."170 The court clearly
permitted a proper concern for "outward appearances" and the largely
physical aspects of stability and permanence. But it also considered the
strength of the domestic bonds and the internal structure of the house-
hold unit in assessing whether it had before it a functional family: the
arrangement was "akin to a traditional family, which also may be sun-
dered by death, divorce, or emancipation of the young.'' 1
All of these cases 172 demonstrate a judicially imposed limitation
on the zoning power: municipalities cannot create classifications distin-
guishing traditional families from domestic groups that, from a land
use point of view, are their functional equivalents. 73 Assuming that
169. Id. at 305, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
170. Id. at 306, 313 N.E.2d at 759, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
171. Id. at 305, 313 N.E.2d at 758,357 N.Y.S.2d at 452. In a subsequent case, Group House v.
Board of Zoning & Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 380 N.E.2d 207, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1978), the New
York Court of Appeals again suggested that a municipality might validly look to the internal
structure of a group home in addition to its external appearance. The proposed group home in
question consisted of two surrogate parents and seven children who would be drawn from the
community because of their unhappy home life. The children would return to their natural fami-
lies if and when this became possible. The court carefully examined the characteristics of the
domestic unit, including its stability and permanency, but also used language of more intangible
objectives when it stated that the group home "would in no way detract from the family and youth
values which one-family zoning is intended to protect," and in fact, "might actually support and
further those values even more effectively than certain natural families." Id. at 273, 380 N.E.2d at
210, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 381. The dissenting judge enumerated the relevant considerations, stating
that "[u]Itimately, the question is whether in theory, size, appearance, and structure the home is
set up to emulate a family." Id. at 277, 380 N.E.2d at 213, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 383 (Breitel, C.J.,
dissenting). Cf. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 989-90 (1978) (arguing that tradi-
tional family functions inhere in a wide variety of enduring relationships and that governmental
interference with any such relationship should be precluded unless compellingly justified); Note,
Group House of Port Washington v. Board of Zoning & Appeals: Encroachment of Community
Residences Into Single-Family Districts, 43 ALB. L. REv. 539, 544 (1979) (suggesting that the court
looked to the overall purpose and intended effect of the group home).
172. See also, e.g., Hessling v. City of Broomfield, 193 Colo. 124, 563 P.2d 12 (1977); State ex.
rel. Ellis v. Liddle, 520 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Little Neck Community Ass'n v. Work-
ing Org. for Retarded Children, 52 A.D.2d 90, 383 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1976); Incorporated Village of
Freeport v. Association for the Help of Retarded Children, 94 Misc. 2d 1048, 406 N.Y.S.2d 221
(Sup. Ct. 1977); Children's Home v. City of Easton, 417 A.2d 830 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980); Hop-
kins v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 423 A.2d 1082 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980).
173. The New York courts, unlike the New Jersey courts, require more than the outward
appearance of a single housekeeping unit in their classification of family-like aggregates. A Wis-
consin court has distinguished between attempts "to duplicate the biological family" on the one
hand, and attempts "to duplicate the family life style" on the other. Browndale Int'l, Ltd. v. Board
of Adjustment, 60 Wis. 2d 182,205, 208 N.W.2d 121, 123 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
Browndale and a recent Ohio case, Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass'n, 63 Ohio St. 2d 259, 407
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some ideological values attach to the traditional family and the tradi-
tional family only, the functional family doctrine suggests that these
ideological values are not goals that justify the use of the police power
to regulate land use. These cases seem to illustrate the desire of some
courts to limit zoning to the regulation of relatively tangible aspects of
the urban environment and the furtherance of more traditional objec-
tives of the police power, such as those which largely motivated the first
comprehensive zoning effort in New York City.
4. Mitigating Factors: The "Escape Hatches." Any scheme of
legislative classification might, in the appropriate circumstances, be im-
pugned for its rigidity. A zoning ordinance permitting no group of un-
related individuals to live within its borders might appear to operate
unfairly against a major sector of society, thus making the ordinance
constitutionally infirm. Arguably, however, there are a number of de-
vices and considerations that would mitigate the alleged rigidity of
traditional-family ordinances and thereby aid them in passing constitu-
tional muster. For example, traditional-family ordinances almost inva-
riably include an exception for a limited number of unrelated
individuals living together in a housekeeping unit. This exception has
received a mixed reception in the courts. In a case considering an ordi-
nance permitting groups related by a "domestic bond" other than birth
or marriage, one court observed that where "the zoning restriction does
not totally exclude occupancy of persons unrelated by blood or mar-
riage ties from all type residential districts, the legislative classification
does not deny equal protection." 174 Most traditional-family ordinances
limit the number of unrelated individuals permitted to occupy a dwell-
ing. The zoning measure in Belle Terre set the limit at two. The
Supreme Court did not consider this an unjustifiably arbitrary choice:
"[E]very line drawn by a legislature leaves some out that might well
have been included. That exercise of discretion, however, is a legisla-
tive, not a judicial, function." 175 In contrast, a New Jersey court held
that a traditional-family ordinance unreasonably restricted the right of
N.E.2d 1369 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981), suggest that a relevant consideration in
determining whether a household is the functional equivalent of a family is the purpose for which
the members have been brought together. The court in Browndale found that the primary purpose
of the therapeutic homes at issue was commercial. The Garcia court concluded that the group
home in question was established primarily for the care and training of its occupants. Conse-
quently, the domestic units in both cases were not deemed to be families.
174. People v. Kalayjian, 76 Misc. 2d 1097, 1100, 352 N.Y.S.2d 115, 118 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
175. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (footnote omitted). The exception
for unrelated individuals permitted Mr. Justice Douglas to distinguish Belle Terre from United
States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (denial of foodstamps to households
containing unrelated individuals is improper). See 416 U.S. at 8 n.6. Some commentators have
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unrelated people to share housekeeping facilities and found "no signifi-
cant amelioration of such unreasonableness in allowing occupancy by
two unrelated people."1 76
Other devices which inject flexibility into the system-the variance
and the special exception or conditional use permit-might appear to
significantly lessen any alleged arbitrariness of a traditional-family or-
dinance. But the few cases on the subject suggest that the availability
of a variance procedure will not adequately ameliorate the effect of an
otherwise unconstitutional traditional-family ordinance. 177 As one
Supreme Court Justice said: "We have now passed well beyond the
day when illusory escape hatches could justify the imposition of bur-
dens on fundamental rights."' 78 No case has yet fully considered the
conditional use question, but the discretionary nature of the permit
process could prove problematic when the identity of land users is so
obviously at issue. 179
If the chief argument against traditional-family ordinances is that
they unfairly limit the housing choices of unrelated groups, the availa-
bility of alternative housing for these groups in other districts within
the municipality or the surrounding region may mitigate the alleged
unfairness. The lower courts considered this issue in the Belle Terre
case. Belle Terre, a small Long Island village,180 was zoned in its en-
tirety for traditional families, with an exception for domestic units con-
criticized the ease with which the Court reconciled Moreno and Belle Terre. See, e.g., Wilkinson
& White, supra note 91, at 584-87.
176. Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 349, 271 A.2d 430,
434 (App. Div. 1970).
177. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 497 n.5, 511-13 (1977) (plurality); City
of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 135-37, 610 P.2d 436, 443-44, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539,
546-47 (1980) (en banc).
178. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring). Ap-
parently, East Cleveland had advised Mrs. Moore that she would probably receive a variance, but
the legal-aid society lawyers representing her wished to test the constitutional issues and per-
suaded her not to apply for it. See R. ELLICKSON & A.D. TARLOCK, supra note 53, at 894; cf.
Brief for Appellee at 18, Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality) ("Relief,
possibly with some stipulation(s) would probably have been granted.") (footnote omitted).
179. See, e.g., City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 159 Cal. Rptr. 29, 39 (1979) (alleged that reli-
gious family group was "excluded by bureaucratic interposition from living in any zone in Chula
Vista"), vacated, 115 Cal. App. 3d 785, 795-96, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738, 744 (1981) (vesting discretion in
planning commission as to establishment of "group residence" created "infirmity" in conditional
use permit system); see also City of Santa Barbara V. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 134-35, 610 P.2d
436, 442-43, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 545-46 (1980) (en banc) (argument that lifestyle of unrelated
households could be preserved by conditional use permit for boarding house not accepted). Simi-
lar distrust of administrative discretion appears in decisions discussing variances. See, e.g., Moore
v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 512-13 (1977) (plurality).
180. Belle Terre contained approximately 220 homes and 700 inhabitants in a land area of less
than one square mile. 416 U.S. at 2.
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sisting of two unrelated individuals. Six unrelated students attending a
nearby university were residing together in one of the village's houses
in violation of the zoning ordinance. To the federal district court, the
fact that the students could either obtain similar housing in nearby
communities or take up residence on campus where dormitory space
was plentiful meant that "no substantial constitutional question [was]
presented"' 8 1 because there was "no present threat exclusion from
Belle Terre would deny to the plaintiff students the right to live as the
group that they are."'182 But a majority of the court of appeals took a
different view: to the appeals court, limiting the geographical scope of
an unconstitutional ordinance did not make the statute less objectiona-
ble. The majority noted that neighboring municipalities might adopt
similar ordinances and that some had already done so.' 8 3
Expulsion from one's home is a serious sanction. 8 4 Fairness,
however, does not require unfettered choice:' 8 5 zoning has always lim-
ited dwelling choices and operated to prevent people from locating in
particular sectors of a community. Furthermore, regional considera-
tions have increasingly entered into judicial appraisals of zoning ordi-
nances.' 86 In short, to recognize municipal autonomy as a worthwhile
value, the availability of alternative housing should not be summarily
rejected as a factor in assessing the validity of traditional-family
ordinances. 8 7
181. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 367 F. Supp. 136, 148-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aj'd, 416 U.S.
1 (1974).
182. Id at 147; see also Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 550 (1977) (White, J.,
dissenting).
183. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 817-18 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1
(1974); see also Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456, 468 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and re-
manded, 510 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975) ("This argument [that there is other housing available] is not
persuasive because it assumes that the original classification was a rational one .... I have found
that it was irrational, and an irrational classification is not saved because one can escape its irra-
tionality by living elsewhere.").
184. See Doyle, Retirement Communities: The Nature and Enforceability of Residential Segre-
gation byAge, 76 MICH. L. REv. 64, 95 n.125 (1977).
185. See Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Planning, in THE NEW
ZONING, supra note 106, at 65.
186. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Blumstein, supra note 83,
at 15-35; Developments in the Law-Zoning, supra note 11, at 1635-41. Regional considerations
were used in the past as well, although at times to uphold the validity of unfairly restrictive munic-
ipal land use controls. See Burchell, Listokin, & James, Exclusionary Zoning: Pitfalls of the Re-
gional Remedy, in NEw DIMENSIONS OF URBAN PLANNING: GROWTH CONTROLS 36 (J. Hughes
ed. 1974).
187. A number of cases appear to support this view. See, e.g., Palo Alto Tenants Union v.
Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908, 912 (N.D. Cal. 1970), a~f'dper curlam, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973);
City of Chula Vista v. Pagard, 159 Cal. Rptr. 29,39 (1979), vacated, 115 Cal. App. 3d 785, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 738 (1981); People v. Renaissance Project, Inc., 36 N.Y.2d 65, 70, 324 N.E.2d 355, 357, 364
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D. The Avoidance of Abuses and the Balancing of Values.
Although courts have at their disposal a multitude of tools with
ivhich to dissect traditional-family zoning ordinances, these tools
should be used with restraint. Courts must balance important values
when reviewing traditional-family ordinances: at the very least, a com-
munity's right to determine its own destiny must be measured against
an individual's interest in choosing his or. her own lifestyle. The cases
reveal no unified policy of review. Some courts champion the public
interest; others, private rights. The preferable middle way should struc-
ture analysis of traditional-family ordinances so that judicial interven-
tion may prevent abuses. But this intervention should be neither
haphazard nor insensitive to the value of local autonomy.
At times the approach of reviewing courts has caused two public
interests to conflict: the public interest in controlling population den-
sity opposes the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the fam-
ily. As noted previously, both concerns have at least some validity as
zoning goals. 188 For instance, one Supreme Court Justice has sug-
gested that absolute density control-limiting the number of people al-
lowed to live in a single-family dwelling-is proper and potentially less
intrusive than a traditional-family ordinance. 18 9 But if such density
controls threatened to split a family it should be appropriate to relax
the restrictions, within the bounds of public health requirements, so as
to allow the family to live in one dwelling. Moore suggests that even
the extended family has a favored constitutional position. Yet, is there
a difference between an ordinance that permits any number of related
individuals to live as a household but limits the number of unrelated
persons who may do so, and an ordinance that ties occupancy to avail-
able floor space but relaxes the standards to permit related individuals
to reside together?190 In their rush to overturn traditional-family ordi-
nances and suggest supposedly more appropriate means to accomplish
the desired ends, the courts sometimes appear to be the ones who are
"burn[ing] the house to roast the pig."191
Furthermore, some ends may be achieved by no means other than
a traditional-family ordinance. The ideological goals associated with
N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (1975); see also Burt, The Constitution ofthe Family, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 329,
390-91 (arguing that the availability of alternative housing in the metropolitan area should have
been considered in Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58, 127-40.
189. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 520 n.16 (1977) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); see also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 19 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
190. See Town of Durham v. White Enters., 115 N.H. 645, 648, 348 A.2d 706, 708 (1975).
191. Larson v. Mayor of Spring Lake Heights, 99 N.J. Super. 365, 374, 240 A.2d 31, 36 (Law
Div. 1968).
[Vol. 1982:761
Vol. 1982:761] ZONING FOR SOCIAL CONTROL
the traditional family can only be promoted by limiting a residential
district exclusively to legally and biologically related groups, with pos-
sible exceptions for small numbers of unrelated individuals.1 92 In addi-
tion, there are aspects of the community character of a single family
neighborhood that cannot be preserved by conventional density, traffic,
and other controls relating to physical aspects. 93 Such abstract and
intangible objectives have received little attention from courts engaged
in their own ends and means analyses.
Because zoning ordinances requiring that domestic units be legally
and biologically related can radically interfere with the lifestyle choices
of some, it seems appropriate to insist that municipalities present a fac-
tual basis for the legislative classification imposed in this sort of regula-
tion. This suggests a departure from the usual judicial appraisal of
zoning restrictions in two ways. First, local governing bodies would
have the burden of justifying their regulatory action; in other words,
the usual presumption of validity would be reversed, at least to some
extent.' 94 Second, requiring that-the factual bases underlying a tradi-
tional-family ordinance be revealed would imply an intermediate level
of substantive review: higher than the usual due process and first level
192. One commentator argues that for a community pursuing the ends that Belle Terre sought
to achieve with its ordinance, "there exists no palatable alternative to bright-line distinctions be-
tween families and other groups. No system of individualized hearings could adequately predict
which living units present substantial risks of community harm, nor could any such system avoid
outrageous intrusiveness in gathering its information." Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REv. 981, 1053 (1979).
193. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 539 n.9 (1977):
The appellant makes much of East Cleveland Housing Code § 1351.03 (1966), which
prescribes a minimum habitable floor area per person; she argues that because the mu-
nicipality has chosen to establish a specific density control the single-family ordinance
can have no role to play. It is obvious, however, that § 1351.03 is directed not at preserv-
ing the character of a residential area but at establishing minimum health and safety stan-
dards.
Id (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Professor Tribe suggests the sort of reasoning a municipality might employ in arguing that it
required a traditional-family ordinance to preserve its character and that no less restrictive regula-
tory alternatives were available to it:
The government, moreover, may insist that. . . the very presence of significant numbers
of student or other non-family groups (if one such group has a right to move in, why not
two? twenty?) will gradually alter the character of life in the community, not simply
because of everyone's knowledge about what sorts of people live behind the drawn
shades but because the entire fabric of cultural, economic, and social existence inevitably
responds to the tastes and preferences of those who make up any given population. Thus
one might, for example, expect a change in the character of the entertainments shown at
a neighborhood theatre after the composition of the neighborhood has changed; such
collective changes cannot be avoided simply by looking the other way. Nor can they be
reduced to any compendium of discrete harms avoidable, one by one, through less restrictive
alternatives than zoning out identied types ofpersons.
L. TRIBE, supra note 171, at 983 (emphasis added).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 123-27.
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equal protection analysis, but somewhat lower than the compelling
state interest test.' 95
By applying this standard, courts could ensure that a municipality
harbors no predominant bad motive-such as a desire to make life dif-
ficult for "alternative" families-in enacting a particular zoning
scheme. Moreover, the burden of indicating the underlying motive
would fall on the party best able to easily and accurately discharge that
burden. Local governments would not, however, face the almost insu-
perable task of meeting the second tier of equal protection analysis or
the brand of substantive due process review applied by some New
Jersey courts in appraising traditional-family ordinances. 196 In this
way, the suggested standard respects the value of local autonomy.
Even if a municipality can justify the legislative classification
found in a traditional-family ordinance with a fact-basis argument,
such a regulation could still harbor the potential for abuse. For in-
stance, a large metropolitan area zoned entirely for traditional families
might prompt even the most enthusiastic supporter of local autonomy
to balk. A court should, however, be more sympathetic to a similar
regulation that provided places in the region for alternative families to
reside in accommodations of acceptable quantity and quality. Even a
variance or conditional use scheme, if it adopted adequately detailed
objective standards for granting the remedy and was administered
openly and fairly, might soften the effect of a city-wide traditional-fam-
ily ordinance sufficiently to validate the ordinance. The availability of
alternative housing should be a crucial factor in determining the valid-
ity or invalidity of a traditional-family ordinance. To argue otherwise
seems inflexible and unnecessarily hostile to the idea of permitting a
municipality to determine its own destiny.
A local government can take this approach one step further by
providing a plan for a balanced housing stock adequate for the needs of
both traditional and non-traditional living groups. In turn, a plan for a
balanced housing stock could form part of a larger comprehensive plan
for the community. An appropriate comprehensive plan would not
only address housing needs in terms of allotting adequate sites for both
related and unrelated groups, but would also contain much of the fac-
tual material upon which the distinction between the related and unre-
lated groups was based.
A comprehensive plan can incorporate each of the factors that a
court should consider in reviewing a traditional-family ordinance: fact
bases, availability of alternative housing, and planning for alternative
195. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 120-22, 134-35 and accompanying text.
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housing. Whether denominated due process, equal protection, or some
other standard of substantive review, an examination of single-family
zoning by a court benefits from the application of a flexible conceptual
framework relying upon these factors. Municipalities would also bene-
fit from adopting this framework as a guide to preparing and drafting
zoning for single-family districts. And as will be seen, this framework
fits equally well with other varieties of zoning for direct social con-
trol-such as age-restrictive zoning.
III. ZONING FOR DIRECT SOCIAL CONTROL: AGE RESTRICTIONS
A. Development of Age-Restrictive Zoning.
Age-restrictive zoning ordinances authorize land users to live in a
dwelling area, or exclude them, on the basis of their age. Such ordi-
nances are a comparatively recent innovation. 197 In 1965 a Connecti-
cut court considered a zoning amendment creating "A Senior Citizen
Planned Community District."198 The ordinance, which required tracts
of land containing at least 400 acres for such projects, imposed special
occupancy restrictions:
[The occupancy of such a community shall be restricted to persons
who are fifty years of age or over, subject to certain exceptions, such
as a spouse under fifty years married to one over that age, children
over eighteen years, residing with at least one parent over fifty years,
and adults under fifty years if his or her presence is required to min-
ister to an occupant over fifty years of age. 199
The court noted that it had found "no precedent in Connecticut or else-
where" for this type of zoning ordinance. 2°° During the past decade,
however, cases considering age-restrictive zoning have become more
prevalent, although they are still relatively few in number.20 ' Appar-
197. The development of zoning provides an excellent example of the law's ability to evolve.
As the urban environment has increased in complexity, the police power has expanded to meet the
new legal needs. See R. WALKER, THE PLANNING FUNCTION IN URBAN GOVERNMENT 50 (2d ed.
1950); Baker, The Constitutionality of Zoning Laws, 20 ILL. L. REV. 213, 242, 250 (1925).
198. Hinman v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 26 Conn. Supp. 125, 214 A.2d 131 (C.P. 1965).
199. Id. at 127, 214 A.2d at 132.
200. Id. at 128, 214 A.2d at 133.
201. See, e.g., Bell v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 174 Conn. 493, 391 A.2d 154 (1978); Shep-
ard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 (1976); Taxpayers
Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976), appeal dismissed and cert. de-
nied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977); Campbell v. Barraud, 58 A.D.2d 570, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1977); Apfel-
baum v. Town of Clarkstown, 104 Misc. 2d 371, 428 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Sup. Ct. 1980). Age-restrictive
ordinances authorizing the creation of retirement communities are probably more common than
the small number of reported decisions considering them would suggest. See Shepard v. Wood-
land Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 236 n.4, 364 A.2d 1005, 1009 n.4 (1976).
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ently age-restrictive ordinances exemplify the increasing trend to em-
ploy zoning for direct social control.202
Age-restrictive zoning has occurred in connection with the estab-
lishment of planned communities designed specifically for the elderly.
These projects, often called retirement communities, usually feature
low density developments, are designed on a relatively large scale, and
may consist of a variety of building types, including low- and even
high-rise apartments, 20 3 duplexes and single-family homes,204 and mo-
bile homes.20 5 They frequently incorporate such features as recrea-
tional and medical facilities, 20 6 central dining areas, 20 7 security
202. The pressures in this direction may be both demographic and market-related. In 1955
Professor Williams noted an increase in age segregation in the urban environment. See Williams,
supra note 77, at 331. It is worth noting, however, that Williams saw segregation of residential
districts by age groups occurring because "most new areas are developed primarily for young
married couples with young children." Id.; see also Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71
N.J. 249, 266-67, 364 A.2d 1016, 1025-26 (1976) ("As a consequence of declining birth rates and
longer life expectancies, the elderly are increasing both in absolute numbers and in relative pro-
portion to the total population.") (citations omitted), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 430 U.S.
977 (1977); Travaio, supra note 123, at 319. Commentators with both governmental and market
perspectives now recognize that the elderly have special housing needs. See Taxpayers Ass'n v.
Weymouth Township, 71 NJ. 249, 267-68, 364 A.2d 1016, 1026-27 (1976) (citing sources), appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977); Melman, Housingfor the Aged-The Government
Response: An Anasis of the Missouri Boarding Housefor the AgedLaw, 8 URB. LAW. 123, 123-25
(1976). They realize that a critical shortage of appropriate housing exists. See Taxpayers Ass'n v.
Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 272-73, 364 A.2d 1016, 1028-29 (1976) (citing sources), appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977). One result has been legislation at both the state
and federal levels. Seeid. at 273,364 A.2d at 1029; Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481,484-85, 330
N.E.2d 403, 406, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, 389, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 993 (1975);
Melman, supra, at 125-30 (description of federal legislative responses to the problem of housing
for the elderly). Another response is the use of private agreements such as restrictive covenants or
condominium agreements to exclude children from developments. See, e.g., Riley v. Stoves, 22
Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974); White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346
(Fla. 1979); Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 236 n.3, 364
A.2d 1005, 1009 n.3 (1976) (while litigation was pending, the effect of age-restrictive zoning ordi-
nance was sought to be achieved through the use of restrictive covenants). The demand for devel-
opments restricted to the elderly is increasing. See, e.g., R. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY
RIGHTS 42-43 (1977); Doyle, supra note 184, at 64. For an account of how the residents of Sun
City, California, petitioned their local government for the creation of an age-restricted zone and
the imposition of that classification upon their residential districts, see Holmes & Brown, The Age
Restricted Residence: Legitimate Exclusionary Zoningfor the Future, 13 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 921,
945-47 (1980).
203. See, e.g., Troy, Mich., Zoning Ordinance art. VI, §§ 5.42(5), 5.45(6), reprinted In C.
CRAWFORD, supra note 44, at 139.
204. See, e.g., Elrod, Housing Alternativesfor the Elderly, 18 J. FAM. L. 723, 740-41 (1979-80)
(general description of retirement communities).
205. See, e.g., Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976),
appeal dismissed and cert denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977); Elrod, supra note 204, at 740-41.
206. See, e.g., Elrod, supra note 204, at 740-41.
207. See, e.g., Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. County of Cook, 49 Ill. App. 3d 630, 640, 365
N.E.2d 913, 918-19 (1977), rev'd, 71 11. 2d 510, 377 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
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systems, 20 8 low-gradient walks, hand rails, and ramps.20 9 The occu-
pancy restrictions in ordinances directed toward these projects also
vary widely, but generally the minimum age for occupancy is at least
fifty-two. 210 Such regulations often include exceptions for some per-
sons who do not satisfy the minimum age requirement, such as
spouses 211 or children above a certain age (usually eighteen).212 Of
course, some ordinances make no exception for under-age spouses21 3
and, with respect to children, limit the number 214 or exclude them
altogether.215
Traditionally, local governments have treated homes for the aged
and nursing homes as disfavored uses and sometimes have attempted
208. Id. at 640, 365 N.E.2d at 919.
209. See, ag., Bell v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 173 Conn. 223, 224 n.l, 377 A.2d 299, 299
n.1 (1977) (reproducing zoning amendment establishing elderly housing regulations).
210. See Elrod, supra note 204, at 742. For cases considering ordinances imposing an age
minimum of fifty-two, see Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230,
364 A.2d 1005 (1976); Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016
(1976), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977); Maryland-National Capital Park &
Planning Comm'n v. Rossmoor Corp., 265 Md. 267, 288 A.2d 898 (1972). For an ordinance speci-
fying a minimum age of fifty-five, see Campbell v. Barraud, 58 A.D.2d 570, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909
(1977). For an ordinance specifying sixty-two, see Troy, Mich., Zoning Ordinance art. II, § 5.2
(79), reprinted in C. CRAWFORD, supra note 44 at 130. At least one ordinance specifies a lower
limit: fifty years of age. See Hinman v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 26 Conn. Supp. 125, 214
A.2d 131 (C.P. 1965). Municipalities have in some instances adopted zoning measures that au-
thorize retirement communities but do not include any minimum age requirement for occupancy.
See, eg., Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, appeal dismissed
and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 993 (1975).
211. See, e.g., Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376, 379, 311 A.2d
187, 188 (App. Div. 1973) (ordinance required younger spouse to be 45 years of age), rep'd, 71 N.J.
249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977); Campbell v.
Barraud, 58 A.D.2d 570, 572, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909, 912 (1977) (no minimum age requirements for
younger spouse).
212. See, e.g., Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376, 379, 311 A.2d
187, 188 (App. Div. 1973) (eighteen), rev'd, 71 N.J. 249,364 A.2d 1016 (1976), appeal dismissed and
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977); Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J.
230,364 A.2d 1005 (1976) (nineteen); Campbell v. Barraud, 58 A.D.2d 570, 572, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909,
912 (1977) (nineteen); Holmes & Brown, supra note 202, at 946 n.91 (quoting ordinance excluding
anyone under eighteen years of age). But see Point Pleasant, N.J., Code ch. 109-54, § 20 (1969),
quoted in Note, Zoningfor the Elderly and Family Rights, 23 CATH. LAW. 118, 129 n.83 (1978) (no
age limit for children if at least one parent is above the age minimum). Some age-restrictive
ordinances admit any adult, whether related or not, if his presence is necessary to minister to an
occupant over the age minimum. See, e.g., Hinman v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 26 Conn.
Supp. 125, 214 A.2d 131 (C.P. 1965); Campbell v. Barraud, 58 A.D.2d 570, 572, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909,
912 (1977); Manalapan, NJ., Amendment to Zoning Ordinance no. 1, art. V (August 1970), quoted
in Note, supra, at 119 n.ll.
213. See Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 234, 364 A.2d
1005, 1007-08 (1976).
214. See id. (limit of one child).
215. See Troy, Mich., Zoning Ordinance art. II, § 5.2 (79), reprinted in C. CRAWFORD, supra
note 44, at 130.
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to exclude them from certain districts.216 The recent age-restrictive or-
dinances, however, seek to affirmatively provide for the elderly.217
Other community policies may conflict with this impulse. For exam-
ple, a number of states have legislation that prohibits discrimination
against children in rental and lease arrangements.21 8 In some circum-
stances courts have looked to these provisions as expressing a public
policy against unequal treatment in housing between families with chil-
dren and those without.219 Nevertheless, recent cases upholding age-
restrictive zoning measures that permit the creation of retirement com-
munities have not considered this type of broad public policy 220 and, in
practice, courts may pay little heed to these statutes.22'
Some states also have general civil rights legislation prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of age.222 In two recent cases upholding
ordinances containing minimum age requirements, courts, by looking
to more specific legislative provisions dealing with housing and real
estate that omitted such prohibitions and by recognizing the public pol-
icy of encouraging the construction of housing for the elderly, deter-
mined that general statutory prohibitions against age discrimination
did not apply.223 Other states have enacted legislation that explicitly
216. See, e.g., Washington ex rel. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Women's
Kansas City St. Andrew Soe'y v. Kansas City, 54 F.2d 1071 (W.D. Mo. 1931), rev'd, 58 F.2d 593
(8th Cir. 1932). See generally 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, §§ 58.11-15.
217. For possible reasons behind this change in attitude, see Supra note 202.
218. See O'Brien & Fitzgerald, Apartmentfor Rent-Children Not Ailowed: The Illinois Chil-
dren in Housing Statute-Its VTiabilidy and a Proposalfor Its Comprehensive Amendment, 25 DE
PAUL L. REV. 64, 66 n. 11 (1975) (listing statutes); Note, Housing Discrimination Against Children:
The Legal Status of a Growing Social Problem, 16 J. FAM. L. 559, 565-71 (1977-78) [hereinafter
cited as Housing Discrimination Against Children].
Some municipalities have enacted ordinances restricting discrimination against children in
rental housing, but the effectiveness of these measures is questionable. See Dunaway & Blied,
Discrimination Against Children in Rental Housing: A California Perspective, 19 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 21, 51 (1979). An extensive list of state and local legislation prohibiting discrimination in
rental housing against families with children is provided in Note, Why Johnny Can't Rent-An
Examination of Laws Prohibiting Discrimination Against Families in Rental Housing, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1829, 1829 n.4 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Why Johnny Can'tRent].
219. See Duggan v. County of Cook, 60 IlL. 2d 107, 116-17, 324 N.E.2d 406, 411 (1975);
Gilman v. City of Newark, 73 NJ. Super. 562, 591, 180 A.2d 365, 381 (Law Div. 1962); Boyd H.
Wood Co. v. Finkelstein, 193 Misc. 315, 84 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. 1948). Such statutes are not
directly enforceable in a situation involving a sale rather than a rental. Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz.
App. 223, 226-27, 526 P.2d 747, 750-51 (1974).
220. See Housing Discrimination Against Children, supra note 218, at 601-02.
221. See O'Brien & Fitzgerald, supra note 218, at 86 (concluding that Illinois legislation is not
viable).
222. Housing Discrimination Against Children, supra note 218 at 572-75.
223. See Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 285 n.16, 364 A.2d 1016, 1035
n.16 (1976), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977); Campbell v. Barraud, 58
A.D.2d 570, 572, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909, 913 (1977).
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recognizes the validity of age restrictions.224 In the vast majority of
states, however, the legislature has not articulated a policy with respect
to age restrictions on land use; as a consequence, the task of determin-
ing the validity of age-restrictive zoning has fallen upon the courts.
Interestingly, the wide variation of judicial opinion found on the
question of the validity of traditional-family ordinances does not ap-
pear in similar appraisals of age-restrictive zoning. State courts notice-
ably hostile to traditional-family ordinances often support measures
containing age restrictions and other related occupancy requirements.
But though they generally uphold age-restrictive zoning, courts have
noted that age-restrictive ordinances can unfairly exclude certain mem-
bers of society from a community.225 Some cases have suggested
means by which this abusive capability of such zoning might be mini-
mized. These suggested safeguards are similar to the ones discussed in
connection with traditional-family zoning,226 and their potential appli-
cability and effectiveness in the context of both types of zoning deserve
further examination. First, however, age-restrictive zoning should be
considered in terms of its goals and its ability to survive substantive
review.
B. Purported Goals of Age-Restrictive Zoning.
Like traditional-family zoning ordinances, age-restrictive ordi-
nances encouraging retirement communities seek to satisfy housing
needs both with respect to relatively intangible matters and with re-
spect to more traditional concerns involving physical aspects of the res-
idential environment. One of the latter, long counted among the
conventional purposes of zoning, is noise control. Resort communities
224. For example, New Hampshire excepts from its prohibition of age discrimination "the sale
or rental of dwellings which are [sic] pursuant to a plan for a retirement or similar community
establishment limited to persons over a certain age, not less than forty-five years." N.H. Rv.
STAT. ANN. § 354-A: 8(V-b)(d) (Supp. 1979); see also AIuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1317(B), 33-
303(B) (Supp. 1980); Why Johnny Can't Rent, supra note 218, at 1842 n.67 (citing other examples
of similar legislation). See generaliy Comment, Neither Seen Nor Heard- Keeping Children Out of
Arizona's Adult Communities Under Arizona Revised Statutes Section 33-1317(B), 1975 AIZ. ST.
L.J. 813.
225. The courts also recognize that all zoning has an exclusionary aspect. See, e.g., Construc-
tion Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934
(1976):
Practically all zoning restrictions have as a purpose and effect the exclusion of some
activity or type of structure or a certain density of inhabitants. And in reviewing the
reasonableness of a zoning ordinance, our inquiry does not terminate with a finding that
it is for an exclusionary purpose. We must determine further whether the exclusion
bears any rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.
Id (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 194-96.
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have attempted to eradicate the boisterous behavior of groups of unre-
lated youths occupying seasonal dwellings by enacting ordinances re-
quiring legal and biological relationships in domestic units,227 but
retirement communities often desire to avoid the noise accompanying
the presence of any younger individuals. As several cases note, the eld-
erly wish to escape the "irritations from the boisterousness of young
children and some older children."228
Retirement communities under age-restrictive zoning also often
attempt to address the specialized housing needs of the elderly by in-
corporating design features that recognize the physical infirmities ac-
companying aging. Testimony in one case indicated that, among other
things, the elderly desire more concentrated services and public trans-
portation facilities.229 Other simpler adjustments include ramps, health
care facilities, and recreation planning.230
Another goal of age-restrictive zoning is to increase the quantity of
suitable housing stock.231 The shortage of appropriate housing for the
227. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
228. Campbell v. Barraud, 85 Misc. 2d 97, 99,376 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383 (Sup. Ct. 1975), mod/fled,
58 A.D.2d 570, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1977); see also, e.g., Flowers v. John Burnham & Co., 21 Cal.
App. 3d 700,703, 98 Cal. Rptr. 644, 645 (1971) (landlord sought to limit children in its apartments
because of their "independence, mischieviousness, boisterousness and rowdyism"); Franklin v.
White Egret Condominium, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084, 1090 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (condominium
agreement excluding children under the age of twelve because young children "are noisy, distract-
ing and frequently an imposition upon our neighbors"), aj'd, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979); C.
PERIN, supra note 16, at 120-21; Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J.
230, 245, 364 A.2d 1005,1014 (1976).
229. Campbell v. Barraud, 85 Misc. 2d 97, 99, 376 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383 (Sup. Ct. 1975), modxfed,
58 A.D.2d 570, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1977).
230. As one government publication noted.
Plans should include more and wider walkways with fewer stairs, an interior and exterior
designed to permit easy social contact, provision for common rooms, short distances be-
tween buildings, easy refuse collection, little maintenance, and well-lighted walkways
and halls.
In addition, housing designed for the elderly should include such facilities as a cen-
tral dining room, health care facilities and recreational facilities.
NJ. OFFICE ON AGING, A COMMUNITY GUIDE: HOUSING NEw JERSEY'S ELDERLY 4 (1971),
quotedin Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 269, 364 A.2d 1016,1027 (1976),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977). For an example of an ordinance that
mandates many of these features, see Bell v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 173 Conn. 223, 224 n.l,
377 A.2d 299, 299 n.1 (1977); see also Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. County of Cook, 49 Ill. App.
3d 630, 639-40, 365 N.E.2d 913, 918-19 (1977) (description of retirement complex), rey'd, 71 Ill. 2d
510, 377 N.E.2d 21 (1978). Relatively easy access to shopping is also important for the elderly.
See Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 241, 364 A.2d 1005,
1011-12 (1976).
231. Although helping to ensure the availability of an adequate supply of housing does not
generally appear as a purpose of zoning in state enabling legislation and was probably not fore-
seen as a necessary concern by the draftsmen of the model legislation, see R. LINOWES & D.
ALLENSwORTH, THE STATES AND LAND-USE CONTROL 162 (1975), in recent years it has come to
be thought of as a proper goal in the public regulation of land use. See, e.g., Southern Burlington
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elderly232 and the difficulty many in this age group encounter in at-
tempting to satisfy their housing needs because of their often fixed and
limited incomes-3 3 is well documented. An age-restrictive ordinance
considered in one case recited in its declaration of policy and purpose
"the need for decent, safe and moderately priced housing for the
elderly."234
Municipalities have also pursued larger fiscal goals through age-
restrictive zoning. Local officials have candidly admitted that in adopt-
ing this sort of ordinance they "desire to obtain additional municipal
revenues without placing concurrent demands upon locally financed
governmental services."' 3 5 Retirement communities represent a fiscally
advantageous use: they generate more tax revenues than charges on
local services because of the absence of school-age residents. 236 Most
age-restrictive ordinances either wholly exclude children or admit only
those above the age of public schooling.237
Other goals underlying age-restrictive zoning enactments resemble
the traditional-family aims discussed previously. One ordinance, for
instance, recited as its purpose in limiting occupancy by age the preser-
vation of community character, specifically "the open agricultural char-
acter" of the district. A reviewing court held that the establishment of
retirement communities was consistent with this purpose.23 8 In another
case, the court suggested that limiting the occupancy of a mobile home
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 175, 178-80, 336 A.2d 713, 727-28,
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
232. See, eg., Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 272, 364 A.2d 1016,
1028-29 (1976) (citing sources), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977).
233. Id. at 268-69, 364 A.2d at 1026 (citing sources).
234. Id at 259, 364 A.2d at 1022.
235. Id at 290, 364 A.2d at 1038-39.
236. See id. at 290, 364 A.2d at 1038-39; see also Housing Discrimination Against Children,
supra note 218, at 564, 595-98. There is little question that schools are expensive: educational
costs comprise up to seventy percent of most local budgets. Hughes, Yhe Fiscal and Social Impact
of.Alternative Forms of Housing, in NEw DIMENSIONS OF URBAN PLANNING, supra note 186, at
92. Thus, age minimums such as fifty-five are selected because people in this age group are "no
longer primarily interested in a child-oriented family of their own." Campbell v. Barraud, 85
Misc. 2d 97, 100, 376 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383 (Sup. Ct. 1975), modfed, 58 A.D.2d 570, 394 N.Y.S.2d
909 (1977).
237. See, eg., Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d
1005 (1976) (ordinance allowed one child of 19 years of age or over). Apparently one New Jersey
municipality has gone to the extreme of developing direct social control zoning to ensure it is not
deluged by school-age children: the municipality "actually limits occupancy of units in multifam-
ily buildings to one preschool-age child per unit and forbids any occupancy by school-age chil-
dren." R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 11, at 9; see also Williams & Norman, supra
note 11, at 488 n.24.
238. See Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 233-34, 364
A.2d 1005, 1007 (1976).
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park to the elderly could substantially reduce the traffic that might
otherwise result from this sort of development. 239 Off-street parking
requirements are often relaxed in housing developments for the elderly
because this age group possesses significantly fewer automobiles.240
Other physical standards have been similarly reduced in recognition of
the unique characteristics in the elderly's use of residential land.241
These various objectives for the most part address the physical aspects
of the urban environment. Furthermore, they all involve relatively
traditional zoning concerns. But these ordinances also pursue more in-
tangible, less traditional ends.
Supporters of age-restrictive zoning regulations often seek to pro-
vide an environment that meets the special social and psychological
needs of the elderly.242 "Though special social and psychological needs
of the elderly are perhaps less obvious than their physical needs," re-
marked one court, "they are no less real."243 Retirement communities
have attempted to encourage friendship and social contact through
their physical design.244 An age-homogeneous resident population
may also serve this end, because the elderly are less mobile and require
"readily accessible companionship," or need help in adjusting to the
"social and psychological effects of retirement. ' 245 Age-homogeneous
communities may also foster a "sense of security" and reduce "the fear
of criminal victimization. ' 246 More simply, age-segregation is said to
have a positive influence on the "mental well-being" and morale of the
elderly.247
239. See Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 279, 364 A.2d 1016, 1033
(1976), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977).
240. See Nelson, Exclusionary Zoning on the Basis ofAge, 28 LAND USE L. & ZONINO Dio. 5,
5 (No. 10 1976); McCrann v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 161 Conn. 65, 282 A.2d 900 (1971).
Ironically, neighboring residents who challenged one zoning ordinance authorizing a retirement
community claimed that the proposed development would increase traffic in the neighborhood.
Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 486, 330 N.E.2d 403, 406, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, 390, appeal dis-
missed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 993 (1975).
241. See Nelson, supra note 240, at 5-6.
242. See, e.g., Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 245, 364
A.2d 1005, 1014 (1976); Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 269-70, 364 A.2d
1016, 1027 (1976), appealdismissed and cer. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977); Campbell v. Barraud, 58
A.D.2d 570, 572, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909, 912 (1977).
243. Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 269-70, 364 A.2d 1016, 1027
(1976), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977).
244. See Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230,240 & n.8, 364
A.2d 1005, 1011 & n.8 (1976); see also Williams, supra note 77, at 321-22.
245. Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 270, 364 A.2d 1016, 1027 (1976),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977).
246. Id. at 271, 364 A.2d at 1028.
247. See Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 245, 364 A.2d
1005, 1014 (1976) (quoting commentator).
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The reported cases clearly indicate that ideological goals are con-
sidered to underlie age-restrictive zoning to a significant extent; a desire
to meet the social and psychological needs of the elderly has been ex-
plicitly identified as a substantial regulatory motivation. In contrast,
although there are strong suggestions that courts have associated ideo-
logical goals with traditional-family ordinances, it is impossible to state
positively that this has occurred. Moreover, the purported goals of age-
restrictive zoning seem startlingly specialized. They differ from other
measures regulating physical standards, and even from traditional-
family ordinances, to the extent that they focus on the welfare of a
relatively narrow group. The next section explores how the judiciary
has treated the various objectives of age-restrictive zoning.
C. Substantive Review of Age-Restrictive Zoning.
1. The Enabling Acts. As noted earlier, courts evaluate tradi-
tional-family ordinances almost exclusively on constitutional
grounds.2 48 In contrast, courts have, to a significant extent, assessed
age-restrictive zoning on the basis of whether the legislation delegating
the zoning power to the relevant municipality authorizes such meas-
ures. This has occurred even under enabling statutes fashioned after
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, which broadly grants power
to zone "[flor the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the
general welfare of the community." 249
The first case to consider age-restrictive zoning found that the
measure exceeded the municipality's authority under the Enabling Act.
In Hinman v. Planning & Zoning Commission,2 5 0 a Connecticut court
held that the state legislature had authorized municipalities to adopt
only regulations "designed for the benefit of all of the people of a com-
munity" and had not conferred the power to "zon[e] for classes of peo-
ple.125 1 Later cases have also examined age-restrictive zoning in terms
of the "general welfare." One reason for this is that age-restrictive zon-
ing appears to promote the interests of a relatively narrow group, and
has consequently given rise to charges of "spot zoning. '252
248. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
249. Standard Act, supra note 54, § 1.
250. 26 Conn. Supp. 125, 214 A.2d 131 (C.P. 1965).
251. Id. at 128-29, 214 A.2d at 133.
252. See, e.g., Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 261-62, 364 A.2d 1016,
1023 (1976), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977); Campbell v. Barraud, 85 Misc.
2d 97, 98, 376 N.Y.S.2d 380, 382 (Sup. Ct. 1975), modfed, 58 A.D.2d 570, 571, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909,
911-12 (1977). Factors which may betray the presence of spot zoning are set out in R. ELLICKSON
& A.D. TARLOCK, supra note 53, at 241-42. In dismissing these claims of spot zoning courts have
considered it significant that large tracts of land have been allocated for retirement communities.
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The concept of the "general welfare" is open-ended; if "regulatory
power may be exercised not only to stop harmful occurrences, but also
to require actions that enhance the social, economic, and physical envi-
ronment ... the potential scope of valid regulation is enlarged consid-
erably."2 53 Over the years state courts and the Supreme Court have
given expansive interpretations of the concept of the general welfare in
land use cases.254 After reviewing various studies and reports on the
housing and other social problems of the elderly, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey dismissed any notion that the age-restrictive zoning ordi-
nance before it in Taxpayers Association v. Weymouth Townshio pro-
moted the interests of too narrow a group; it noted that "the concept of
the 'general welfare' in land use regulation is quite expansive, and en-
compasses the provision of housing for all categories ofpeople, includ-
ing the elderly."2 55 In this light, age-restrictive zoning may help
advance the public welfare by "bringing about 'the greatest good of the
greatest number.' "256 Age-restrictive zoning cannot, however, be sus-
tained on this rationale if it particularly burdens another group in the
population, a possibility examined later in this article. 257
An issue underlying all zoning for direct social control, the distinc-
tion between the regulation of land use and the regulation of land
users, has proved especially troublesome in the context of age-restric-
tive zoning. Initially, the lower courts in New Jersey invalidated ordi-
nances imposing minimum age requirements because the enabling
legislation authorized only regulation of the physical aspects of land
See Campbell v. Barraud, 85 Misc. 2d 97, 99, 376 N.Y.S.2d 380, 382 (Sup. Ct. 1975), modfled, 58
A.D.2d 570, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1977). The court in Weymouth Townsho defined spot zoning as
"the use of the zoning power to benefit particular private interests rather than the collective inter-
ests of the community." "General welfare" tests aim directly at this practice.
253. Heyman, supra note 185, at 45-46. Cf. CITIZENS' ZONE PLAN CONFERENCE, CHICAGO
26-27 (1920) (report of proceedings Dec. 16-17, 1919) (health includes the promotion of comfort).
254. See eg., Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. at 265, 364 A.2d at 1024 ("the term is mutable and
reflects current social conditions"); see also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 6 (1974);
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954). See generally 1 N. WILLUAMS, supra note 9, § 13.03,
at 285 (notion of general welfare expands in accordance with the views of judges).
255. 71 N.J. at 275, 364 A.2d at 1030 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); see also Shep-
ard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 238, 364 A.2d 1005, 1010 (1976);
Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 487, 330 N.E.2d 403, 407, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, 391, appeal dis-
missed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 993 (1975) ("meeting this community shortage of suitable hous-
ing accommodations for its population, including an important segment of that population with
special needs is such [a proper governmental] objective") (no minimum age requirement imposed
in ordinance); ABA ADvIsORY COMMISSION ON HOUSING AND URBAN GROWTH, supra note 109,
at 123.
256. E. FREUND, supra note 104, at 5.
257. See infra text accompanying notes 307-08.
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use.253 The state Supreme Court, however, adopted a different position
in Weymouth,259 concluding that "ordinances which regulate use by
regulating identified users are not inherently objectionable." 260 The
court also noted that zoning need not be rigidly confined to the physical
aspects of the urban environment.261 Instead, "ordinances adopted
under the zoning enabling act must bear a real and substantial relation-
ship to the regulation of land within the municipality."262
The Weymouth standard might imply that a zoning ordinance may
not pursue exclusively ideological goals and must have some relation-
ship to the physical use of land.263 A more relevant inquiry is not
whether wholly ideological objectives underlie a zoning ordinance, but
whether such objectives involve legitimate government interests and
whether the measure in question actually advances those interests. Per-
haps the Weymouth test addresses this latter question as well, by re-
quiring a municipality to show the fact bases underlying its
ordinances. 264 But the phrasing of the test-which also echoes consti-
tutional standards requiring that an impugned regulation bear a ra-
tional relationship to a legitimate governmental objective-does not
clearly require fact bases analysis. 265
2. Equal Protection.: Weymouth Township. Constitutional ap-
praisal of age-restrictive zoning has, for the most part, proceeded along
lines of equal protection rather than substantive due process analy-
258. See Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 135 N.J. Super. 97, 99, 342
A.2d 853, 855 (App. Div. 1975), rev'd, 71 NJ. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 (1976); Taxpayers Ass'n v.
Weymouth Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376, 380-81, 311 A.2d 187, 189 (App. Div. 1973), rev'd, 71
NJ. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977 (1977).
259. "[A]s a conceptual matter regulation of land use cannot be precisely disassociated from
regulation of land users." 71 NJ. at 277, 364 A.2d at 1031 (emphasis in original). The same view
was expressed in the companion case. See Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning
Bd., 71 NJ. 230,244-45,364 A.2d 1005, 1013 (1976); see also 1 N. WILLAMs, supra note 9, §13.05,
at 289.
260. 71 N.J. at 277, 364 A.2d at 1031 (footnote omitted). The court relied on Maldini v. Am-
bro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 487-88, 330 N.E.2d 403, 407-08, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, 391-92, appeal dismissed
and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 993 (1975).
261. 71 NJ. at 278, 364 A.2d at 1032.
262. Id at 264, 364 A.2d at 1024. A similar test was adopted in the companion case, Shepard
v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 243, 364 A.2d 1005, 1013 (1976).
263. See generally Developments in the Law--Zoning, supra note 11, at 1455-57. The problem
with this explanation is that none of the cases cited as illustrations of the application of the new
test considered a zoning restriction pursuing wholly ideological ends. In fact, none of the cited
cases investigated the extent to which ideological goals may be served by a zoning measure en-
acted pursuant to state enabling legislation.
264. See id at 1456-57.
265. Butcf. State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 414-15, 416 A.2d 821, 827 (1980) (suggesting that court
in Weymouth Townsh6p really had meant to require an examination of the factual bases of the
municipality's action).
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siS. 266 The most elaborate equal protection analysis in any age-restric-
tive zoning case appears in Weymouth. Using a conventional two-
tiered approach, the Weymouth court first considered whether the age
restriction at issue infringed upon any "fundamental" right so as to
trigger strict scrutiny. Noting that housing has not been deemed a fun-
damental right under the fourteenth amendment of the federal Consti-
tution,267 the court moved on to other concerns.268 This rather curt
treatment of the fundamental rights question stands in contrast to the
extensive treatment of this issue by commentators269 and other
judges.270 In Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., 27 1 the plain-
tiffs challenged a condominium agreement excluding children under
the age of twelve as a violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Florida District Court of Appeal found a
number of fundamental rights involved: the right to travel, the right to
marry, the right to procreate and the right to marital privacy.272 If a
private agreement imposing an age limit impairs such rights, afortiori a
public zoning regulation imposing a similar requirement would also be
constitutionally infirm.
Most courts have resisted the claim that any sort of zoning might
infringe the constitutionally protected right to travel.273 A majority of
the Supreme Court summarily dismissed the right to travel claim made
in the attack on the traditional-family ordinance that was considered in
266. Substantive due process considerations have not figured largely in judicial appraisals of
age-restrictive zoning. The decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Weymouth Townshp
demonstrates this: the court held that the suit's due process claim was "little more than a restate-
ment" of the equal protection challenge. 71 N.J. at 288, 364 A.2d at 1037. This passage of the
opinion aptly demonstrates how, conceptually speaking, the two branches of constitutional sub-
stantive review have been closely associated; see also Travalio, supra note 123, at 310 n. 112. It is
evident that the concepts of substantive due process and equal protection of the laws were also
closely associated in Shefpard v. Woodland Townsho Comm & Planning Bd, the companion case to
Weymouth Townshp. See 71 NJ. at 247, 364 A.2d at 1015.
267. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
268. Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223,228 n.2, 526 P.2d 747,752 n.2 (1974), reached a similar
conclusion in considering a restrictive covenant that limited residence in a subdivision to residents
above a certain age. But see Adrian Mobile Home Park v. City of Adrian, 94 Mich. App. 194, 288
N.W.2d 402 (1979) (age-restrictive provision in special use permit invalidated).
269. See, e.g., Doyle, supra note 184, at 76-79, 89-97; Travalio, supra note 123; Comment,
supra note 224, at 821-31; Note, supra note 212.
270. See Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977) (age restrictive condominium agreement), aft'd, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979).
271. Id (constitutional issues apparently arising pursuant to state action theory).
272. 358 So. 2d at 1088. In denying a petition for rehearing the court indicated that a plethora
of fundamental rights were infringed by the age restriction. The "panoply of rights associated
with family life" were again enumerated and in greater detail, but this time the right to travel was
added to the list. Id at 1089-90.
273. See Doyle, supra note 184, at 76-78.
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Belle Terre.274 The attitude of the courts is understandable. All zoning
regulations to some extent interfere with a person's right to travel and
settle where he wishes; recognizing the right to travel argument could
subject all land use controls to the second tier of equal protection scru-
tiny with its concomitant compelling state interest test-an ordeal that
few ordinances could survive. 275
The argument that age restrictions interfere with the bundle of
rights associated with family life is more troublesome. The Supreme
Court's careful treatment of the unique traditional-family ordinance
struck down in Moore v. City of East Cleveland276 indicates the degree
of constitutional solicitude that may attach to the family. A number of
commentators have noted that an age-restrictive zoning ordinance
might exclude a family from an area because one or more of the family
members fails to meet the age minimum.277 Nevertheless, when the
age-restrictive condominium agreement at issue in the Franklin case
finally came before the Supreme Court of Florida, Moore presented no
barrier to such land use schemes.278 In distinguishing Moore, the court
appeared to be influenced by the limited geographic scope of the age-
segregated community. 279 The significance of spatial factors in deter-
mining whether age-restrictive zoning is being employed in an abusive
fashion is a matter which will be taken up more extensively in due
course.
280
In Weymouth, the New Jersey Supreme Court also addressed the
question of whether the legislative classification of age restriction in-
volved a "suspect" criterion, which would trigger heightened scrutiny
under the fourteenth amendment. It concluded that age is not a suspect
274. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
275. See Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal.
3d 582, 602-04, 557 P.2d 473, 484-85, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 52-53 (1976); Comment, Zoning, Com-
munes and Equal Protection, 1973 URB. L. ANN. 319, 324; Sf. L. TIUBE, supra note 171, at 955-56
(qualitative as opposed to quantitative land use controls should be immune to challenge on right
to travel basis so long as they do not discriminate against new residents).
276. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality). See generally Developments in the Law-The Constitution
andthe Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1161-97 (1980).
277. See, e.g., Doyle, supra note 184, at 89-97.
278. See White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 351 (Fla. 1979) ("We
reject the view that Moore v. City of East Cleveland absolutely prohibits this type of limitation.
We note that Congress has established age limitations in recognizing the need for senior citizen
housing by including an age minimum of sixty-two years for occupancy of certain housing devel-
opments.") (citations omitted).
279. Id at 351; see also Travalio, supra note 123, at 315. But see Doyle, supra note 184, at 95
n.125.
280. See infra text accompanying notes 341-46.
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criterion.281 Although a relatively early case found age along with
"race, color, creed or physical condition 2 82 an irrelevant zoning con-
sideration, later cases dealing specifically with age-restrictive ordi-
nances have, like the court in Weymouth, specifically held that age is
not a suspect criterion. One case distinguishes old age from the suspect
classifications because of the changeability of a person's age.283 Realis-
tically speaking, however, age is a relatively immutable characteristic,
not significantly different at a given point in time from a classification
like race.
284
Other grounds justify distinguishing age restrictions from the type
of classification contained in a racial segregation ordinance. Suspect
criteria turn on more than the mere immutability of a characteristic. 285
In the context of zoning for the elderly, the minimum age requirement
should be analyzed both from the point of view of the young people
excluded by the limitation and from the standpoint of the elderly who
fall within the restriction. The young people excluded from a retire-
ment community by an age-restrictive ordinance are generally neither a
minority nor politically powerless, nor do they have a history of une-
qual treatment in regard to housing. Thus, it is difficult to argue that
the age restriction is a suspect classification because it unfairly burdens
this group.286 From the viewpoint of the elderly who meet the mini-
mum age requirement, the ordinance appears beneficial to their inter-
ests. Indeed, one court described an ordinance establishing a
281. 71 N.J. at 281-82, 364 A.2d at 1034 (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307 (1976) and other cases).
282. Central Management Co. v. Town Bd., 47 Misc. 2d 385, 387, 262 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731 (Sup.
Ct.), ar9'd, 24 A.D.2d 881, 264 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1965).
283. See Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481,488, 330 N.E.2d 403, 408, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, 392
("'Senior citizenship' may be more appropriately regarded as a stage in life within the normal
expectancy of most people than as an unalterable or obstinate classification like race. . . religion
or economic status.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 993 (1975); see also Campbell v.
Barraud, 58 A.D. 2d 570, 572, 394 N.Y.S. 2d 909, 912 (1977) ("Age is not a 'suspect' criterion and
old age, or senior citizenship, merely 'marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our
normal span.' ") (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.s. 307, 313-14
(1976)); Travalio, supra note 123, at 322.
284. See Doyle, supra note 184, at 75 n.43 ("In one sense, of course, age is mutable, since
everyone who enjoys a normal lifespan will experience old age. But in other ways age is immuta-
ble. No one can, at any given moment, change his age. And no one who is old can become young
again.").
285. See Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. at 281 n.15, 364 A.2d at 1034 n.15; Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, supra note 130, at 1124-27.
286. See Doyle, supra note 184, at 75; see also Travalio, supra note 123, at 329. It is possible,
however, that in the appropriate circumstances age-restrictive zoning could have an exclusionary
effect which would qualify somewhat the analysis in the text, even if a suspect classification would
not thereby be created. See infra notes 307-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
exclusionary potential of age-restrictive zoning.
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retirement community district as an action "to correct social and histor-
ical patterns of housing deprivation. 2 87 Hence, key elements of a sus-
pect classification are absent.2 88
Having determined that the zoning regulations at issue in Wey-
mouth implicated neither fundamental rights nor suspect criteria for
purposes of fourteenth amendment analysis, the court applied the first
level of equal protection scrutiny. This required the parties challenging
the age-restrictive zoning to prove that it lacked a rational relationship
to a legitimate state objective. The Weymouth plaintiffs failed to dis-
charge this burden. Weymouth Township's choice of fifty-two as the
minimum age for residency was somewhat arbitrary, but the court as-
serted that this was "necessarily" so, because "[a]ny choice of a specific
figure inevitably excludes some persons who might plausibly be admit-
ted and includes others who might plausibly have been excluded."2 89
Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Belle Terre, the court character-
ized the choice of a minimum age as a legislative determination "which
ought not be disturbed by the judiciary unless it exceeds the bounds of
reasonable choice."290 Furthermore, the imposition of appropriate age
287. Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y. 2d 481,485-86, 330 N.E. 2d 403, 406, 369 N.Y.S. 2d 385, 390,
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 993 (1975); cf Travalio, supra note 123, at 322 ("Age-
segregated housing looks more like a societal recognition that a particular segment of the society
has special needs that can only be met in a certain way, rather than smacking of political
repression.").
288. The same considerations would of course not apply to an age-restrictive ordinance that
sought to exclude the elderly. See Travalio, supra note 123, at 324; cf. Weymouth Townsho, 71
N.J. at 285, 364 A.2d at 1036 (Pursuant to the New Jersey constitution, it has been "held that age,
at least where the classification burdens the young rather than the old, is not a 'suspect' crite-
rion."). But see Apfelbaum v. Town of Clarkstown, 104 Misc. 2d 371, 420 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Sup. Ct.
1980) (denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment declaring unconstitutional zoning provi-
sions that required age-restricted developments for the elderly to be limited in size and dispersed
throughout the community. The court seemed to be influenced by the fact that the challenged
provisions were part of the municipality's comprehensive zoning plan).
289. 71 N.J. at 284, 364 A.2d at 1035.
290. Id at 284, 364 A.2d at 1035. The courts have almost invariably found a sufficient rela-
tionship between minimum age requirements and the purported ends of zoning for the elderly. In
a New York case, for example, the court found that the specific age-restriction was "essential to
the achievement of the purpose of the planned retirement community ordinance, and its rational
application" because otherwise there would be no guarantee that the group for which the housing
had been designed would occupy the development. Campbell v. Barraud, 58 A.D.2d 570, 572, 394
N.Y.S.2d 909, 912 (1977) ("It is illogical to encourage the construction of housing geared to the
specialized needs of the elderly and then prohibit its exclusive use by such group. Moreover,
occupancy restrictions of this nature also ensure that all of the original comprehensive planning
and effort will not go for naught after the development has become fully operational."); see also
Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 246, 364 A.2d 1005, 1014
(1976). Commentators have noted that without minimum age requirements, the elderly might lose
out in a competition with "[y]oung couples, singles, and students [who] will also gravitate toward
this type of small, low-cost housing." Nelson, supra note 240, at 6; see also Note, Weymouth
Townshop: 4ge Restrictions in Zoning, 31 ARK. L. Rav. 707, 718 (1978). Moreover, if the occu-
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restrictions appears to be the most effective means of achieving goals of
retirement communities.
Having completed its federal equal protection clause review, the
court analyzed the Weymouth age restriction pursuant to the principles
of equal protection ensconced in the state constitution. The court ulti-
mately concluded that the ordinances would survive even close judicial
scrutiny under the state constitution, because the legislative classifica-
tion was "based upon real factual distinctions, and also [bore] a real
and substantial relationship to the ends which the municipality [sought]
to accomplish by that classification." 291 The court's discovery of fac-
tual grounds for the challenged age restrictions tends to explain the
contrastingly aggressive stance that the New Jersey court has displayed
in reviewing traditional-family ordinances, where it evidently has been
unable or unwilling to make a similar finding with respect to the defini-
tions of "family" contained in those regulations. Furthermore, as a
passage in the companion case to Weymouth, Shepard v. Woodland
Townshio Committee & Planning Board292 illustrates, the court con-
sciously wished to circumscribe its review of age-restrictive measures:
[I]t is a major question to decide whether the aged should live in
special segregated areas, or scattered among the general population;
a decision on this is likely to be phrased in terms of a land-use deci-
sion. Why should the courts invoke judge-made policy to preclude
responsible local officials from implementing such policies? 293
pancy of retirement communities was not limited to the elderly, the relaxation of physical stan-
dards, such as off-street parking requirements, which is often permitted for such developments,
would no longer be appropriate. See, Nelson, supra note 240, at 5-6.
291. 71 N.J. at 287, 364 A.2d at 1037. At another point in the opinion the court admits that it
could not be said that the age limitation of fifty-two was "unreasonable or without a factual ba-
sis." Id at 284, 364 A.2d at 1035. In support of this assertion the court pointed out that many
persons experience a decline in net income at this age, that the median ages at which men and
women become grandparents are fifty-seven and fifty-four respectively, and that Americans in-
creasingly retire in their fifties. Id at 284-85, 364 A.2d at 1035.
292. 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 (1976). The ordinance considered in Shepard imposed an
occupancy limit of three people in any residential unit. This numerical restriction was not keyed
to available floor space, or some other physical standard, as the court suggested would be appro-
priate in the course of overturning traditional-family ordinances, see, e.g., State v. Baker, 81 N.J.
99, 110,405 A.2d 368, 373 (1979), nor did the Shepard court require the municipality to justify the
need for the occupancy restriction, see Doyle, supra note 184, at 81 n.70 ("Neither the New Jersey
Supreme Court nor the courts below addressed the issue of how the restriction on number of
residents promoted the welfare of elderly housing consumers."); cf. Molino v. Mayor of Glass-
boro, 116 N.J. Super. 195,204,281 A.2d 401, 405-06 (Law Div. 1971) ("There is also a right to live
as a family, and not be subject to a limitation on the number of members of that family in order to
reside any place. Such legal barriers would offend the equal protection mandates of the
Constitution.").
293. Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. at 248, 364 A.2d at
1015-16 (emphasis deleted) (quoting 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, § 1.11 at 22). It would appear
that Professor Williams disagrees with the manner in which his treatise was cited: "The language
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In examining traditional-family ordinances, the New Jersey courts
inquire whether each non-related household excluded from a residen-
tial district by the particular definition of "family" would in fact dis-
play the undesirable characteristics of such living units generally.
Because not all of the unrelated groups excluded by a traditional-fam-
ily ordinance exhibit the purportedly unwanted qualities, the New
Jersey courts have often struck down such zoning restrictions as over-
broad.294 But when confronted with age-restrictive ordinances, the
same courts have not inquired whether all of those excluded would
have been undesirable residents from the viewpoint of the proposed
retirement community. Instead, the courts have ignored the individu-
ality of excluded persons and have recited principles of judicial re-
straint, leaving legislative line-drawing to elected officials. In the end,
the attitudes of New Jersey's courts, and the courts of at least one other
state,295 seem inconsistent. This suggests at least two possible ap-
proaches to zoning for direct social control. Parallelling this choice of
attitudes, the expansion of the police power with respect to traditional-
family zoning has been halted in a number of states while its scope may
still be widening in regard to age segregation in housing.
D. The Non-Elderly ffho Wish to Exclude Children:
"Adult-Only" Developments.
Children have been described as "a lightning rod of social fric-
tion."296 Understandably, the elderly have often desired to avoid
youthful neighbors through the creation of retirement communities.
But non-elderly adults have also displayed a desire to live apart from
children, "reflected in the skyrocketing number" of housing complexes
now prohibiting children as residents.2 97 Various commentators have
recognized that younger adults may have legitimate reasons for want-
ing to live in a child-free environment and a legitimate right to pursue
omitted.. . makes it clear that this passage was arguing in favor of heterogeneity, not homogene-
ity and segregation." 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, § 50.16, at 50 n. 111.55 (1981 Supp.).
294. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979); Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough
of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971).
295. There is a similar unevenness of approach in the manner in which New York courts have
dealt with traditional-family ordinances and age-restrictive zoning. Compare Group House v.
Board of Zoning & Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 380 N.E.2d 207, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1978) and City of
White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974) with Campbell
v. Barraud, 58 A.D.2d 570, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
296. C. PERIN, supra note 16, at 120.
297. See Housing DiscriminationAgainst Children, supra note 218, at 561; see also R. NELSON,
supra note 202, at 42-43; Holmes & Brown, supra note 202, at 948-49 & n.97;-Wh7y Johnny Can't
Rent, supra note 218, at 1829, 1835.
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this objective, at least by means of private agreement.298 On the other
hand, in Molino v. Mayor of Glassboro299 a lower New Jersey court
held an attempt to exclude children indirectly by means of zoning re-
strictions invalid. Glassboro sought to discourage families with chil-
dren from locating within its borders by sharply curtailing the number
of bedrooms permitted in apartment units. The zoning ordinance pro-
vided that at least seventy percent of all units could have no more than
one bedroom and included other provisions designed to exclude fami-
lies with children. The town had adopted the ordinance with the
avowed fiscal motive of limiting its number of school-age children so as
to reduce education costs and the concomitant burden on local tax
revenues.
The Molino court might not have overturned the ordinance so
readily had it affirmatively provided for the adults in the municipality
who wished to live in a child-free environment. Such an ordinance,
limited in geographic scope and promoting a physical design suitable to
the social and other needs of younger adults, would be similar to age-
restrictive zoning for retirement communities. 300
Cases dealing with restrictive covenants and condominium agree-
ments provide the closest analogy to this possibility. White Egret Con-
dominium, Inc. v. Franklin,30 1 for example, involved a condominium
agreement prohibiting residency by children under the age of twelve.
298. "Adults who wish to live in. . . adult-only housing developments. . . also have consti-
tutional and statutory rights which must be respected." Dunaway & Blied, supra note 218, at 50;
see also Housing Discrimination Against Children, supra note 218, at 570, 606; O'Brien & Fitzger-
ald, supra note 218, at 89; Why Johnny Can't Rent, supra note 218, at 1839 ("Restrictions on child
discrimination also infringe the interests of renters who desire to live apart from children ...
ITihe age classifications used by most landlords are not arbitrary and should, if possible, be
respected.") (footnote omitted).
299. 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (Law Div. 1971). But see Malamar Assocs. v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 260 Md. 292, 272 A.2d 6 (1971) (bedroom restrictions upheld as a valid means
of controlling density).
300. The two types of zoning might be distinguished, however, on the grounds that unlike the
elderly, younger adults are not politically and economically weak, have not been historically dis-
advantaged when it comes to housing, and, in reality, do not have housing "needs" but have
something more on the order of housing "preferences." But Vf. the testimony of the plaintiff in a
case upholding a restrictive covenant limiting the use of lots in a subdivision to persons 21 years of
age and older, suggesting why an eligible resident might seek out such an environment for bona
fide health reasons:
In the first place we searched for quite some time to find an adult area that suited us; was
quiet especially for my wife in her condition. Two specialists in California advised her
due to her condition to move into a quiet area. She has a nervous condition and an
arthritic condition. So the best place we figured out to move for her benefit would be to
move to Arizona. And we searched in many places around here and due to these restric-
tions and being away and quiet this was our number one choice for residing here.
Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 226, 526 P.2d 747, 752 (1974).
301. 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979), affg 358 So.2d 1084 (Fla. Dist App. 1978).
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Admittedly, the restriction was not a zoning ordinance enacted under
the police power, but rather a private agreement entered into by each of
the owners in the condominium development.30 2 But because theories
of state action can subject private restrictions on land use to the re-
quirements of the fourteenth amendment,30 3 the review of the private
age restrictions parallels the scrutiny that the same restrictions would
have received if contained in zoning ordinances. By upholding such
restrictions, the cases suggest that age-restrictive zoning for the non-
elderly adult might encounter a less rocky road in the course of judicial
appraisal than might, at first, be thought. 3°4
Furthermore, at least one jurisdiction already deems the provision
of child-free housing for adults a legitimate state interest. An Arizona
statute makes it a criminal offense for a person to rent or lease his prop-
erty in violation of a restrictive covenant against the sale of such prop-
erty to persons having a child or children living with them, or to rent to
persons with children when his property lies within a subdivision
designed, advertised, and used as an exclusively adult subdivision.30 5
This legislation allows the creation of land use controls, functionally
equivalent to zoning ordinances, excluding children from residential
areas and raises similar constitutional issues.30 6 The Arizona legisla-
tion aptly demonstrates how the perceived scope of the police power in
this area continues to expand, and shows that regulatory goals will be-
302. See id. at 350; see also Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 226-27, 526 P.2d 747, 750-51
(1974).
303. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); cf. L.
TRIBE, supra note 171, at 978 ("judicial enforcement of an anti-commune covenant would proba-
bly have to meet the same constitutional tests as those applicable to [a traditional family] ordi-
nance") (footnote omitted); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1645, 1669 (1971) ("Restrictive covenants covering large areas thus verge so closely on being zon-
ing ordinances that courts should be willing to view them as state action, and apply the same
standards of equal protection suggested here for zoning ordinances."). But see Doyle, supra note
184, at 97-105 (questioning whether state action theory applicable to imposition of private age
restrictions); Travalio, supra note 123, at 325-31 (assessing whether state action theory applicable
to age-restrictive covenants); id at 332-34 (discussing applicability of state action theory to condo-
minium rules).
304. Cf. Why Johnny Can't Rent, supra note 218, at 1839 n.60 (suggesting that a claim that
child exclusion is unconstitutional is unlikely to succeed).
305. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1317(B) (Supp. 1981):
No person shall rent or lease his property to another in violation of a valid restrictive
covenant against the sale of such property to persons who have a child or children living
with them nor shall a person rent or lease his property to persons who have a child or
children living with them when his property lies within a subdivision which subdivision
is presently designed, advertised and used as an exclusive adult subdivision. A person
who knowingly rents or leases his property in violation of the provisions of this subsec-
tion is guilty of a petty offense.
See also ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-303(3) (Supp. 1981).
306. See generally Comment, supra note 224.
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come increasingly sophisticated as the particular housing preferences of
discrete sectors of the population receive legislative recognition.
E. The Potentialfor Abuse and Methods of Avoiding It.
1. The Potentialfor Abuse. In dealing with age-restrictive zoning
authorizing retirement communities, some courts have expressed the
fear that local governments will so strongly desire to achieve fiscal ben-
efits that they will enact age-restrictive zoning for exclusionary pur-
poses. "To put it bluntly," remarked one court, "a municipality could
so regulate its zoning districts as to virtually exclude all but senior citi-
zens, high income younger families, and industrial and commercial
users, thereby ensuring the benefits of a large tax base. ' 30 7 As addi-
tional cause for concern, retirement communities appear to serve
mostly semi-affluent whites.308
In spite of these dangers, courts have not struck down age-restric-
tive ordinances on the basis of their potential or actual exclusionary
impact, largely because the parties objecting to the regulations have not
pressed such theories.30 9 Nevertheless, the cases have implied a
method for avoiding the exclusionary potential of age-restrictive zoning
for the elderly. They have also provided some indication of how to
ensure that the legislative classifications imposed in these ordinances
are not in themselves abusive. This section examines these safe-
guards-safeguards previously suggested in the section on traditional-
family zoning.
2. Fact Bases. In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey described the analysis earlier employed in Weymouth to ensure
that ordinances adopted under the enabling act bear a real and sub-
stantial relationship to the regulation of land within the municipality:
307. Campbell v. Barraud, 58 A.D.2d 570, 573, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909, 913 (1977); see Shepard v.
Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. at 248-49, 364 A.2d at 1016; Weymouth
Township, 71 N.J. at 288-96, 364 A.2d at 1037-42. The exclusionary potential of senior citizen
zoning was recognized in the message accompanying the New Jersey Governor's veto of a state
bill explicitly authorizing age-restrictive zoning. The message is quoted in Weymouth Township.
Id at 291-92, 364 A.2d at 1039. The infamous Mount Laurel zoning scheme included an age-
restrictive senior citizen classification. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 168-69, 336 A.2d 713, 722, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S.
808 (1975).
308. See Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. at 242 & n.10, 364
A.2d at 1012 & n.10; Elrod, supra note 204, at 741-42.
309. See Campbell v. Barraud, 58 A.D.2d 570, 573, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909, 913 (1977); Shepard v.
Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 NJ. at 248-49, 364 A.2d at 1016; Weymouth
Township, 71 NJ. at 294, 364 A.2d at 1040.
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While recognizing the municipality's desire to satisfy the social and
psychological needs of the elderly. . . we required the municipality
to articulate tangible, specific objectives promoted by the zoning
measure-there the unusual physical and economic needs of the eld-
erly. . . . We then carefully examine the factual bases of the munici-
pality' conclusion that reserving mobile homesfor the elderly in fact
served those specfc ends. 310
Although the "fact bases" test of Weymouth was developed to assess
the limits of the zoning power under the relevant enabling legislation, it
resembles tests formulated to determine the constitutionality of zon-
ing.311 For example, in Belle Terre, the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit stated that "the test for application of the Equal Protection
Clause is whether the legislative classification is in fact substantially
related to the object of the statute." 31 2 The fact bases test also recalls
the various ends and means analyses employed in a number of the
traditional-family ordinance cases.313
Fact bases defenses--demonstrating the facts underlying a legisla-
tive classification and showing that the ordinance is factually related to
its purported objective-have often succeeded in cases challenging age-
restrictive ordinances authorizing retirement communities. A Connect-
icut court, in a comparatively early case invalidating such a measure,
remarked that no credible evidence had been adduced to demonstrate
the need for age-restricted housing for the elderly.314 In contrast, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey in Weymouth and Shepard had available
several studies, reports of governmental hearings, and other data
315
that lent credence to the suggestion that the elderly have unique hous-
ing needs and thereby upheld the age classifications contained in the
ordinances. The court could also conclude that the respective ordi-
310. State v. Miller, 83 NJ. 402, 414-15, 416 A.2d 821, 827 (1980) (emphasis added). One is
left with the impression that it was some time after the Weymouth Township decision before the
New Jersey court discovered that it had engaged in the analytical approach described. The court
cites Developments in the Law-Zoning, supra note 11, at 1456-57, wherein the authors sought to
rationalize the Weymouth Township court's behavior in regard to the real and substantial relation-
ship to land use test. In Miller the court evidently adopted this explanation of Weymouth
Township.
311. Indeed, the discussion in State v. Miller of the fact bases approach occurred in the context
of a description of strict constitutional scrutiny. See 83 N.J. 402, 414-15, 416 A.2d 821, 827-28
(1980).
312. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 814 (2d Cir. 1973) (emphasis in original),
rep'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). The court of appeals was specifically rejecting the traditional two-tiered
equal protection analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 130-36.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 147-57.
314. See Hinman v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 26 Conn. Supp. 125, 129,214 A.2d 131, 133
(1965).
315. Many of these resources are listed in Weymouth Townshp at 71 NJ. at 267-68, 364 A.2d
at 1026.
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nances actually responded to the goal of authorizing housing to satisfy
the unique physical, psychological, and social needs of senior
citizens. 316
The fact bases test formulated in Weymouth is not really new. The
relation of a zoning ordinance to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare is essentially a question of fact in which courts have
always expressed an interest.317 Alfred Bettman explains,
Zoning cases raise in peculiarly urgent shape the problem of the ex-
tent to which the question of constitutionality is decided from the
four comers of the measure or is one upon which evidence may be
received and considered .... [Flact issues are necessarily involved
in the issue of reasonableness .. . .Our constitutional procedure
would itself be unreasonable and arbitrary, if it were to permit a
court to declare a zone plan unreasonable and arbitrary without
hearing the facts upon which the plan was based and the principles
which went into its making.318
The founders and early practitioners of zoning took particular care
to amass factual material: first, to help formulate a rational zoning
plan and, second, to support the scheme in the event it came under
attack in the courts.319 However, as one respected commentator has
stated, the problem of zoning for appropriate amenity levels "is laced
with ...real but vague psychological elements. '' 320 Consequently,
"[i]t is too much ever to expect watertight standards here."321 But fact
bases are probably particularly important when a municipality uses
zoning for direct social control. Such zoning by definition concerns the
identity of land users and is readily susceptible to prejudicial uses.
Moreover, most zoning for direct social control is of relatively recent
origin, and "[t]he real obligation to base zoning provisions on fact
comes when a new zoning technique is introduced." 322 Therefore,
when confronted with direct social control zoning, a court should ex-
amine the factual basis for the legislative classification imposed and
assess whether the measure in fact furthers its purported goals. In this
316. See Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. at 240-42, 364 A.2d
at 1010-12; Weymouth Township, 71 NJ. at 273-75, 364 A.2d at 1029-30.
317. See A. BETrMAN, The Fact Bases of Zoning, in CrrY AND REGIONAL PLANNING PAPERS,
supra note 99, at 45.
318. Bettman, supra note 23, at 856-57; cf Landels, Zoning: AnAnalysis oflts Purposes andIts
Legal Sanctions, 17 A.B.A. J. 163, 167 (1931) (arguing that zoning in particular should not be
judged by theoretical standards but by the concrete conditions which induced it); Williams, supra
note 77, at 319 ("what is needed in planning law is a super-Brandeis-brief approach").
319. See, eg., CTZENs' ZONE PLAN CONFERENCE, CHICAGO, supra note 253, at 86; A.
BETrMAN, supra note 99, at 181-83.
320. Toll, ZoningforAmenities, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 266, 269 (1955).
321. Id
322. M. MCLEAN, supra note 82, at 7.
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fashion, the court can help ensure that the regulation is not used in an
abusive fashion.323
3. Comprehensive Planning. A fact bases analysis could be per-
formed through a requirement traditionally imposed in zoning en-
abling legislation. Section 3 of the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act states: "Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a com-
prehensive plan .... ,"324 The extent to which the comprehensive
planning requirement can accommodate the fact bases test and aid in
the avoidance of regulatory abuse is considered here.325
At the least, comprehensive planning articulates the goals of a mu-
nicipality's land use scheme, and communicates them to the courts
when litigation arises.3 26 For example, the New York Court of Appeals
in upholding a retirement community ordinance was satisfied that the
ordinance was based on the town's previously formulated goal of pro-
viding for the needs of the elderly because of the goal's explicit inclu-
sion in the town's comprehensive plan.3 27 Thus, comprehensive
planning can aid a court in performing a fact bases analysis. With the
purported goals of the zoning scheme clearly stated, the issue of
whether the challenged ordinance in fact furthers those objectives in a
reasonable fashion comes into sharp focus.3 2 8
Comprehensive planning may also help to ensure the legitimacy of
land use goals. One court has stated that, without a comprehensive
plan, "there can be no rational allocation of land use" and that such a
plan "is the insurance that the public welfare is being served and that
zoning does not become nothing more than just a Gallup poll." 329 In
323. The burden of proof to show fact bases-or lack thereof-is probably as important as the
test itself. See infra text accompanying notes 347-62.
324. Standard Act, supra note 54, § 3.
325. In practice the import of the comprehensive plan requirement has not been clearly de-
fined and often has not been accorded much weight by reviewing courts. See Tarlock, Consistency
with AdoptedLand Use Plans as a Standard of JudicialReview: The Case Against, 9 Urn. L. ANN.
69, 82-83 (1975). Furthermore, the traditional comprehensive plan requirement contained in the
Standard Act has been replaced with tailor-made language by a number of states. See R. ELLICK-
SON & A.D. TARLOCK, supra note 53, at 403-06. Insofar as these new statutory provisions require
that comprehensive planning precede the enactment of a zoning ordinance (whether embodied in
a separate document or not), the analysis in the text is unaffected by these developments.
326. See Eliott, Introduction to THE NEw ZONING at xxii (N. Marcus & M. Groves ed. 1970).
327. See Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 485 & n.1, 330 N.E.2d 403, 405-06 & n.1, 369
N.Y.S.2d 385, 389 & n.l, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 993 (1975).
328. Cf. Haar, InAccordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1158, 1174
(1955) (when a municipality has a comprehensive plan that publicly sets out its objectives, an
arbiter of land use disputes can assess the reasonableness of the implementing ordinances more
effectively).
329. Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463,469, 235 N.E.2d 897, 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 893-94 (1968).
See R. NELSON, supra note 202, at 79 ("For many communities, a formal comprehensive plan has
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Weymouth, the Supreme Court of New Jersey noted that illegal "spot
zoning" was likely to occur when a municipality ignored the enabling
legislation's comprehensive plan requirement.3 30 In Shepard, the same
court found it reassuring that the age limitation imposed in the chal-
lenged ordinance was part of a comprehensive scheme for land devel-
opment.33' The inclusion of a traditional-family ordinance in a
comprehensive plan was of some importance to a lower New York
court upholding the ordinance.332
A planning requirement alone, however, cannot insure against ar-
bitrariness. A zoning authority could disregard the facts or act on them
capriciously and "[t]he municipal plan may be just as arbitrary and
irresponsible as the municipal zoning ordinance if that plan reflects no
more than the municipality's arbitrary desires. '3 33 But the facts
amassed in the planning process are useful in determining whether a
municipality has acted arbitrarily and, as noted above, because com-
prehensive planning encourages the clear articulation of goals, it helps
courts assess whether legislative action advances those objectives.
Finally, if a court administers a fact bases test in accordance with
the statutory requirement that zoning regulations follow a comprehen-
sive plan, or, as was the case in Weymouth, with reference to the limits
of the zoning power as delegated by state enabling legislation, the in-
validation of an ordinance for not satisfying the standard would respect
the value of local autonomy. The decision would not preclude either
local governments or the state legislature from adopting a land use re-
striction exercising the challenged type of direct social control with
proper factual support.334 The state court decisions that have over-
turned traditional-family ordinances on substantive due process and
other constitutional grounds do not demonstrate a similar respect for
provided important assurance to the judiciary that land-use regulations were being employed for a
broad---'planned'-public interest."); Heyman, supra note 185, at 57 (planning helps governments
show that regulations are necessary to accomplish desirable social objectives).
330. 71 N.J. at 261-62, 364 A.2d at 1023.
331. 71 N.J. at 246-47, 364 A.2d at 1014-15.
332. People v. Kalayjian, 76 Misc. 2d 1097, 1099, 352 N.Y.S.2d 115, 118 (App. Term 1973).
333. R. BABCOCK, supra note 24, at 123. Cf. Hinman v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 26
Conn. Supp. 125, 129, 214 A.2d 131, 133 (C.P. 1965) (although vested with wide discretion in
creating a comprehensive plan a municipality "is not vested with unlimited authority, even in an
endeavor to promote what it believes to be best to promote health and general welfare").
334. Cf. Sandalow, The Limits of Municioal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts,
48 MINN. L. Rav. 643, 720 (1964) ("Indeed, avoidance of constitutional questions is a primary
purpose of permitting courts to invalidate an exercise of municipal power on the ground that it
goes beyond the initiative conferred by a grant of home rule.") (footnote omitted); Bruff, Judicial
Review in Local Government Law. A Reappraisal, 60 MINN. L. REv. 669, 688 (1976) ("The courts
can also avoid deciding serious constitutional issues by construing the local action to be unauthor-
ized.") (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 1982:761
Vol. 1982:761] ZONING FOR SOCIAL CONTROL
local autonomy. Had they applied a statutory basis of review, these
courts could have examined the existing data allegedly supporting the
requirement 335 and, if unconvinced, simply found the fact bases lack-
ing. Such review leaves municipalities free to adopt such regulations
when they can marshall sufficient factual support. It also allows a state
legislature to provide a clear statutory signal that the impugned regula-
tory classification meets with its approval, 336 thus shielding the regula-
tion from attack based on lack of statutory authorization.337
4. Comprehensive Plan for Balanced Housing Stock and Alterna-
tive Sites. Among other things, a comprehensive plan can specifically
provide for a balanced housing stock within the municipality. In Wey-
mouth, the Public Advocate argued that because the age-restrictive
zoning at issue posed an exclusionary threat, it should be sustained
only within the context of a comprehensive housing plan.338 Although
the court did not remand the case for further hearings about the munic-
ipality's housing stock, it did express the view that "the Public Advo-
cate's recommendation that zoning for planned housing developments
for the elderly be permitted only as part of a comprehensive municipal
plan for a balanced housing stock presents a reasonable mechanism for
averting the potentially exclusionary effects of such zoning. '339
This sort of comprehensive housing plan has often been used in
efforts to allocate low- and moderate-income housing throughout a mu-
nicipality or region.340 Such plans are based on the principle that the
general welfare "contemplates housing for all categories of people in
both the community and the surrounding region."'341
Related to the notion of a balanced housing stock is whether the
availability of alternative housing should affect the validity of an age-
restrictive ordinance or other type of direct social control zoning. If
335. See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 192, at 1053 & nn.338 & 339 (citing sources).
336. See State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 118-21,405 A.2d 368, 377-78 (1979) (Mountain, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 116 (1966)). In criticiz-
ing this position, Professor Williams has suggested that turning the matter over to the state
legislature only places it in the hands of the "dominant suburban forces." See 3 N. WILLIAMS,
supra note 9, §66.13f at 34-35 (Supp. 1981).
337. Cf. Bruff, supra note 334, at 688 ("a holding that statutory authorization is absent has the
effect of inviting legislative consideration of the appropriateness of a particular local program").
338. 71 N.J. at 288, 364 A.2d at 1037.
339. Id at 293, 364 A.2d at 1040.
340. See generally H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEViN, IN-ZONING 145-75 (1974); M. DAN-
IELSON, supra note 12, at 242-78; R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 11, at 108-31.
341. Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. at 238, 364 A.2d at 1010
(emphasis in original); Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. at 293, 364 A.2d at 1040 (developing munici-
palities must provide, by their land use regulations, "the opportunity for an appropriate variety
and choice of housing for all categories of persons who may desire to live there.").
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excluded individuals can obtain similar housing nearby, they would
seem to have no more cause to complain about a given zoning restric-
tion than if it represented part of a comprehensive scheme specifically
addressed to the problem of achieving a fair balance in housing alloca-
tion. Nevertheless, the concept of alternative housing sites has received
a mixed reception in cases considering the validity of traditional-family
ordinances.
In contrast, courts appraising the validity of age-restrictive land
use controls other than zoning have upheld private restrictions of lim-
ited geographic scope when no showing was made of a shortage of
housing for families with children. 342 And the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in Weymouth thought it "obvious that the seriousness of any
exclusionary threat will depend upon the circumstances of each case,
including in particular the relationship which the population, area, and
available vacant land within the municipality bears to that within the
areas occupied by the senior citizens communities. ' '343
The number of alternative housing opportunities in an urban area
is vitally relevant to the issue of the exclusionary impact of an ordi-
nance. The relevance of alternative housing to the issue of legislative
classification, however, presents a more controversial 344 and delicate
problem. For instance, to argue that the availability to a racial minor-
ity of ample housing should sustain the legislative classification con-
tained in a segregation ordinance would be to return to the doctrine of
Plessy v. Ferguson. 345 But if the legislative classification involved a less
invidious distinction, such as that between relatedness and unrelated-
ness in a traditional-family ordinance, or that between one age and an-
other in a retirement community measure, neither distinction being
clearly suspect under the equal protection clause, the availability of al-
ternate housing should carry more weight.346
342. See Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 228, 526 P.2d 747, 752 (1974); Franklin v. White
Egret Condominium, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084, 1092 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (Letts, J., dissenting),
aI'd, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979).
343. 71 N.J. at 292, 364 A.2d at 1039.
344. Compare Doyle, supra note 184, at 95 n.125 ("Expulsion from one's home, even if alter-
native housing is available, is a sanction sufficiently serious to warrant. . . constitutional protec-
tion.") with Travalio, supra note 123, at 315 & n.138 (If the result of age-restrictive ordinances is
not unreasonable, such ordinances should be upheld as long as the age restrictions apply to only a
small portion of the municipality.).
345. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Courts have sometimes embraced the notion of regionalism, which
is closely related to the concept of alternative housing sites, to uphold exclusionary land use con-
trols. See Burchell, Listokin & James, supra note 186, at 36-37; see also Feller, Melropolitanizalion
and Land-Use Parochialism-Toward a JudicialAttiude, 69 MICH. L. REv. 655, 667-73 (1971).
346. Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 171, at 989:
If ... it can be demonstrated that a community's efforts to preserve its character
[through a traditional family ordinance] do not operate to freeze out alternatives indefi-
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When an ordinance exercising direct social control comes before a
court, the judge inevitably faces competing values: he must balance
municipal self-determinism against individual freedom in domestic as-
sociations. The court may find the factual basis for the legislative clas-
sification a little weak, or it may find some misalignment between ends
and means. If so, the validity of the ordinance may depend on whether
suitable alternative housing is available for the excluded individual. If
the excluded individual can obtain suitable alternative housing, the or-
dinance's unscientific design or less than exacting operation might be
tolerable. But if in addition to its general shoddiness the ordinance has
the effect of closing the doors of an urban area to a certain group, or of
substantially reducing the group's housing choices, the measure should
be struck down. Courts should consider this sort of balancing process
in seeking to adequately recognize the competing values at stake when
appraising zoning for direct social control.
5. Presumptions and Burdens of Proof. As noted earlier, zoning
regulations are traditionally presumed valid.347 Courts upholding re-
tirement community ordinances have generally relied on, or at least
used the rhetoric of, this presumption.348 Furthermore, the party chal-
lenging a zoning ordinance traditionally has the burden of establishing
its invalidity.3 4 9 In recent years, however, in attempting to prevent the
unjust exercise of municipal zoning power, courts have sometimes
nitely or to exclude them from an area wider than a few square miles, such efforts should
be regarded as entitled to at least some constitutional protection from the imposed uni-
formity of state or federal law.
Michelman, supra note 144, at 196-97 (discussion of concept embodied in the question: "Why
should the plaintiffs [in Belle Terre] prevail-at least as long as they can, without great loss or
inconvenience, live nondisruptively somewhere else?").
347. See I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §3.14 (2d ed. 1976); Comment, supra
note 128.
There are many policy reasons behind the strong presumption of constitutionality tradi-
tionally applied to zoning ordinances. A zoning ordinance is a legislative decision, to be
accorded the same deference as state or federal legislation. The local municipal gov-
erning body ordinarily has more knowledge of local affairs and expertise in fashioning
ordinances to suit local conditions. Finally, the presumption acts to protect the munici-
pality from harassing attacks on its zoning plans. It seems hardly justified to discard the
traditional presumption of constitutionality simply because it is easier for a plaintiff to
challenge the ordinance or because it might be administratively more convenient.
Id at 676 (footnotes omitted).
348. See Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. at 264, 364 A.2d at 1024; Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d
481, 484, 330 N.E.2d 403, 405, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, 389, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 993 (1975).
349. See I R. ANDERSON, supra note 347, § 3.16; see, e.g., Campbell v. Barraud, 58 A.D.2d
570, 571, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909, 912 (1977) (age-restrictive ordinance).
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abandoned the presumption of validity and shifted the burden of
proof.350
Courts have made the most notable modifications in the tradi-
tional rules about presumptions and burdens of proof in the context of
cases dealing with exclusionary land use schemes. 351 One court specifi-
cally observed that traditional presumptions should be eradicated and
the customary burden of proof shifted when assessing an age-restrictive
ordinance shown to be exclusionary. 352 But the presumption of validity
has also played a role in the judicial assessment of the legislative classi-
fications contained in zoning restrictions. In Euclid, the Supreme
Court suggested the standard of proof required to overcome the tradi-
tional presumption: "If the validity of the legislative classification for
zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be
allowed to control. .... ,,353
There are at least two reasons why a court might impose the bur-
den of demonstrating the validity of classifications contained in a zon-
ing ordinance on a municipality. One reason is the potential for abuse
of such ordinances. 354 Public restrictions dictating who may live where
are a radical alteration of traditional property rules; the restricting
body should show some solid basis for such novel intervention. Fur-
thermore, "[i]t would appear that a requirement of articulation will ex-
pose local parochialism when it is contrary to the public interest and
force local legislators to consider carefully their reasons for enacting an
ordinance when larger public interests may be at stake. '355 A second
reason is that the municipality is usually the party best able to indicate
the purpose and circumstances prompting a zoning law.3 56 Presuma-
bly, the local governing body is best equipped to reveal the planning
studies or other factual materials, if any, on which it based its legisla-
tive line-drawing.
350. See, e.g., Bosselman, supra note 128, at 260-62; Note, supra note 128, at 147; Note, Land-
Use Controls: Is there a Placefor Everything?, 6 Sw. U.L. REV. 607, 629-33 (1974); Comment,
supra note 128.
351. See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 347, § 3.19.
352. See Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. at 295 n.20, 364 A.2d at 1041 n.20.
353. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
354. For example, courts have been compelled to assume a particularly active role in attempt-
ing to ensure that group homes are not unfairly excluded from preferred residential districts by
traditional family ordinances. See, e.g., State ex rel Ellis v. Liddle, 520 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975); Abbott House v. Village of Tarrytown, 34 A.D.2d 821, 312 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1970) (mem.).
355. Feiler, supra note 345, at 702.
356. See generally, James, Burdens ofProof, 47 VA. L. REv. 51, 60 (1961). The principle that
the party with the readier access to a given fact in question may justifiably be allocated the burden
is not the only consideration that influences the allocation of the burden and "it is by no means
always controlling." Id.; f Note, Legitimate Use Exclusions Through Zoning: Applying a Balanc-
ing Test, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 461, 475 (1972) (by removing the burden of proof from the chal-
lenger it "is placed upon the municipality, the party with the particular expertise").
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A court deciding to shift the burden of proof onto a municipality
must also decide the extent of this shift. It could simply impose on the
municipality the burden of production; to prevent the invalidation of
its zoning regulation the municipality would have to adduce some evi-
dence of the purpose of the legislative classification and the factual
data upon which it was grounded, but the ultimate burden of proving
that the restriction is unreasonable would remain with the challenging
party.357 On the other hand, the risk of nonpersuasion might also be
placed on the municipality, requiring that it fully demonstrate the va-
lidity of its zoning ordinance.358
In assessing the validity of direct social control zoning such as age-
restrictive and traditional-family ordinances, some courts understanda-
bly desire to shift at least the burden of production to the municipal-
ity.359 Because the concerns underlying these ordinances are
intangible, and the impact that they can have on residential lifestyles is
far-ranging, courts should seek the best source of evidence of the goals
and factual bases of a given ordinance. But shifting the burden of per-
suasion as well would devalue local autonomy 360 and would represent
a much more radical departure from the traditional rule.
To whatever extent any burden-shifting occurs, it could be effected
by at least two different means. A municipality could be required to
satisfy a fact bases test in the context of administering the requirement,
found in most zoning enabling acts, that regulations "be made in ac-
cordance with a comprehensive plan."361 Requiring the presentation of
such a plan could effect a shift in the burden. On the other hand, some
courts appraising traditional-family ordinances have removed the pre-
sumption of validity, or have shifted the burden, in the course of active
substantive review pursuant to the due process or equal protection362
clauses of the fourteenth amendment or comparable provisions of state
357. See generally Comment, Burden ofProof in Land Use Regulation: A UnfifedApproach and
Application to Florida, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 499, 500-01 (1980).
358. See generally, 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 347, § 3.18, at 117. The two distinct meanings
of "burden of proof' are succinctly discussed in Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of
Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 568-69, 468 P.2d 290, 300-01 (1970).
359. Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 171, at 989 ("But the embedding of a choice within a close
human relationship or network of relationships should always be regarded as significantly increas-
ing the burden of justification for those who would make the choice illegal or visit it with some
deprivation.") (emphasis deleted).
360. Cf. Comment, supra note 128, at 679 ("The presumption of constitutionality surrounding
zoning ordinances rests on the assumption that zoning is best left in local hands.") (footnote omit-
ted). Shifting the burden to this extent would also undercut any notion of judicial restraint.
361. Standard Act, supra note 54, §3.
362. Cf. Note, supra note 350, at 623 ("It has been suggested that the equal protection clause
could be used to strip zoning of its-presumption of validity.") (footnote omitted).
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constitutions. Through either means the burden-shifting could occur
without any radical departure from the usual methods of judicial ap-
praisal of zoning ordinances.
IV. ZONING FOR DIRECT SOCIAL CONTROL: INDIGENTS,
STUDENTS, RACIAL MINORITIES, AND BEYOND
A. Inclusionary Zoning.
Professor Norman Williams has defined exclusionary land use
controls as "those which interfere seriously with the availability of
housing for low- and moderate-income people in areas where such
housing is much needed. ' 363 The converse of this definition describes
inclusionary land use controls: regulations that promote the availabil-
ity of housing for low- and moderate-income people where there is a
need for such housing.3 " At one time the law imposed no affirmative
duty to exercise zoning power in an inclusionary fashion.365 In recent
years, however, some state courts have imposed a legal duty on munici-
palities to administer land use in such a way as to encourage housing
for low- and moderate-income groups.3 66 Additionally, certain locaP 67
and state governments 368 have adopted inclusionary land use
programs.
Inclusionary land use techniques include variances, special per-
mits, conditional zoning, incentive zoning, and planned unit develop-
363. 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, §64.10, at 666. Some commentators use the term "exclu-
sionary" to mean "restrictive" or "particularly restrictive." For example, 1 P. ROHAN, ZONIN
AND LAND USE CONTROLS (1978), includes discussion of traditional-family ordinances and age-
restrictive zoning in a chapter on exclusionary land use controls. See id, §§3.04 & 3.05[l]. The
use of "exclusionary" in this broad sense is problematic; the term connotes abuse, and one should
not state categorically that traditional-family ordinances and age-restrictive zoning are abusive.
Hence, it is preferable to use "exclusionary" in the narrower sense of Professor Williams' defini-
tion. This article employs this definition.
364. Cf. Comment, Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enterprises, Inc.: A Case of Inclusionary
Zoning, 60 IowA L. REV. 413,416 (1974) ("Unlike exclusionary zoning, inclusionary zoning refers
to ordinances which open the suburban market to lower income people").
365. See H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEVIN, supra note 340, at I.
366. See H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEVIN, supra note 340, at 209; Pazar, Constitutional
Barriers to the Enactment of Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit Ordinances in New Jersey, 10 RUT.-
CAM. L. REV. 253 at 253, 257-59 (1979); Comment, supra note 364, at 420-21.
367. See Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances--Policy andLegal Issues in Requiring Private Devel-
opers to BuildLow Cost Housing, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1432, 1436 (1974). Professor Kleven notes
that the "reasons for this change in attitude are not yet entirely clear." He suggests as possibilities
the desire of suburban municipalities to 1) avoid exclusionary zoning litigation; 2) satisfy the
housing needs of retiring residents or adult children of present residents; or 3) attract with appro-
priate housing opportunities lower-paid workers who are needed in the relevant area. See also
Rose, The Mandatory Percentage ofModerately Priced Dwelling Ordinance (MPMPD) is the Latest
Technique of Inclusionary Zoning, 3 REAL EST. L.J. 176 (1974).
368. See Kleven, supra note 367, at 1436 n.7; Pazar, supra note 366, at 255 n. 11.
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ments. When used in the appropriate manner, all of these can
encourage the construction of low- and moderate-income housing.369
Zoning for direct social control can also accomplish this end. This
technique for inclusionary results has variously been called the
"mandatory percentage of moderately priced dwelling ordinance"
(MPMPD), 370 "moderately priced dwelling unit ordinance"
(MPDU),371 and simply "inclusionary zoning" or the "inclusionary or-
dinance. '3 72 These inclusionary ordinances seek to increase the supply
of low- and moderate-income housing by requiring developers to in-
clude a stipulated amount of such housing in their residential construc-
tion projects or by encouraging developers to voluntarily incorporate
such housing in their projects.3 73 Mandatory measures generally at-
tempt to compensate the developer for producing lower cost units by
granting him relaxed zoning restrictions, government subsidies, or den-
sity bonuses. Voluntary ordinances usually contain incentive zoning
provisions. 374 The most interesting feature of these ordinances is that
they generally limit the sale or rental of the designated units to low- or
moderate-income families. 375 Thus a new application of zoning for di-
rect social control arises: land users can live in specified dwelling units
on the basis of income level, a normally stable personal characteristic
explicitly identified in these ordinances. Inclusionary ordinances
"overtly intend . . . to benefit a class of persons on the basis of their
economic station in life rather than on the basis of the distinguishing
features of the land they own or occupy. ' 376
The inclusionary ordinance adopted by the Board of Supervisors
of Fairfax County, Virginia, is similar to many other regulatory efforts
in this area377 and was the first such ordinance to be subjected to litiga-
tion.378 The measure was adopted as an amendment to the municipal-
ity's zoning ordinance on June 30, 1971, and was the first measure of its
369. See H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEVIN, supra note 340, at 113-43; Comment, supra note
364, at 416-17; Note, Municipalities and the Increasing Needfor Low and Moderate Income Hous-
ing, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 408 (1971).
370. See Rose, supra note 367.
371. See Pazar, supra note 366.
372. See Kleven, supra note 367; Comment, supra note 364.
373. See Kleven, supra note 367, at 1437; Fox & Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide Low
and Moderate Cost Housing, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1015, 1028 (1976).
374. See Fox & Davis, supra note 373, at 1028.
375. See, e.g., H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEVIN, supra note 340, at 131.
376. Id at 106.
377. Other municipalities' ordinances do vary in their details. See generallyid at 131-41; Fox
& Davis, supra note 373, at 1036-65; Kleven, supra note 367, at 1439-48; ABA ADVISORY COMMIS-
SION ON HOUSING AND URBAN GROWTH, supra note 109, at 584-85; see also Pazar, supra note
366, at 253 n.2 (quoting ordinance of Cherry Hill, New Jersey).
378. See Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enters., 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d 600 (1973).
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kind to be enacted in the United States.379 It required a developer of
fifty or more dwelling units in certain zones to commit himself, before
re-zoning or site plan approval, to build at least fifteen percent of the
units as low- and moderate-income dwellings.380 The amendment fur-
ther provided that, on completion of the project, the developer could
sell the designated units only to persons of low and moderate income at
prices not exceeding governmental guidelines. 38' The scheme relied on
government housing subsidies38 2 and, in all but exceptional cases, af-
forded developers a density bonus to aid in reducing the fiscal burden
of building the low-cost units.38 3
The Virginia Supreme Court invalidated Fairfax County's inclu-
sionary ordinance in Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enterprises.384
The court found that the intention of the state's zoning enabling act
"was to permit localities to enact only traditional zoning ordinances
directed to physical characteristics and having the purpose neither to
include nor exclude any particular socio-economic group." 38 5 It con-
cluded that the Fairfax amendment improperly involved "socio-eco-
nomic zoning" and further exceeded the bounds of the enabling
legislation by seeking to "control the compensation for the use of
land. '386 The court also held that, in requiring developers to rent or
sell the designated units at "prices not fixed by a free market," the in-
clusionary scheme amounted to a taking without compensation in vio-
lation of the Virginia constitution. 387
379. See Kleven, supra note 367, at 1439. Like other zoning for direct social control, inclusio-
nary zoning is of recent origin.
380. The relevant definitions of low- and moderate-income housing were those promulgated
by the Fairfax County Housing and Redevelopment Authority and the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development. See Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enters., 214 Va. 235,
235-36, 198 S.E.2d 600, 601 (1973). For more extensive descriptions of the Fairfax County
amendment, see Kleven, supra note 367, at 1439-42; Comment, supra note 364, at 417-18.
381. See Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enters., 214 Va. 235, 236, 198 S.E.2d 600, 6Cl
(1973).
382. See Kleven, supra note 367, at 1439 & n.18.
383. See id at 1440.
384. 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d 600(1973). A companion case to DeGroffwas Board of Supervi-
sors v. Lukinson, 214 Va. 239, 198 S.E.2d 603 (1973). In a per curiam opinion the court followed
the result in DeGroff for the same reasons expressed therein. A case which considered inclusion-
ary conditions attached to a special permit for the construction of an apartment development was
Middlesex & B. St. Ry. v. Board of Aldermen, 371 Mass. 849,359 N.E.2d 1279 (1977). The Massa-
chusetts court invalidated the inclusionary condition on the basis that the board had exceeded its
statutory authority. 1d at 1284.
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The DeGroff decision has been criticized 388 and with good reason.
As this article has pointed out, all zoning has inherent socioeconomic
implications.389 The Standard Act and legislation based upon it dele-
gates power very broadly and may confer upon municipalities the full
extent of the state's police power with respect to the regulation of land
use.3 90 Commentators have noted that the socioeconomic features of
inclusionary zoning resemble those of age-restrictive ordinances which
affirmatively provide housing opportunities for the elderly,39' and
courts have usually been sympathetic to age-restrictive zoning.392 But
the extensive use of enabling legislation like Virginia's, a variation of
the Standard Act, could give DeGroff widespread influence in future
judicial appraisals of inclusionary schemes.393 The consensus of the
commentators is that inclusionary ordinances will not face an enabling
act challenge in states such as New Jersey and Pennsylvania that have a
broad conception of zoning as capable of promoting the "general wel-
fare. '394 DeGroff may reflect an archaic legal perspective: the Virginia
courts have a tradition of construing narrowly delegations of authority
from the state to local governments, thus being one of the few jurisdic-
tions still adhering to the so-called Dillon's rule.395 One commentator
388. See generally H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEVIN, supra note 340, at 138-39; ABA ADVI-
SORY COMMISSION ON HOUSING AND URBAN GROWTH, supra note 109, at 588-92; National Com-
mittee Against Discrimination in Housing and the Urban Land Institute, Fair Housing and
Exclusionary Land Use 50 (ULI Research Report 23, 1974); Comment, supra note 364, at 413;
Note, Socio-Economic Zoning: One Court'r Response, 35 U. PiTr. L. REV. 837 (1974).
389. See, eg. H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEVIN supra note 340, at 138; ABA ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON HOUSING AND URBAN GROWTH, supra note 109, at 588; Rose, supra note 110, at
323; Note, supra note 388, at 841.
390. See H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEVIN supra note 340, at 138; Note, supra note 369, at
410 nn.17 & 18.
391. See ABA ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HOUSING AND URBAN GROWTH, supra note 109, at
590-91; Pazar, supra note 366, at 261-63.
392. See supra notes 197-306 and accompanying text.
393. See Comment, supra note 364, at 418.
394. See Rose, supra note 367, at 179; Pazar, supra note 366, at 260-61; Comment, supra note
364, at 423. Of course, legislatures could amend the enabling legislation to specifically authorize
inclusionary objectives. See Rose, supra note 367, at 179; Note, supra note 388, at 842. Munici-
palities could also avoid DeGroff by basing inclusionary programs on home rule powers, a course
some local governments have followed. See H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEVIN, supra note 340,
at 138-39 ("[B]ecause of the questions raised by resting mandatory inclusionary ordinances on the
state zoning enabling laws, both the Montgomery County [Maryland] and Los Angeles ordinances
are authorized instead by the police powers granted to those communities under their home rule
charters."); see also Pazar, supra note 366, at 262 n.42 (it might be argued that inclusionary ordi-
nances are authorized in New Jersey by the state's home rule statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:48-2
(West 1967)).
395. See ABA ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HOUSING AND URBAN GROWTH, supra note 109, at
588 n.447. Dillon's Rule embodies the following proposition:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses
and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express
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has simply dismissed the decision as an "aberration. '396
Despite its idiosyncratic reading of the state enabling legisla-
tion,397 the DeGroff court conceded that "providing low and moderate
income housing serves a legitimate public purpose. '398 Other courts
have reached similar conclusions, 399 and some have even imposed an
affirmative duty to promulgate inclusionary controls. In the landmark
Mount Laurel case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that a de-
veloping municipality must "plan and provide, by its land use regula-
tions, the reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice
of housing, including, of course, low and moderate cost housing, in or-
der to meet the needs, desires and resources of all categories of people
who may desire to live within its boundaries." 4 °°
Inclusionary zoning demonstrates how governmental regulation
increasingly promotes the interests of narrow groups in society.40 1
words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly
granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and pur-
poses of the corporation,-not simply convenient, but indispensable.
1 DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448-49 (5th ed. 1911)
(emphasis in original).
396. See Note, Required Low-Income Housing in Residential Developments: Constitutional
Challenges to a Community Imposed Quota, 16 Aruz. L. REv. 439, 441 n.12 (1974).
397. The constitutional implications of inclusionary zoning with respect to the taking issue,
also raised by the DeGroff decision, have been carefully examined in other commentaries. See
e.g., Fox & Davis, supra note 373, at 1031-32; Pazar, supra note 366, at 273-75; Note, supra note
388, at 844-49; Comment, supra note 364, at 424-27. But the Virginia court did not address the
constitutional aspects of classifying the land users for inclusionary zoning. Income classification
for such zoning would easily satisfy substantive due process: providing housing for low- and
moderate income persons is a legitimate governmental goal, see Kleven, supra note 367, at 1509-
10; Comment, supra note 364, at 443-44, and inclusionary measures seem the most direct way to
accomplish this end. Moreover, inclusionary zoning impinges on no "fundamental" interest that
might trigger more aggressive substantive due process review under the Supreme Court's plurality
opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). Inclusionary zoning also war-
rants deferential equal protection appraisal. The Supreme Court has not held classifications based
on wealth alone to be suspect, see San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973), nor has the Court made access to housing a fundamental right, see Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972).
398. Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enters., 214 Va. at 237, 198 S.E.2d at 601.
399. See, e.g., Board of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Comm. in the Dep't of Community Af-
fairs, 363 Mass. 339, 384-85, 294 N.E.2d 393, 424 (1973); Kleven, supra note 367, at 1505 n.227
("There can now be no doubt about the validity of the public purpose of legislation designed to
produce housing for low and moderate income people.") (citing cases); id at 1508-10 (citing anddiscussing cases); Comment, supra note 364, at 420-21 (citing and discussing cases). Some state
legislatures have adopted anti-exclusionary legislation. See Pazar, supra note 366, at 255 n. Il
(citing and discussing statutes).
400. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 179,
336 A.2d 713, 728, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). The court subsequently
elaborated on this affirmative duty in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J.
481, 512, 371 A.2d 1192, 1207 (1977).
401. Of course, society in general benefits when all its members are housed adequately be-
cause problems such as the spread of disease and a less than fully productive workforce are
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Whether this tendency is because of the rise in political interest groups'
effectiveness, the increased complexity or balkanization of society, or
simply because governments are exploring more regulatory areas than
they did in the past is uncertain. But as a type of zoning for direct
social control, the inclusionary ordinance illustrates the increasingly
discerning intervention into the marketplace undertaken through pub-
lic control of land use.4 °2
B. Zoning with Respect to Students.
Housing for college and university students has long received spe-
cial treatment in comprehensive zoning schemes.40 3 Some of the earli-
est zoning cases involved ordinances excluding fraternity and sorority
houses from residential districts.4o4 Generally speaking, courts have
supported such zoning restrictions.4o5 One case noted that "[s]tudent
housing has been for 800 years a distinguishable subject matter for so-
cial and governmental restrictions." 4°6
Some municipalities have, however, gone beyond the simple regu-
lation of fraternity and sorority houses as land uses and adopted zoning
ordinances explicitly identifying students as a class and imposing
unique restrictions on their use of land. For example, one zoning
measure provided in part that "[n]o more than four (4) students will be
roomed in any one house."''4 7 Judging from how few reported cases
consider this type of ordinance,408 these zoning provisions are either
rare or have failed to generate much litigation.409
Arguments of density control often support the adoption of restric-
thereby alleviated. Nevertheless, like age-restrictive zoning, inclusionary ordinances appear to
confer substantial benefits on one sector of the population.
402. Review of inclusionary zoning, like review of other forms of zoning for direct social con-
trol, could benefit from fact bases analysis, presentation of a comprehensive plan, or of a plan
detailing the particular balance in housing sought by the inclusionary measure. See ABA ADVI-
SORY COMMISSION ON HOUSING AND URBAN GROWTH, supra note 109, at 587-88, 590 n.452;
Comment, supra note 364, at 428. The latter are probably always available because inclusionary
measures are usually conceived with regard to the housing situation in the rest of the community.
Thus, placing the burden of production on the municipality would also seem appropriate.
403. See generally 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, §§ 58.04-58.09 (1974).
404. See, e.g., Pettis v. Alpha Alpha Chapter of Phi Beta Pi, 115 Neb. 525, 213 N.W. 835
(1927); City of Syracuse v. Snow, 123 Misc. 568, 205 N.Y.S. 785 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
405. See 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 9, § 58.05.
406. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 367 F. Supp. 136, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aft'd, 416 U.S. I
(1974), rel'g 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973).
407. Township of Ewing v. King, 131 NJ. Super. 29, 30, 328 A.2d 242, 242 (App. Div. 1974),
rev'don other grounds, 69 NJ. 67, 350 A.2d 482 (1976); cf Provo City v. Hansen, 585 P.2d 461
(Utah 1978) (per curiam) (considering a similar ordinance).
408. See cases cited supra note 407.
409. Perhaps there is little litigation because students often have limited access to local legal
services.
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tions on student housing.410 Other arguments might include noise con-
trol, traffic control, and preservation of community character.41' A
generally unexplored question, however, is whether local governments
could zone affirmatively for direct social control with respect to stu-
dents. Would a planned community restricted to occupation by college
and university students represent a legitimate use of the local zoning
power? "[S]tudent housing, specifically as such and oriented to the
idea that students wish to live and learn together, is a matter that has
been regarded as impressed with a public interest, ' 412 and local govern-
ments have on occasion exercised powers of eminent domain and
pledged public credit to permit the construction of student housing.' 3
Thus, the public interest might well support the affirmative use of zon-
ing power for students. This group of land users have social, educa-
tional and possibly even psychological reasons for desiring to live
among their peers.414
Moreover, students have some special needs that the physical plan
of a housing development devoted to their exclusive occupation could
recognize. For one, the residents of a planned community for univer-
sity students would have an interest in being located near the institu-
tion they were attending; for another,, the physical design of the facility
might take into account the collective recreational and social interests
of this group. Conceptually, a planned community for university stu-
dents would differ little from the retirement communities considered
earlier in this article.415
Negative restrictions on student populations are also similar to
age-restrictive ordinances in that some courts have treated negative stu-
dent zoning with similar deference. For example, the court in Townsh v
410. See Township ofEwing v. King, 131 N.J. Super. 29, 31-32, 328 A.2d 242, 242 (App. Div.
1974), rev'don other grounds, 69 N.J. 67, 350 A.2d 482 (1976).
411. See supra notes 54-103 and accompanying text.
412. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 367 F. Supp. 136, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), af d, 416 U.S. 1
(1974), rev'g 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973).
413. Id.
414. See id Cf. R. NELSON, supra note 202, at 42-43 ("In fact, there are strong trends toward
greater social segregation of living patterns generally .... Some examples are 'singles' apart-
ment complexes, retirement communities, university towns for youth, and rural communes.") (em-
phasis added).
415. A planned community for university students could very well be a financially advanta-
geous land use from a municipality's viewpoint. Because university students rarely have school-
age children, a municipality could permit such a development and collect the tax revenues it
generated without fear of overburdening the local school system. From the standpoint of the local
tax base, it would be much better to house students in a private community authorized by an
appropriate zoning restriction than to have them living in a dormitory owned by a state university,
because state university property is immune from local taxation. See 16 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 44.56 (3d ed. 1979).
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of Ewing v. King416 dismissed constitutional claims against an ordi-
nance limiting the number of students allowed in any house by stating
"[z]oning ordinances are to be liberally construed in favor of the mu-
nicipality," and then relying on the traditional presumption of validity
accorded zoning417 to uphold the measure.
Such deference may not always be appropriate. Certainly regula-
tory classifications with respect to students have not been considered
"suspect" for equal protection purposes. And the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in Belle Terre suggests that the Ewing ordinance would
not trigger strict scrutiny at the federal level by violating a fundamental
right. Guarantees of fundamental rights in state constitutions have,
however, been interpreted more broadly than their counterparts in the
United States Constitution. Recent cases in California418 and New
Jersey419 have held that the freedom to choose one's domestic associ-
ates is strongly protected by privacy rights under the constitutions of
those states. Therefore, in zoning for direct social control with respect
to students, a municipality might have to demonstrate that the zoning
advanced a compelling government interest. Moreover, a court might
require a municipality to show why less restrictive means such as the
active enforcement of traffic, anti-noise, and other general police power
ordinances could not satisfy the goals sought to be achieved by limiting
the number of student roomers.420 In such an inquiry, the presentation
of fact bases-in a comprehensive plan or otherwise-would greatly
aid a court's review.
C. "Benign" Racial Zoning and Other Experiments.
This article has alluded to the efforts of some municipalities during
the early decades of this century to separate white residential neighbor-
hoods from their black counterparts by means of segregation ordi-
nances.421 Because these measures intended clearly discernible white
and black residential areas they were often called "checker-board" or-
416. 131 N.J. Super. 29, 328 A.2d 242 (App. Div. 1974), rei'don other ground, 69 NJ. 67,350
A.2d 482 (1976).
417. 131 N.J. Super. at 31, 33, 328 A.2d at 242, 244.
418. See City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539
(1980).
419. See State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 114 n.10, 405 A.2d 368, 375 n.10 (1979).
420. See Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 254, 281 A.2d 513, 520
(1971) (dictum) (traditional-family ordinance invalidated on the basis that it was too broad in its
sweep, excluding land users who did not threaten to exhibit the undesirable behavior); Larson v.
Mayor of Spring Lake Heights, 99 N.J. Super. 365, 374, 240 A.2d 31, 36 (Law Div. 1968) (munici-
pality should have enforced existing police power ordinances rather than enacting overbroad zon-
ing ordinances).
421. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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dinances. In 1962 Professor Boris Bittker considered a hypothetical
case in which the imaginary Town of New Harmony, Illinois, enacted a
checker-board ordinance designating all residential lots within the mu-
nicipality alternately as "white" and "black." 422 Only whites could ac-
quire and occupy a "white" lot, and only blacks could hold an interest
in the property beside it. The difference between this checker-board
ordinance and those of an earlier time was that New Harmony's meas-
ure was intended to promote racial integration, not segregation: New
Harmony's ordinance posited that if whites and blacks were not legally
compelled to live side by side, the two races would tend to live apart.
Shortly after Bittker created the "benevolent" checker-board ordi-
nance, another commentator created a different hypothetical case, this
time involving an "integration ordinance. '423 In this hypothetical, the
City of Bayside imposed on publicly assisted housing an occupancy ra-
tio allotting seventy percent of the homes to whites and thirty percent
to blacks. The ratio was imposed to avoid the "tipping point," the the-
oretical "point at which a rising proportion of nonwhites will cause
whites to abandon an area, '424 thereby thwarting the goal of racial
integration.
The hypothetical Bayside ordinance, or something very much like
it, was nearly adopted in Oak Park, Illinois, in 1973.425 The Oak Park
measure proposed creating a racially integrated community.426 To this
end, the amendment to the municipality's Fair Housing Ordinance
would have made it unlawful to sell any real estate in a designated area
to a black person if thirty percent or more of the block, as defined in
the regulation, was occupied by blacks.427 Furthermore, in multiple
family dwellings of a certain size, the regulation would have made it
422. See Bittker, The Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations,
71 YALn LJ. 1387 (1962).
423. See Note, he Integration Ordinance: Honi Soit Qui Mal Y Pense, 17 STAN. L. REv. 280
(1965).
424. Id. at 282 n.14.
425. See Note, he Use ofRacialHousing Quotas to Achieve Integrated Communities: The Oak
ParkAplproach, 6 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 164 (1975). The municipality ultimately rejected the housing
quota approach in favor of a more broad-ranging plan. Id. at 166. The Oak Park measure was
not technically a zoning ordinance. See id. at 164 n.3. It did, however, designate permitted land
uses and their locations and thus functioned as a zoning regulation.
426. See id. at 165. Apparently blacks were moving into the eastern part of the municipality,
and a possibility existed that, with white flight, the area would become entirely black. The pro-
posed measure sought to avoid this result. Id. at 165 n.4.
427. The material provision read as follows:
24-1/2.10.3Limitation on Sales in DesignatedArea. It shall be unlawful for any seller or
any agent for any seller to knowingly sell any real property to a black person on any
block in the designated area if thirty (30%) percent or more of the block between two
intersecting streets on both sides of the street has been occupied by black persons.
Quoted in id. at 164 n.3.
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unlawful to rent a unit to a black person if thirty percent or more of the
units had been rented to blacks.428 The proposal charged the munici-
pality's Community Relations Department with "locat[ing] comparable
housing ... in other areas of the Village of Oak Park" for any black
person prevented from buying or renting accommodations in the mu-
nicipality because of the amendment. 429
Racial quotas to achieve integration in housing have received wide
attention in the professional literature.430 Programs affirmatively seek-
ing racial balance in housing through ceiling quotas, including integra-
tion ordinances, rely on the basic premise that integrated housing is
good431 and is legitimately pursued through quota schemes. This argu-
ment could distinguish integration ordinances from the segregation or-
dinance struck down in Buchanan v. Warley432  or the racially-
restrictive covenants that courts were prohibited from enforcing in
Shelley v. Kraemer433 because the ultimate goal of integration ordi-
nances-integration and racial balance-is desirable, whereas the
Buchanan and Shelley measures were aimed at preserving undesirable
428. The wording of this provision was as follows:
24-1/2.10.4 Rentals in DesignatedArea. It shall be unlawful for any owner or any agent
for an owner to knowingly rent any apartment in a multiple family dwelling of four or
more units in the designated area to a black person if 30% or more of the multiple family
dwellings in the building have been rented to or have been occupied by black persons.
This section shall not apply to the renewal of an existing lease.
Quoted in id. at 164 n.3.
429. Id. (quoting proposed ordinance).
430. See, ag., Ackerman, Integrationfor Subsidized Housing and the Question of Racial Occu-
pancy Controls, 26 STAN. L. Rav. 245 (1974); Bittker, supra note 422; Hellerstein, The Benign
Quota, Equal Protection, and "he Rule in Shelley's Case," 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 531 (1963);
Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World- Equalityfor the Negro-The Problem of Special Treat-
ment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363 (1966); Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How. L.J. 30
(1960); Developments in the Law-EqualProtection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1104-32 (1969); Note,
The Benign Housing Quota A Legitimate Weapon to Fight White Fight and Resulting Segregated
Communities?, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 891 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Benign Housing
Quota]; Note, supra note 425; Note, Racial and Ethnic Quotas: The Tpping Phenomenon in Otero
v. New York City Housing Authority, 4 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Racial and Ethnic Quotas]; Note, supra note 423.
431. There is support for the view that integration in housing is in the public interest. See
Linnark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1977) ("This Court has ex-
pressly recognized that substantial benefits flow to both whites and blacks from interracial associa-
tion and that Congress has made a strong national commitment to promote integrated housing.")
(citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972)); VJ. Kaplan, supra note 430,
at 389 n.54 ("One's advocacy of the benign quota is of course determined by the relative priority
he gives to integration and to the benefit which will be denied those Negroes in excess of the
quota."). Integration in housing may bring such benefits as integration in schools. See, e.g., G.
MULLER EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 12 (1972); Note, supra note 423, at 281. But housing integration
may also cause problems such as less political power for the minority. See Kaplan, supra note
430, at 397-98.
432. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
433. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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racial inequality.434 An argument of this type might well refute an at-
tack alleging that an integration ordinance was not authorized by the
relevant enabling legislation.435 The typical enabling act authorizes the
regulation of land use to promote the "general welfare"; the laudable
goal of achieving integrated housing seems to fall within the scope of
this power.
The inevitable constitutional challenge would present a more diffi-
cult problem. Race has long been a suspect classification, 436 and thus
integration ordinances would receive strict scrutiny pursuant to the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Under such
scrutiny the municipality would have to demonstrate that the regula-
tion furthered a compelling state interest and was the least restrictive
method of accomplishing that goal:4 37 a difficult proposition given the
uncertainty over the percentage of minority representation that will
cause a dwelling district to "tip" toward segregation.438 Furthermore,
integration ordinances generally involve "ceiling" rather than "access"
quotas. Access quotas, such as the one considered in the Bakke case,4 39
are supposedly "benign" because they directly benefit a minority group
with a history of societal discrimination. In contrast, a ceiling quota
requires members of the disadvantaged minority to bear the burden of
achieving integrated housing.440 "Indeed," write the authors of one
commentary, "the opinions in Bakke suggest that the Court might not
be sympathetic to the use of 'benign' ceiling quotas."'4
434. See Bittker, supra note 422, at 1392, 1393-95; Hellerstein, supra note 430, at 536-41. But
cf. Note, supra note 425, at 168 (suggesting that Buchanan, Shelley and Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967), "indicate that the Court will invalidate actions by the state which make racial
distinctions the basis for access or non-access to housing").
435. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 157 Fla. 342,25 So. 2d 860 (1946) (segregation ordinance); State
v. Darnell, 166 N.C. 300, 81 S.E. 338 (1914) (segretation ordinance).
436. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
437. Cf Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 430, at 1106 ("The traditional
standard of review of such classifications would require that the state demonstrate an overriding
justification for the use of racial distinctions and show that the purpose of the action could not be
accomplished by a non-racially focused alternative.") (footnote omitted).
438. See Note, Racial and Ethnic Quotas, supra note 430, at 14; Note, Benign Quotas-Fair
Housing -Affrmative Action Permits the Granting of Preference to Whites in Admission to Public
Housing to Insure Racial Integration, 20 WAYNE L. REv. 1109, 1125-26 (1974).
439. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), involved the validity of a
quota system used to increase the number of minority students entering the University of Califor-
nia at Davis Medical School.
440. See Rubinowitz & Trosman, Affirmative Action and the American Dream: Implementing
Fair Housing Policies in Federal Homeownershiv Programs, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 491, 565 (1979);
Note, The Benign Housing Quota, supra note 430, at 900.
441. See Rubinowitz & Trosman, supra note 440, at 559 n.258.
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Obviously benign racial quotas of either type raise a multitude of
difficult legal and social issues. To incorporate a quota scheme into a
zoning ordinance, a local governing body would have to believe in the
value of integrated housing with sufficient fervor to accept the public
criticism and legal attacks inevitably attending the adoption of such a
measure. A desire to avoid such repercussions probably contributed to
the Village of Oak Park's eventual retreat from its proposed integration
ordinance.442 Nevertheless, the integration ordinance remains a poten-
tial application of zoning for direct social control.
If a municipality adopted an inclusionary racial ordinance, it
would be pursuing the wholly ideological objective of integration in
housing. Clearly, the goals articulated during the period of the devel-
opment of New York City's building zone resolution have given way
to, or at least have been joined by, a plethora of more ideological objec-
tives. This shift in objectives is particularly apparent in traditional-
family ordinances and age-restrictive zoning. Some would argue that
the ideological concerns furthered by these two examples of zoning for
direct social control involve little more than petty residential prefer-
ences not deserving of legislative recognition. But with inclusionary
zoning and integration ordinances, zoning for direct social control
seeks to further ideological goals that lie at the heart of the American
value-system and that are vitally "involved in creating an environment
suitable for democratic living."443
This article has not identified all the possible applications of zon-
ing for direct social control. Other instances of this sort of land use
regulation have already arisen and new manifestations will continue to
appear. An example appears in Robert Nelson's description of how the
artists of SoHo, a neighborhood in New York City, preserved the char-
acter of their community.444 In SoHo, artists have converted old man-
ufacturing lofts to serve their needs. But a large number of relatively
442. Oak Park ultimately developed a wide-ranging community plan for racial integration
with a number of alternatives to ceiling quotas. This integration plan is discussed in Note, supra
note 425, at 182-83. One of the more interesting proposals of the integration plan involved the
adoption of an "equity assurance program": the municipality would guarantee homeowners
against any devaluation of their property below a certain proportion of appraised value. This
assurance would help stabilize the occupancy of a neighborhood insofar as homeowners would no
longer move because of a fear that integration would depress property values. 'See id. at 182. The
plan also called for a community-wide "orientation program" directed at all persons seeking hous-
ing in the community involving seminars, media advertising, and the mandatory distribution of
printed material through the housing industry. "This orientation would be intended to make the
individual examine his own housing decision so that his selection might further the Village's
goals." Id. at 183.
443. Williams, supra note 177, at 319.
444. See R. NELSON, supra note 202, at 15.
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wealthy New Yorkers who evidently like to live among artists
threatened to innundate the area. The resulting increase in rent levels
would ultimately have forced out the legitimate artists. Not about to
let SoHo go the way of Greenwich Village, the artists in 1971 "per-
suaded the New York City government to establish an Artists Certifica-
tion Committee that would certify applicants as professional artists and
then to make such certification a zoning requirement for SoHo resi-
dency."4" 5 This is a fascinating example of the importance the identity
of land users may have in shaping the character of a neighborhood.
The City of Long Beach, New York, appeared concerned with the
identity of certain land users for less praiseworthy reasons when, in
1973, it adopted an ordinance amending its municipal code with re-
spect to the operation and occupancy of hotels, boarding houses and
rooming houses. A federal district court subsequently reviewing the
ordinance noted that it dealt with, "[i]n substance, . . the registration
of the mentally il.''446 Among other things, the measure provided that
"[tlhose patients requiring continuous medical or psychiatric services
shall not be registered," and that "certain personal records shall be
maintained for any person registered and remaining in excess of fifteen
days."4 4 7 Although the court found the ordinance unconstitutional, the
case provides a striking example of how discerning a municipality may
become in identifying land users in a local regulation." 8
V. CONCLUSION
Zoning for direct social control represents a double departure from
more traditional zoning efforts. First, such ordinances go beyond the
mere governance of the physical aspects of the urban environment and
seek to regulate the users of land in residential districts. Second, not
only do these ordinances frequently attempt to promote more amor-
phous goals involving the preservation of community character and
aesthetics, but in many instances they pursue ideological concerns. It
is, indeed, ironic that one commentator was moved to write as early as
1927, "the conclusion is forced upon us that the police power has been
extended until the limits upon the power, as generally conceived, no
445. Id.
446. Stoner v. Miller, 377 F. Supp. 177, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). Technically speaking, the ordi-
nance was not a zoning measure but, rather, a hotel and boarding house regulation. However, in
identifying certain persons and restricting their use of specified dwelling types, the ordinance bore
a close resemblance to zoning for direct social control.
447. Id.
448. The court held that the ordinance both infringed on the fundamental rights of travel and
privacy and was overly vague. See id. at 180-81.
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longer exist."449 Particularly with respect to zoning for direct social
control, this assertion overstates the case today. Clearly the federal and
state constitutions continue to impose limitations, even if constitutional
guarantees adjust to new public needs.450 The statutes that delegate
zoning power to the municipalities from the state legislatures are also a
restraining influence. Determining how these various limitations
should be applied to ensure that zoning for direct social control does
not become abusive but remains sensitive to the competing values in-
volved poses a difficult problem.
Whenever land use is regulated, important interests clash: "protec-
tion of the individual confronts utilitarian goals of provision for the
general welfare."'451 There is, moreover, the interest of a municipality
in determining its own destiny. In the landmark zoning case of Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. ,452 the Supreme Court noted that a sep-
arate municipality has the "authority to govern itself as it sees fit."'453
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,454 the Court reaffirmed that a com-
munity has a "right to define its own character and values."455 There
are several reasons why municipalities should retain a good deal of lo-
cal autonomy. For one thing, the affection for local democracy at a
"grass roots" level is deeply embedded in American political ideol-
ogy. 456 It is often said that local decisionmaking is more responsive to
local needs, 45 7 and that government at the local level provides greater
public access to government, affording an opportunity for increased cit-
izen participation. 458 Furthermore, local autonomy permits local gov-
449. N. BAKER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ZONING 26 (1927).
450. See E. FREUND, supra note 104, § 21; A. BETTMAN, Is Housing A Public Use?, in CITY
AND REGIONAL PLANNING PAPERS, supra note 99, at 87; Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 268-
69, 225 N.E.2d 749, 752, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22, 26 (1967).
451. J. DIMENTO, THE CONSISTENCY DOCTRINE AND THE LIMITs OF PLANNING at xv (1980).
452. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
453. Id. at 389.
454. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
455. See Developments in the Lan-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1180
(1977); cf. Lupu, supra note 192, at 1053 ("[I]t has been a constant tenet of American constitu-
tional tradition that, outside the realms of thought, expression, religion and conscience, the polit-
ical agencies of the community may define the limits of acceptable human enterprise. Belle Terre
is consistent with that tradition.") (footnote omitted).
456. See, ag., Sandalow, supra note 334, at 709-10; Silverman, Housing for .411 Under Law:
The Limits of Legalist Reform,.27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 99, 144 (1979).
457. See, eg., Sandalow, supra note 334, at 710; Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and
Federalism, supra note 455, at 1180; Note, Land Use Regulation, the Federal Courts, and the .4b-
stention Doctrine, 89 YALE L.J. 1134, 1141 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Land Use Regulation];
Note, The Constitutionaliy of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J 896, 900 (1970).
458. See supra authorities cited in note 457; cf. 1 J. METZENBAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING at v
(2d ed. 1955):
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ernments to act as laboratories for experimentation in social policy.459
The ability of localities to develop policies responsive to their own
unique needs has the beneficial result of promoting diversity.460 Ulti-
mately, individuals have a greater opportunity to choose a community
particularly suited to their personal needs and preferences when local
governments can formulate independent policy responses to commu-
nity issues.461 For example, local age-restrictive land use controls pro-
vide a citizen with the choice of living in an age-integrated or an age-
homogeneous environment, a choice that might not otherwise be
available.462
There are also persuasive counterarguments. Largely because of
the smaller unit of government involved, the political process in local
decisionmaking may be inferior to the political processes at the state or
federal levels. 463 This observation echoes the argument of Federalist X
a smaller society is more likely to have a homogeneous population with
a clearly identifiable majority and, with fewer interests being brought
to bear on a given issue, it is more likely that the majority will success-
fully disregard the interests of the minority.464 In addition, local gov-
It [zoning] has helped to restore the original concept of the American form of govern-
ment-the Town Meeting theory-for, unlike changes in the average law which are
voted by those in authority with no specific notice to those affected, zoning changes may
not-generally-be made without actual or constructive notice to all those affected
within the neighborhood, with an opportunity to be heard.
459. See, e.g., Sandalow, supra note 334, at 719; Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and
Federalism, supra note 455, at 1180; Note, Land Use Regulation, supra note 457, at 1141. In this
regard, Professor Tribe has pointed out that traditional-family ordinances might be viewed as
courageous social experiments in light of the increasing prevalence of alternative domestic as-
sociations. See L. TFIBE, supra note 171, at 989.
460. See Note, The Constitutionality fLocal Zoning, supra note 457, at 900 ("A significant
benefit derived from local responsiveness and flexibility is diversity."); Developments in the La--
Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 455, at 1180:
This conception of political decentralization as the key to the preservation of diversity
and of government attuned to local values and problems has been considered particu-
larly compelling in the United States, given the political and cultural heterogeneity of
the American people and the traditional focus on the community as the center of polit-
ical and social life.
461. See Note, The Constitutionality ofLocal Zoning, supra note 457, at 900 ("Many decisions
have primarily local significance, yet must be made by all communities. Giving each community
power to order its own consumption choices from the common menu not only encourages innova-
tion and experimentation, but also allows individuals a greater opportunity to satisfy their own
preferences."). Specialization among municipalities may enhance economic efficiency as well. See
R. ELLICKSON & A.D. TARLOCK, supra note 53, at 811-13 (discussion of Tiebout Hypothesis).
462. See Travalio, supra note 123, at 319-20.
463. See Bruff,.supra note 334, at 671-72; Sandalowsupra note 334, at 7 10-12; Note, Land Use
Regulation, supra note 457, at 1151-52.
464. See THE FEDERALIST No.10, at 83 (J. Madison) (New Am. Lib. ed. 1961), quotedin Bruff,
supra note 334, at 672.
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests
composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a ma-
jority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing
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ernmental structure lacks "complicated checks and balances" and
"clear structural separations of power," perhaps creating a greater risk
of abusive action.465 The possibility that municipal actions will have
extraterritorial effects and the inadequacy of procedural safeguards
have also been cited as justifications for judicial supervision of local
actions.466 Finally, local land use decisionmakers may be less informed
than those at the state level.467
Factors unrelated to local competence also dictate in favor of a
more circumspect use of zoning for direct social control. Such zoning
could seriously interfere with the interest individuals have in living
with domestic associates of their own choosing. For example, in Belle
Terre the village's zoning ordinance recognized the interest of tradi-
tional families in associating with their own kind and thus, concep-
tually speaking, their personal interest was in harmony with the value
of local autonomy. In contrast, the village's ordinance did not recog-
nize and, in fact, interfered with the associational interests of the six
unrelated university students who wished to live together in the vil-
lage.468 Moreover, the values embodied in a particular zoning ordi-
nance exercising direct social control may compete with the desirable
goal of affording all sectors of the population a reasonable opportunity
to obtain housing in the area. An ordinance authorizing a retirement
community, for instance, might contribute to the exclusion of low- and
moderate-income familes with children from the municipality.
This article has discussed these competing values. How should a
reviewing court deal with them in a sensitive manner when the validity
of a direct social control zoning ordinance is challenged? A rather en-
ergetic, but not prohibitive form of judicial review is probably appro-
priate. Zoning of this type represents a novel use of local power and,
a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily
will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.
Cf. Makielski, Zoning: Legal Theory andPoliticalPractice, 45 J. URB. L. 1, 22 (1967) (The zoning
system "has the effect of reinforcing and protecting middle-class economic and social values while
providing little or no opportunity for underrepresented groups to find expression or recognition.").
465. See Bruff, supra note 334, at 672-73.
466. See id. at 671, 673.
467. See Note, Land Use Regulation, supra note 457, at 1151.
468. These interests, although similar, were competing. See City of Chula Vista v. Pagard,
115 Cal. App. 3d 785, 796, 171 Cal. Rptr. 738, 743 (1981) (discussion of competing rights of pri-
vacy); cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 171, at 977 (1978) ("Two claims of association are at stake [in Belle
Terre]-that of the students, wishing to live with one another in their preferred way in the village,
and that of the great majority of the village's inhabitants, wishing to preserve the integrity of their
preferred associational form as a community of traditional families") (footnote omitted);
Michelman, supra note 144, at 196-97 (discussion of "community-self-determination type of pub-
lic-interest model of legitimacy"). Belle Terre's mayor claimed that with its opinion the Supreme
Court recognized a "community's right to privacy." M. DANIELSON, supra note 12, at 183-84.
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because it identifies land users, may be particularly subject to prejudi-
cial manipulation.469 This article has suggested several means of re-
view that would prevent abuses yet provide municipalities with
substantial leeway to experiment. Fact bases tests, comprehensive plan
requirements, the availability of alternative housing sites, and the ad-
justment of the presumption of validity and burdens of proof are all
possible tools. By appropriate use of one or more of these tools, the
responsibility for planning policy can remain with local governments to
a larger degree than would be possible under more rigorous forms of
substantive review.
In accordance with these principles, for example, a court would
probably not hold on the basis of Moore470 that age-restrictive zoning is
unconstitutional as applied to the elderly excluded from a retirement
community because of the youth of one or more of the members of
their family.471 Within the confines of the facts, a court could empha-
size the limited geographic scope of the retirement community and
point to reasonably comparable housing alternatives in the municipal-
ity in rejecting the claim. By way of further illustration, a court could
uphold a traditional-family ordinance, although perhaps not so readily
as some courts have in the past, if suitable alternative housing existed
for so-called "voluntary" families and if the municipality could articu-
late its goals and perhaps come forward with some empirical basis for
passing such an ordinance. In any event, if a reviewing court must
overturn a traditional-family ordinance, it should strive to do so on the
grounds that the statutory mandate has been exceeded, not on the
grounds that a constitutional guarantee has been violated.
Zoning for direct social control is a recent and growing innova-
tion. Courts will no doubt be increasingly called on to draw the line
between reasonable and unfair restrictions of this sort. This article has
suggested the attitude with which courts might properly approach zon-
ing for direct social control. By and large, no attempt has been made to
pass judgment categorically on the appropriateness of any particular
instance of this type of zoning. Such a judgment would ignore the flex-
ible attitude advocated, whereby such zoning ordinances receive
enough deference that, given reasonably supportive factual circum-
stances, many of them can be allowed to stand. This approach respects
the competing values often presented by zoning for direct social con-
469. Cf. Bruff, supra note 334, at 688 ("There is reason for greater caution, however, in up-
holding local assertion of powers that are novel or that, however exercised, have a special capacity
for abuse.") (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 701.
470. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality).
471. But see Doyle, supra note 184, at 89-97.
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trol. The devices and concepts accompanying this approach could aid
courts in setting a steady course between judicial activism and judicial
self-restraint.

